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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  Denial of nonprofessional weapons permit.  U.S. Const. amend. II;
Iowa Const. art. I, §1, 6 (1857); Iowa Const. art. I, § 1 (amend. 45); Iowa Code §§ 724.4, 724.7,
724.8, 724.11 (2001).  Section 724.11, which provides the ninety-nine county sheriffs with
discretion to issue nonprofessional weapons permits to individuals residing in their counties,
does not facially offend the state constitutional guarantee to defend life and liberty and protect
property.  Section 724.11 does not implicate a violation of the state constitutional guarantee to
equal protection of the law.  (Kempkes to Boddicker, State Representative, 10-2-01) #01-10-1
The Honorable Dan Boddicker
State Representative 
State Capitol
LOCAL
Dear Representative Boddicker:
Historically, state governments have regulated the carrying of weapons by individuals.  79
Am. Jur. 2d Weapons & Firearms § 7, at 12 (1975); see 1920 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 629, 630.  Not
long after the Civil War, the General Assembly passed a statute permitting the carrying of
concealed weapons only by police officers and those persons having the duty to execute
processes or warrants or to make arrests.  See Iowa Code § 3879 (1873).  Just before World War
I, the General Assembly enacted the first comprehensive statute governing weapons.  Among
other things, the General Assembly vested the county sheriff with discretion to issue a permit to a
person wishing to carry a concealed revolver, pistol, or pocket billy.  See 1913 Iowa Acts, 35th
G.A., ch. 297, § 3.
You have requested an opinion on the constitutionality of the current version of this
statute, which provides that each county sheriff has discretion to issue “nonprofessional weapons
permits” to individuals desiring to carry weapons.  Pointing to the possibility that Iowa’s ninety-
nine sheriffs in the exercise of their discretion might not use the same criteria for issuing such
permits, you ask whether the statute offends the state constitution.  Your letter, however, narrows
this broad question to whether the statute offends the guarantees to equal protection of the law
and to defend life and liberty and protect property.   
I.  Applicable law
Iowa Code chapter 724 (2001) is entitled Weapons.  Section 724.4 criminalizes the act of
carrying weapons:
(1).  Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person
who goes armed with a dangerous weapon concealed on or about
the person, or who, within the limits of any city, goes armed with a
pistol or revolver, or any loaded firearm of any kind, whether
concealed or not, or who knowingly carries or transports in a
vehicle a pistol or revolver, commits an aggravated misdemeanor.
. . . .
(4).  [Subsection 1 does] not apply to . . . 
. . . .
(i).  A person who has in the person's possession
and who displays to a peace officer on demand a valid permit to
carry weapons which has been issued to the person, and whose
conduct is within the limits of that permit. . . .
Sections 724.7, 724.8, and 724.11 govern issuance of nonprofessional weapons permits:
Any person who can reasonably justify going armed may be
issued a nonprofessional permit to carry weapons. 
Iowa Code § 724.7. 
No person shall be issued a . . . nonprofessional permit to
carry weapons unless:
(1).  The person is eighteen years of age or older.
(2).  The person has never been convicted of a felony.
(3).  The person is not addicted to the use of alcohol or any
controlled substance.
(4).  The person has no history of repeated acts of violence.
(5).  The issuing officer reasonably determines that the
applicant does not constitute a danger to any person.
(6).  The person has never been convicted of any crime
defined in chapter 708, except “assault” as defined in section 708.1
and “harassment” as defined in section 708.7.
Iowa Code § 724.8 (emphasis added).
Applications for permits to carry weapons shall be made to
the sheriff of the county in which the applicant resides.
Applications from persons who are nonresidents of the state, or
whose need to go armed arises out of employment by the state,
shall be made to the commissioner of public safety.  In either case,
the issuance of the permit shall be by and at the discretion of the
sheriff or commissioner, who shall, before issuing the permit,
determine that the requirements of sections 724.6 to 724.10 have
been satisfied. . . .
Iowa Code § 724.11 (emphasis added).
II.  Analysis
You have suggested that section 724.11 offends the state constitution.  We, like a court,
have a limited review in determining the constitutionality of statutes:
It is fundamental that the [General Assembly] has the power to
legislate on all subjects, unless it is expressly or impliedly
prohibited from so doing by the Constitution, and the [statute] 
which is assailed must be plainly at variance with the Constitution
before the court will so declare it.  All doubtful questions will be
resolved in favor of [its] validity . . . .
Shaw v. City Council of Marshalltown, 131 Iowa 128, 104 N.W. 1121, 1124 (1905).
The challenger to a statute such as section 724.11 bears the burden to negate every
conceivable basis supporting its constitutionality and to show that the statute violates the
constitution beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Keene, 629 N.W.2d 360, 364 (Iowa 2001); Iowa
Dept. of Transp. v. Iowa Dist. Court, 592 N.W.2d 41, 43 (Iowa 1999).
(A)
You assert that individuals have three options in protecting themselves in cases of assault: 
 “escape; passive acceptance; or active response, without any tools or with tools (weapons).” 
You also assert that section 724.11 impinges upon the third option of an individual who applies
for, but does not receive, a nonprofessional weapons permit.  You imply that the General
Assembly cannot pass such a law, because an individual has an absolute right to keep and bear
arms under the state constitution.
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[a] well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”  U.S. Const. amend. II.  This language does not create a
right on the part of individuals to keep and bear arms.  United States v. Nelsen, 859 F.2d 1318,
1320 (8th Cir. 1988); Olympic Arms v. Magaw, 91 F. Supp.2d 1061, 1071 (E.D. Mich. 2000). 
See generally Annot., “Right to Bear Arms,” 37 A.L.R.Fed. 696, 701 (1978).  Similarly, our state
constitution does not expressly recognize an individual right to keep and bear arms.  Kopel,
Cramer & Hattrup, “A Tale of Three Cities:  the Right to Bear Arms in State Supreme Courts,”
68 Temp. L. Rev. 1177, 1177 & n. 13 (1995).  With regard to arms, the state constitution
provides only that “[t]he militia of this state . . . shall be armed, equipped, and trained, as the
[General Assembly] may provide by law” and that “[n]o person or persons conscientiously
scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to do military duty in time of peace . . . .”  Iowa
Const. art. VI, §§ 1, 2. 
You suggest, however, that an individual right to keep and bear arms may inhere in
another provision of the state constitution:  “All men and women are, by nature, free and equal,
and have certain inalienable rights – among which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and
happiness.”  Iowa Const. art. I, § 1 (amend. 45) (emphasis added). 
We do not believe, however, that the words “defend” (life and liberty) or “protect”
(property) presuppose an individual right to keep and bear arms.  Nothing in their common
meanings necessarily implicates the keeping and bearing of arms.  See Black’s Law Dictionary
419 (1991); Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 294, 919 (1979).  As you acknowledge,
persons may certainly defend life and liberty and protect property without resorting to arms.  We
have previously indicated that persons protect their property by resorting to the legal system.  See
1976 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 451, 452, 453 (right of individual to protect property “is a basic
inviolable right” that is “protected by affording individuals the right to due process of law, and
equal protection of the laws”). 
Even if there were a state constitutional right on the part of an individual to keep and bear
arms, the State can impose reasonable regulations upon it.  Rights, though inalienable, are
“subject . . . to such reasonable regulations as the peace, comfort and welfare of society may
demand.”  State v. Osborne, 171 Iowa 678, 154 N.W. 294, 300 (1915).  Accord Gibb v. Hansen,
286 N.W.2d 180, 185 (Iowa 1979).  As legal historians have explained, no constitutional right in
England or America “was absolute in the modern sense, that is, unqualifiable.”  W. Nelson & R.
Palmer, Constitution and Rights in the Early American Republic 66 (1987).  Qualification of
rights “was merely the realization of the rights of others in society.”  Id.  See Des Moines Joint
Stock Land Bk. v. Nordholm, 217 Iowa 1319, 253 N.W. 701, 727 (1934) (Claussen, C.J.,
dissenting).  Iowa’s judiciary reached this realization quite some time ago.  See In re Ruth, 32
Iowa 250, 252-53 (1871).
We conclude that the state constitutional guarantee to the inalienable right to defend life
and liberty and protect property does not prohibit the State from reasonably regulating the
carrying of weapons.  See Annot., “Gun Control -- State Constitutions,” 86 A.L.R.4th 931, 937
(1991) (state constitutional guarantees to keep and bear arms generally interpreted to grant right
“that is limited rather than absolute”).  Cf. 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons & Firearms § 4, at 8, (1975)
(common law did not recognize absolute right to keep and bear arms).  Were it otherwise,
children, ex-felons, or prisoners could go about carrying weapons and anyone could carry sawed-
off shotguns, AK-47s, or machine guns.  We also conclude that requiring a permit to carry a
weapon constitutes reasonable regulation. 
(B)
You have indicated that section 724.11 may offend the state constitutional guarantee to
equal protection of the law on the basis that it may treat persons differently depending upon the
county in which they reside.  See generally Iowa Const. art. I, § 6; In re Morrow, 616 N.W.2d
544, 547 (Iowa 2000).  Case law from other jurisdictions points to a different conclusion.  See
Mecikalski v. Wyoming Att’y Gen., 2 P.3d 1039, 1046-47 (Wy. 2000); San Jose Police Officers
Ass’n. v. City of San Jose, 245 Cal.Rptr. 728, 733 (App. 1988); City of Cape Girardeau v. Joyce,
884 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Mo. App. 1994).  Any equal-protection argument attacking the county-by-
county determination sanctioned by section 724.11 suffers from at least three flaws.  
First:  To maintain a prima facie case, challengers to section 724.11 must show that a
recognizable, distinct class has been singled out for different treatment under the law.  See, e.g.,
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493, 97 S. Ct. 1272, 51 L. Ed. 2d 498 (1977).  
Section 724.11 does not, on its face, create any class or classes of people.  At the very
most, by allowing the sheriff in each county to decide whether to issue a nonprofessional
weapons permit, it creates the possibility that applicants may receive different treatment from
county to county.  In an analogous case, Shackleford v. Catlett, 244 S.E.2d 327, 330 (W. Va.
1978), a court found no violation of equal protection in considering a statute that permitted each
county court in the state to elect against subscribing to a worker compensation fund.  An
employee of a county court electing against subscription asserted a violation of equal protection
on the ground that employees of other county courts, which had subscribed to the fund, received
worker compensation benefits.  The court held that the equal protection guarantee only
encompassed the employees of a single county court and did not require equal treatment of all
employees of all county courts.  What happened in other counties had no relevancy to the
question of equal protection.  
We thus disagree that unsuccessful applicants residing in one county can maintain an
equal-protection action premised upon the treatment accorded applicants residing in other
counties.  
Second:  To establish a prima facie case, unsuccessful applicants would also have to
show that they and the successful applicants from other counties constitute “similarly situated”
classes under the law.  See In re Morrow, 616 N.W.2d at 547; Klinger v. Nebraska Dep’t of
Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1185 (1995). 
Issuing or denying a permit will involve an assessment of the facts and conditions
peculiar to a geographic area.  No two counties are alike -- their differing crime rates and
differing demographics may have an impact on the decision to issue nonprofessional weapons
permits.  See Galvan v. Superior Court, 452 P.2d 930, 938 (Cal. 1969) (“[t]hat problems with
firearms are likely to require different treatment in San Francisco County than in Mono County
should require no elaborate citation of authority”).  We recently observed in analogous
circumstances: 
Our state commonly makes classifications according to
geography that result in different treatment.  Depending on where
we are or where we live, we may have very different rights. . . .
[T]here is no rule that counties, as counties, must be
treated alike; the Equal Protection Clause relates to
equal protection of the laws “between persons as
such rather than between areas. . . .  A State, of
course, has a wide discretion in deciding whether
laws should operate statewide or shall operate only
in certain counties, the legislature “having in mind
the needs and desires of each.”  
2000 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. ___ (#00-2-1) (citation omitted).  Similarly, the United States
Supreme Court has observed:
Each State has the right to make political subdivisions of its
territory for municipal purposes, and to regulate their local
government.
. . .  The Fourteenth Amendment does not profess to secure
to all persons in the United States the benefit of the same laws and
the same remedies.  Great diversities in these respects may exist in
two States separated only by an imaginary line. . . .  If diversities of
laws . . . may exist in the several States without violating the
equality clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no solid
reason why there may not be such diversities in different parts of
the same State.  
Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 30-31, 31-32, 25 L.E. 989 (1879).  
We thus conclude that unsuccessful applicants residing in one county likely cannot show
that they and successful applicants from other counties constitute “similarly situated” classes. 
See Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 552, 74 S. Ct. 280, 98 L. Ed. 281 (1954) (when
territorial differences exist, “[t]erritorial uniformity is not a constitutional requisite”).
Third:  That a county sheriff might erroneously deny issuing a nonprofessional weapons
permit in a given case does not transform such a simple and common instance of decision-
making into a violation of equal protection.  See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,
565, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 145 L. Ed. 1060 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).  One federal appeals court
has observed that “[t]he concept of equal protection is trivialized when it is used to subject every
decision made by state or local government to constitutional review . . . .”  Indiana St. Teachers
Ass’n v. Indianapolis Bd. of School Comm’rs, 101 F.3d 1179, 1181 (7  Cir. 1996).th
We seriously doubt that an unsuccessful applicant for a nonprofessional weapons permit
can maintain an equal-protection action based solely upon a faulty decision by the county sheriff. 
See New Burnham Prairie Homes, Inc. v. Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1481 (7  Cir. 1990), cert.th
denied, 498 U.S. 1039 (1991) (discrimination based merely on individual rather than group
reasons will not suffice to maintain a claim of unequal treatment); Hayden v. Grayson, 134 F.3d
449, 454 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 953 (1998) (same).  Were it otherwise, every
unsuccessful applicant for a governmental permit, license, contract, or job to assert “that the
decision was arbitrary and an arbitrary decision treats likes as unlike and therefore denies the
equal protection of the laws.”  Indiana St. Teachers Ass’n v. Indianapolis Bd. of School
Comm’rs, 101 F.3d at 1181.  
Finally, we point out that the lack of an equal-protection basis for challenging decisions
by county sheriffs does not insulate them from judicial review.  Section 724.11 requires county
sheriffs to exercise discretion, and unsuccessful applicants may use that requirement as a basis
for challenging the denial of a nonprofessional weapons permit.  As we have previously
explained, if a county sheriff 
would categorically refuse or deny the issuance of any permits
whatsoever, the discretionary or decision making power vested in
him by the legislature would be rendered a nullity and the
responsibility conferred under the language of the statute to render
a judgment would be abrogated.  This a sheriff cannot do.  The
legislature has not said that no person may carry a concealed
weapon, but rather citizens may be so armed if the sheriff in his
judgment finds it to be warranted. . . .
1976 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 767, 768 (citations omitted). 
III.  Summary
Section 724.11, which provides the ninety-nine county sheriffs with discretion to issue
nonprofessional weapons permits to individuals residing in their counties, does not facially
offend the state constitutional guarantee to defend life and liberty and protect property.  Section
724.11 does not implicate a violation of the state constitutional guarantee to equal protection of
the law.
Sincerely,
Bruce Kempkes 
Assistant Attorney General 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST; CIVIL SERVICE:  Civil service commissioners, city and county
attorneys, union representation on appeal.  Iowa Code §§ 341A.12, 341A.16, 362.5, 400.2,
400.26, 400.27 (2001).  Depending upon the surrounding facts and circumstances, (1) civil
service commissioners may have a conflict of interest if they conduct business with their
respective city or county and (2) city or county attorneys may have a conflict of interest when
serving as legal counsel to their respective civil service commissions.  Union members without
licenses to practice law may not provide legal representation to employees in appeals to civil
service commissions.  (Kuhn and Kempkes to Connors, State Representative, 12-5-01) #01-12-1
The Honorable John Connors
State Representative
Statehouse
LOCAL
Dear Representative Connors:
You have requested an opinion on the laws governing the civil service for county and city
employees.  You ask (1) whether members of a civil service commission have a conflict of
interest if they conduct business with their respective city or county; (2) whether city or county
attorneys have a conflict of interest if they serve as legal counsel to their respective civil service
commissions; and (3) whether union members without licenses to practice law can provide legal
representation to employees in appeals to civil service commissions.  These questions primarily
require an examination of Iowa Code chapters 341A and 400 (2001).
I.  Applicable law
Chapter 341A is entitled Civil Service for Deputy County Sheriffs and applies to
counties.  Section 341A.5 provides that “[a]ll commission meetings shall be public meetings.” 
Section 341A.12 specifies the procedure for appeals to county civil service commissions after the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions and provides that an employee “shall be entitled to appeal
personally, produce evidence, and to have counsel.”  Section 341A.16 provides that the county
civil service commission “shall be represented in such suits by the county attorney.”
Chapter 400 is entitled Civil Service and applies to cities.  Its provisions “shall be strictly
carried out” by each city civil service commission and any person charged with carrying them
out.  Iowa Code § 400.30.  Under section 400.2, city civil service commissioners “shall not sell
to, or in any manner become parties, directly, to any contract to furnish supplies, material, or
labor to the city in which they are commissioners except as provided in section 362.5.”  After
defining “contract” as “any claim, account, or demand against or agreement with a city, express
or implied,” section 362.5 provides that “[a] city officer or employee shall not have an interest,
direct or indirect, in any contract or job of work or material or the profits thereof or services to be
furnished or performed for the officer's or employee's city” unless one of twelve exceptions
applies.
Chapter 400 also specifies the procedures for appeals to city civil service commissions
after the imposition of disciplinary sanctions.  Section 400.26 provides that “[t]he trial of all
appeals shall be public, and the parties may be represented by counsel.”  Section 400.27 provides
that a city civil service commission has jurisdiction to hear and determine matters involving the
rights of employees and that “[t]he city attorney or solicitor shall be the attorney for the
commission . . . .” 
II.  Analysis
(A)
You have asked whether civil service commissioners have a conflict of interest if they
conduct business with their respective city or county.  In this state, the common law as well as
statutory provisions govern conflicts of interest for those serving government.  1994 Iowa Op.
Att'y Gen. 125, 125.  Our discussion focuses upon the statutory provisions governing county and
city civil service commissioners, who serve by appointment and receive no compensation for
their services.  See Iowa Code §§ 341A.2, 400.1, 400.2.
Regarding city civil service commissioners, section 400.2 expressly refers to section
362.5 on matters relating to their public contracts.  As a result, city civil service commissioners
may not have “an interest, direct or indirect, in any contract or job of work or material or the
profits thereof or services to be furnished or performed for [their] city” unless one of twelve
exceptions applies.  Iowa Code § 362.5.
Regarding county civil service commissioners, no provision in chapter 341A expressly
refers to section 331.342, which applies to contracts between a county and any “officer or
employee of [the] county.”  Similar to section 362.5, section 331.342 prohibits such officer or
employee from having “an interest, direct or indirect, in a contract with [the] county” unless one
of ten exceptions applies.  
A question thus exists whether a county civil service commissioner constitutes a county
“officer” or “employee” – terms undefined by statute -- for purposes of section 331.342. 
Whatever the precise scope of those terms, we believe that a county civil service commissioner
falls within that scope and that, accordingly, section 331.342 governs their public contracts.  This
conclusion rests on three arguments.  
First:  The common law presumably would not treat a county civil service commissioner
differently from a city civil service commissioner with regard to their public contracts.  See
generally Iowa Code § 4.6(4) (court may consider laws upon same or similar subject in
determining legislative intent); Farmers Co-op. Co. v. DeCoster, 528 N.W.2d 536, 538 (Iowa
1995) (“[w]hen statutes relate to the same subject matter or to closely allied subjects they are said
to be in pari materia and must be construed, considered and examined in light of their common
purpose and intent so as to produce a harmonious system or body of legislation”; “we presume a
legislature does not deliberately enact inconsistent provisions when it is cognizant of them both,
without expressly recognizing the inconsistency”).  
Second:  We see no reason for the General Assembly to distinguish between the two
positions and create disharmony in the law.  See generally Farmers Co-op. Co. v. DeCoster, 528
N.W.2d at 538; Metier v. Cooper Transport Co., 378 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Iowa 1985) (“a
legislative enactment presumes a reasonable result is intended, . . . and our interpretation should
avoid impractical or absurd results”).  
Third:  Laws governing conflicts of interest “have a practical focus,” 1998 Iowa Op. Att’y
Gen. ___(#98-5-3), not a technical one, 1994 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 119, 123-24.  See generally
1996 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 30, 31 (identifying fundamental principle that “the construction of any
statute must be reasonable”).  “Public policy tends to suggest an all-inclusive definition of
[<officer’ and <employee’].”  1994 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 119, 124.  Courts have gone beyond the
letter to the spirit of statutes governing conflicts of interest.  1994 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 119, 123. 
Accordingly, we have concluded that the term “officer” -- partially defined in a general conflict-
of-interest statute as a person serving a fixed term -- “might [still] encompass persons having all
the attributes of statutorily defined officers except for their serving fixed terms, particularly since
no reason exists for treating [such persons] differently for purposes of conflicts-of-interest laws
than those persons statutorily defined as officers.”  Id. 
We therefore conclude (1) city civil service commissioners may not sell to, or in any
manner become parties, directly, to any contract to furnish supplies, material, or labor to the city
unless one of the exceptions in section 362.5 applies and (2) county civil service commissioners
may not sell to, or in any manner become parties, directly, to any contract to furnish supplies,
material, or labor to the county unless one of the exceptions in section 331.342 applies. 
Commissioners should seek advice from the county or city attorney, as the case may be, when
they believe they may have a conflict of interest by virtue of a public contract. 
(B)
You have asked whether city or county attorneys have a conflict of interest if they serve
as legal counsel to their respective civil service commissions.  Such service does not per se
constitute a conflict of interest, because it falls squarely within their statutory duties:  section
341A.16 provides that a county civil service commission “shall be represented by the county
attorney,” and section 400.27 provides “[t]he city attorney or solicitor shall be the attorney for the
[city civil service] commission.”  See generally Iowa Code § 4.1(30)(a) (unless otherwise
defined, “shall” in statutes imposes a duty).  
Nevertheless, specific facts and circumstances may give rise to a conflict of interest in a
given case.  See generally Iowa Code § 400.27 (“the commission may hire a counselor or an
attorney on a per diem basis to represent it when in the opinion of the commission there is a
conflict of interest between the commission and the city council”).  For example, a city attorney
may have a spouse who has appealed a disciplinary sanction to the city civil service commission,
or a county attorney may have advised the sheriff on the specific action underlying an appeal
before the county civil service commission.  See generally 1994 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 21 
(#93-6-4(L)); 1980 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 580, 582. 
(C)
You have asked whether union members without licenses to practice law can provide
legal representation to employees in appeals to civil service commissions.  We understand that no
collective bargaining agreement has any applicable terms and conditions governing such
representation, and we limit our analysis to the specific context of civil service appeals.
The General Assembly has not specifically affirmed the right of employees to have
anyone other than a lawyer represent them in those appeals.  Section 341A.12 provides that a city
employee “shall be entitled to . . . have counsel,” and section 400.26 provides that a county
employee “may be represented by counsel.”  
In a 1980 opinion, we concluded that “counsel” in section 400.26 “comprehends only
duly licensed practitioners of the law and no others.”  1980 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 30 
(#79-3-8(L)) (emphasis added).  See 1976 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 461, 462 (county supervisors may
not provide or pay for counsel to represent employee before county civil service commission). 
The General Assembly presumably knew of our 1980 opinion and could have amended section
400.26 and its corollary provision, section 341A.12, if it disagreed with it.  See 1994 Iowa Op.
Att’y Gen. 114 (#94-6-5(L)); 1992 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 1, 3 (that the legislature has not directly
negated a prior opinion by subsequent legislation “strongly indicates acquiescence by the
legislature”).  Moreover, we will not withdraw or modify a prior opinion unless the underlying
law has changed or subsequent review reveals that the opinion has a “clearly erroneous”
conclusion.  1986 Iowa Op. Att'y Gen. 125 (#86-11-1(L)).  
Another consideration lends support to our 1980 opinion.  The General Assembly has
provided that an individual claiming unemployment benefits “may be represented by counsel or
other duly authorized agent” in administrative proceedings.  See Iowa Code § 96.15(2); see also 
Iowa Code § 311.14 (providing that interested party to proposed secondary road assessment
district may appear in person “or by authorized agent”).  Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (under federal
Administrative Procedure Act, party in administrative proceeding entitled to counsel “or, if
permitted by the agency, by other qualified representative”); Model State Admin. Proc. Act 
§ 4-203(b) (party in administrative proceeding entitled to counsel “or, if permitted by law, other
representative”).  That the General Assembly expressly provided for nonlawyer representation in
the context of unemployment benefit proceedings tends to suggest that it did not intend for
nonlawyer representation to exist in the context of civil service proceedings.  See generally Iowa
Code § 4.6(4) (statutory construction may take into account statutory provisions on similar
subjects).  
We therefore conclude that, in the absence of specific legislation authorizing nonlawyer
representation, only duly licensed lawyers may provide legal representation to employees in
proceedings before civil service commissions.
III.  Summary
City and county civil service commissioners may not conduct business with their
respective city or county unless a statutory exception applies.  City or county attorneys may have
a conflict of interest when serving as legal counsel to their respective civil service commissions.  
Union members without licenses to practice law may not provide legal representation to
employees in civil service appeals.
Sincerely,
Cristina Kuhn
Assistant Attorney General
Bruce Kempkes
Assistant Attorney General
JUVENILE LAW:  Delinquents at juvenile home.  Iowa Code §§ 218.4, 232.52, 232.102,
233B.3, 233B.5, 233B.7 (2001).  The Iowa Juvenile Home may admit juvenile delinquents
adjudicated as children in need of assistance.  (Kempkes to Davis, Scott County Attorney,
10-10-01) #01-10-3(L)
Mr. William E. Davis
Scott County Attorney
416 W. Fourth St.
Davenport, IA 52801
Dear Mr. Davis:
You have requested an opinion on the admission of residents into the Iowa Juvenile
Home.  Pointing to an administrative rule promulgated by the Iowa Department of Human
Services (DHS), you ask whether the home may admit juvenile delinquents adjudicated children
in need of assistance.  This question primarily requires an examination of Iowa Code chapters
218, 232, and 233B (2001).
I.  Applicable law
Chapter 218 is entitled Institutions Governed by Human Services Department.  These
institutions include the Iowa Juvenile Home.  Section 218.4 provides for the promulgation of
rules “not inconsistent with law as [such institutions] may deem necessary for . . . the admission
of residents thereto . . . .”
Chapter 233B is entitled Juvenile Home.  Section 233B.1 provides:
The . . . home shall be maintained for the purpose of
providing care, custody and education of such children as are
committed to the home.  Such children shall be wards of the state. 
Their education shall embrace instruction in the common school
branches and in such other higher branches as may be practical and
will enable the children to gain useful and self-sustaining
employment. . . . 
See Iowa Code § 233B.7.  See generally Iowa Code § 218.1(8).  Under section 233B.3,
Admission to the home shall be granted to resident children
of the state under seventeen years of age, as follows, giving
preference in the order named:
(1).  Neglected or dependent children committed by the
juvenile court.
(2).  Other destitute children.
(emphasis added).  See generally Iowa Code § 4.1(30)(a) (unless otherwise defined, “shall” in
statutes imposes a duty).  Section 233B.5 governs transfers of children to the home from other
institutions, and section 233B.7 governs expulsions of children from the home.
Chapter 232 is entitled Juvenile Justice.  Section 232.52(2)(e) permits the DHS to place
juvenile delinquents “in the state training school or other facility . . . .”  Section 232.102(3)
specifies that a court may enter an order transferring the guardianship of a child in need of
assistance to the DHS “for purposes of placement in the Iowa juvenile home . . . .”
II.  Analysis
You have asked whether the Iowa Juvenile Home may admit juvenile delinquents
adjudicated as children in need of assistance. 
The DHS has rule-making authority regarding admissions to the home.  See Iowa Code 
§ 218.4.  Promulgated pursuant to section 218.4, a DHS administrative rule provides:  “No
children adjudicated to have committed a delinquent act shall be admitted to the . . . home.”  441
Iowa Admin. Code 101.9(3).  
We, like courts, must “give appropriate deference to the view of [an] agency with respect
to particular matters that have been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.” 
Iowa Code § 17A.19(11)(c).  Nevertheless, the doctrine of ultra vires, Hiserote Homes, Inc. v.
Riedemann, 277 N.W.2d 911, 913 (Iowa 1979), as well as section 218.4 itself, prohibits an
administrative body such as the DHS  from having a view on the eligibility of children for
admission to the home that “is inconsistent with” legislatively enacted provisions.  
Against this background, the question arises whether the DHS administrative rule
precludes admission to the home of all juvenile delinquents or, instead, whether it permits
admission of juvenile delinquents who have been adjudicated children in need of assistance.  
We have a duty to interpret statutes in ways consistent with constitutional provisions and
a similar duty to interpret administrative rules in ways consistent with statutory provisions.  See
generally Iowa Code § 4.4 (courts presume constitutionality of statute), § 4.6(5) (courts take into
account the consequences of a particular statutory interpretation in determining legislative
intent).  In other words, we strive to avoid interpreting statutes and rules in such a way that would
lead to their invalidation.  That principle necessarily leads to the conclusion that the DHS
administrative rule, placed against the background of chapter 233B, does not preclude the home
from admitting juvenile delinquents who have been adjudicated as children in need of assistance.
The General Assembly in chapter 233B has specified which children can reside at the
home.  Section 233B.5 prohibits transfers of any child “who [suffers from] mental illness or
mental retardation, or who is incorrigible, or has any vicious habits, or whose presence in the
home would be inimical to the moral or physical welfare of the other children within the home 
. . . .”  Section 233B.7 permits the expulsion of any child “for disobedience and refusal to submit
to proper discipline.”  Under section 233B.3, the home shall admit resident children of the state,
under seventeen years of age, who are “[n]eglected or dependent children committed by the
juvenile court” and “[o]ther destitute children.”  We believe that this language clearly
encompasses children in need of assistance.  See Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary
302, 762 (1979) (“dependent” means relying upon another for support; “destitute” means lacking
possessions and resources, suffering from extreme want; “neglected” suggests something
receiving little attention, disregarded, or unattended to).  See generally Iowa Code § 4.1(38)
(undefined words in statutes shall be construed according to context and approved English
usage).  Section 232.102(3) dispels any doubt on this matter by providing that a court may enter
an order transferring the guardianship of a child in need of assistance to the DHS “for purposes
of placement in the Iowa [Juvenile Home] . . . .”
Section 233B.3 clearly permits the home to admit children adjudicated in need of
assistance.  Section 233B.3, in conjunction with sections 233B.5 and 233B.7, establishes the
parameters of eligibility for admission to and continued residency in the home.  None of these
statutes necessarily precludes residency by a “child who has committed a delinquent act” or by a
“juvenile delinquent,” phrases they do not employ. 
We note that the foregoing analysis of chapter 233B comports with the home’s practice to
admit juvenile delinquents adjudicated as children in need of assistance.  See Annual Report: 
Iowa Juvenile Home/ Girls Training School 5 (2001) (of the 167 children admitted to the home
in 2001, 71 had been adjudicated in need of assistance and 47 had committed a delinquent act). 
See generally Iowa Code § 4.6(6) (courts may take into account administrative construction of
statute in determining legislative intent).  We also note that, in the distant past, the home
admitted such children.  See 1920 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 108, 109; see also 1982 Iowa Op. Att’y
Gen. 321 (#82-1-2(L)).
III.  Summary
The Iowa Juvenile Home may admit juvenile delinquents adjudicated as children in need
of assistance.  
Sincerely,
Bruce Kempkes 
Assistant Attorney General 
COUNTY AND COUNTY OFFICERS; COURTS:  Control over courthouse and personnel. 
Iowa Code §§ 331.301, 331.361, 331.502, 331.503, 331.903, 331.904 (2001).  The supervisors
and the auditor both act as caretakers of the courthouse, but the auditor acts subject to instruction
from the supervisors.  The auditor’s general custody and control of the courthouse only involves
the building, or buildings, occupied and appropriated according to law for the holding of courts. 
The supervisors, not the auditor, have authority to hire, fire, and assign maintenance and
custodial personnel for the courthouse, purchase maintenance and custodial supplies, and
determine the budget therefor.  (Kempkes to Dearden, State Senator, 4-12-01) #01-4-1 
April 12, 2001
The Honorable Dick L. Dearden
State Senator
Capitol
LOCAL
Dear Senator Dearden:
You have requested an opinion on county government.  First, you ask about the respective
authority of the county auditor and the county board of supervisors over the courthouse.  Second,
you ask whether the auditor’s authority over the courthouse also encompasses other county
buildings that house county officers and employees.  Third, you ask whether the auditor has
authority to hire, fire, and assign maintenance and custodial personnel, purchase maintenance and
custodial supplies, and determine the budget therefor.  Your questions primarily invite
examination of Iowa Code chapter 331 (2001), entitled County Home Rule Implementation. 
I.  Applicable Law
Chapter 331 invests supervisors with many defined duties and powers.  They have
authority to enter into certain leases for real property, see Iowa Code § 331.301(10); manage the
county’s real property, see Iowa Code § 331.361(6); and arrange for the construction of new
county buildings, see Iowa Code § 331.361(7).  Supervisors also have many duties and powers
undefined by statute.  See generally Iowa Const. amend. 25 (1968) (constitutional home rule);
Iowa Code § 331.301 (statutory home rule).  Section 331.301(2) broadly provides that “[a] power
of the county is vested in the [supervisors], and a duty of a county shall be performed by or under
[their] direction except as otherwise provided by law . . . .”  See generally Iowa Code 
§ 4.1(30)(a) (“shall” in statutes imposes a duty unless otherwise defined).
Chapter 331 invests the auditor with many defined duties and powers, albeit far less than
those of the supervisors.  See Iowa Code §§ 331.502, 331.504, 331.511, 331.512; see also Iowa
Code § 602.1303(1).  Only one duty directly concerns the county’s real property:  section
331.502 provides that the auditor “shall . . . [h]ave general custody and control of the courthouse,
subject to the direction of the board [of supervisors].”  Only one power directly concerns county
personnel:  sections 331.503(2), 331.903(1), 331.903(5), and 331.904(4) combine to provide that
the auditor may appoint deputies, assistants, clerks, temporary assistants, and extra help and
clerks to serve in the auditor’s office. 
II.  Analysis
In addition to the auditor and the supervisors, other members of the executive branch as
well as of the judicial branch may exercise authority over the courthouse itself or its operation. 
See, e.g., Hurd v. Odgaard, 297 N.W.2d 355, 358 (Iowa 1980); 1996 Op. Att’y Gen. 25, 27-28;
1990 Op. Att’y Gen. 66 (#90-3-4(L)); 1988 Op. Att’y Gen. 67 (#88-1-11(L)).  We limit our
discussion, however, to the duties and powers of the auditor and the supervisors.
(A)
You have asked about the respective authority of the auditor and the supervisors over the
courthouse.  Section 331.502 provides the auditor with general custody and control of the
courthouse, subject to the direction of the supervisors.  
“Custody” commonly signifies the immediate care, charge, and control of a thing, Black’s
Law Dictionary 384 (6  ed. 1991), and “control” commonly means the “power or authority toth
manage, direct, superintend, restrict, regulate, govern, administer, or oversee,” 1996 Op. Att’y
Gen. 25, 29.  See Connies’ Const. Co., Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 207, 210
(Iowa 1975) (“care,” “custody,” and “control” commonly connote a possessory as opposed to a
proprietary right in property and signify in charge of; “care” refers to temporary charge,
“custody” implies a keeping or guardian of, and “control” indicates power to manage,
superintend, direct, or oversee).  See generally Iowa Code § 4.1(38) (undefined words and
phrases in statute shall be construed according to approved English usage).  “Direction”
commonly means the act of governing; management; or superintendence.  Black’s, supra, at 460. 
See Crabb’s English Synonyms 265 (1917) (to “direct” supposes authority and entails
instruction). 
We need not pinpoint the difference, if any, between “custody and control” on the one
side of the balance and “direction” on the other.  See J. Fernald, English Synonyms, Antonyms &
Prepositions 265 (1914) (“control” and “direct” are synonyms of “govern”).  Compare E.
Ordway, Synonyms & Antonyms 82 (1913) (“control” is a synonym of “direction”) with R.
Soule, A Dictionary of English Synonymes 95 (1891) (“direct” is a synonym of “control”). 
Section 331.502 clearly tilts the scale toward the side of the supervisors:  it invests them with
superior authority by providing that the auditor exercise custody and control of the courthouse
subject to their direction.  “Subject to” commonly means liable, subordinate, subservient,
inferior, obedient to; governed or affected by; or answerable for.  Black’s, supra, at 1425. 
Accord In re Kraft's Estate, 186 N.W.2d 628, 631-32 (Iowa 1971); Van Duyn v. H.S. Chase &
Co., 149 Iowa 222, 128 N.W. 300, 301 (1910); Moen v. Moen, 519 N.W.2d 10, 14 (N.D. 1994). 
Similarly, “subjection” means the obligation to act at the discretion, or according to the judgment
and will, of others.  Black’s, supra, at 1425.  These definitions point to the conclusion that the
auditor may only exercise general custody and control over the courthouse pursuant to instruction
from the supervisors.  
Nonetheless, the auditor and the supervisors both act as caretakers of the courthouse.  See
Long v. Board of Supervisors, 258 Iowa 1278, 142 N.W.2d 378, 384-85 (1966).  We cannot
precisely define in all instances the line that specifically divides their respective care-taking
responsibilities.  See generally 61 IAC 1.5(2), 1.5(3)(c).  We can emphasize that cooperation
between the auditor and the supervisors will resolve any conflict arising out of the scheme of
dual responsibility created by section 331.502.  We can also emphasize that the auditor may have
discretion to address a particular subject in the absence of instruction from the supervisors. 
Emergencies infrequently arise that the supervisors may not foresee.  For example, if the
supervisors have left the state on an official trip, and a storm blows the roof off the courthouse,
the auditor would have authority to take immediate action to prevent damage to its offices and
their contents.
(B)
Noting that a county may not house all county officers and employees in its courthouse,
you have asked whether the auditor’s general custody and control of the courthouse in section
331.502 also encompasses every county building that houses county officers and employees.  
The General Assembly has acknowledged that the meaning of its words may depend upon
the context.  See generally Iowa Code § 4.1(38) (statutory words and phrases shall be construed
according to context).  Thus, at times, “courthouse” may mean the principal building for the
housing of county offices and may even signify the county seat.  See Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary 259 (1979); see also Hurd v. Odgaard, 297 N.W.2d at 358 (“[t]he
courthouse is the place where the business of the county is conducted -- where citizens go to pay
taxes, obtain licenses, record instruments, and attend court”).
More commonly -- and perhaps more accurately reflective of its syllables -- “courthouse”
specifies the particular building occupied and appropriated according to law for the holding of
courts.  Webster’s, supra, at 259; Black’s, supra, at 354; 21 C.J.S. Courts § 121, at 140 (1990);
accord Board of Comm’rs v. Stout, 35 N.E. 683, 685 (Ind. 1893) ("courthouse" is chiefly for the
use of the court, the remaining uses being subordinate and to a great extent incidental); Harriss v.
State ex rel. Dolan, 18 So. 387, 388 (Miss. 1895) ("courthouse" is the building occupied and
appropriated for holding of courts); Zangerle v. Court of Common Pleas, 46 N.E.2d 865, 870
(Ohio 1943) (“courthouse” is the building that primarily provides facilities essential for courts);
Johnson City Buick Co. v. Johnson, 54 S.W.2d 946, 946-47 (Tenn. 1932) ("courthouse" is the
building in which courts are held); Greensville County v. City of Emporia, 427 S.E.2d 352, 357
(Va. 1993) ("courthouse" is the permanent place for holding of courts).   
Nothing suggests that the General Assembly intended for “courthouse” to be the
equivalent of “every county building” or “all county buildings.”  See generally Woodbury County
v. Sioux City, 475 N.W.2d 203, 205 (Iowa 1991) (“[t]he legislative intent that controls in the
construction of a statute has reference to the legislature that enacted it”).  To the contrary, the
limited evidence suggests that the General Assembly originally intended “the courthouse” to
mean, simply, the courthouse.  See, e.g., Iowa Code § 303(5) (1873) (providing county with
power to build and keep in repair “the necessary buildings for the use of the county and of the
courts”).  Nothing in current statutes detracts from this conclusion.  See, e.g., Iowa Code 
§ 217.32 (mentioning “courthouse or any other building owned by the county”) (2001).  
Had the General Assembly ever intended for the auditor to have general custody and
control over all county buildings, it certainly knew how to express this intent in clear language. 
See, e.g, Iowa Code § 303(5) (1873); Iowa Code § 217.32 (2001).  Accordingly, the auditor’s
general custody and control of “the courthouse” only involves the building occupied and
appropriated according to law for the holding of courts.  
This general custody and control may involve more than one building, even though
section 331.502 expressly limits it to “the” courthouse.  Normally, that article “particularizes the
subject which it precedes and is [a] word of limitation as opposed to indefinite or generalizing
force of <a’ or <an.’”  Black’s, supra, at 1477.  Accord Webster’s, supra, at 1199.  In this context,
however, placing “the” before “courthouse” does not necessarily mean a single building, because,
historically as well as legally, more than one building may serve as the place for holding court in
a single county.  See Iowa Code § 331.907(4).  See generally Iowa Code § 4.1(38) (words and
phrases shall be construed according to context).  It appears, then, that the General Assembly in
section 331.502 used “the courthouse” in its generic sense, see Webster’s, supra, at 1199, and
that the auditor thus exercises general custody and control over every county building occupied
and appropriated according to law for the holding of courts.  
(C)
Regarding the courthouse itself, the auditor has no express statutory authority to appoint a
janitor or any other personnel or to purchase janitorial or any other supplies.  You have asked
whether “general custody and control” of the courthouse in section 331.502 provides the auditor
with authority to hire, fire, and assign maintenance and custodial personnel; purchase
maintenance and custodial supplies; and determine the budget therefor.  
The auditor’s general custody and control of the courthouse has long roots, dating to the
presidency of Ulysses S. Grant.  1950 Op. Att’y Gen. 19, 20; see Iowa Code § 323 (1873)
(auditor “shall have the general custody and control of the court house . . . , subject to the
direction of the board of supervisors”).  Old decisions and opinions on its scope thus retain their
relevancy.
In Kitterman v. Board of Supervisors, 137 Iowa 275, 115 N.W. 13 (1908), the courthouse
janitor sued the supervisors when they did not reappoint him at the end of his contract.  In its
decision, the court noted in passing that the supervisors “no doubt had the right to provide for the
filling of [this position.]”  115 N.W. at 15.  In Arnold v. Wapello County, 154 Iowa 111, 134
N.W. 546 (1912), an applicant for the position of courthouse janitor sued the supervisors when
they appointed someone else to the position.  The court held that they had exercised discretion in
making the appointment.  134 N.W. at 546-47.  In Sorenson v. Andrews, 221 Iowa 44, 264 N.W.
562 (1936), the courthouse janitor sued the supervisors when they did not reappoint him at the
end of his contract.  The court accepted the supervisors’ argument that “the selection and
appointment of a janitor of the county courthouse, growing out of [their] custodial duties . . . ,
must be so made as to insure the efficiency, safety, and economy for which [they]  must strive.” 
264 N.W. at 563.  In McLaughlin v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Iowa 267, 288 N.W. 74 (1939),
an applicant for the position of courthouse janitor sued the supervisors when they hired someone
else.  The court held that they had exercised discretion in making the appointment.  288 N.W. at
77.
In 1949, this office issued an opinion that specifically addressed the question whether the
supervisors vis-a-vis the auditor had authority over courthouse personnel.  We reviewed the
foregoing case law and noted as well that, for many years, supervisors across the state had
exercised the power of appointing courthouse janitors.  1950 Op. Att’y Gen. 19, 21-23.  We thus
concluded that the supervisors, not the auditor, have authority to employ a janitor for the
courthouse as well as other personnel therein.  Id. at 23.
More than fifty years have now elapsed since issuance of the 1949 opinion.  The absence
of any subsequent legislation on the subject creates a presumption that the General Assembly
acquiesces in its conclusion.  See 1992 Op. Att’y Gen. 1, 3; 1950 Op. Att’y Gen. 19, 22-23.  
Moreover, the strength of this presumption increases over time.  We thus see no reason to
withdraw the 1949 opinion.
In addition, we believe that staff assignments and terminations, purchasing of necessary
supplies, and budgeting therefor logically and reasonably accompany the authority to appoint or
employ the janitor of the courthouse and other personnel therein.  Cf. Iowa Code § 331.903(4)
(“[e]ach deputy officer, assistant and clerk shall perform the duties assigned by the principal
county officer making the appointment”).  This allocation of responsibility carries obvious
pragmatic appeal, because, among other things, it negates the possibility of appointees facing the
prospect of serving two masters.  See generally Iowa Code § 4.4(4) (presumption in statutory
construction that legislature intended a result feasible of execution).  It also gives meaning to the
phrase “subject to the direction of” in section 331.502, a phrase that appears to impart even more
authority than “subject to the approval of.”  Compare Black’s, supra, at 460 (“direction” means
act of governing; managing; or superintending) with Mayor of Ocean City v. Johnson, 470 A.2d
1308, 1313 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (“subject to approval of” implies that approving body
retains discretion and performs more than a ministerial or perfunctory task) and 2000 Op. Att’y
Gen. __ (#00-11-1) (“subject to approval of” indicates that authority to make final determination
lies with approving body).
We therefore conclude that the supervisors have authority to hire, fire, and assign
maintenance and custodial personnel for the courthouse, purchase maintenance and custodial 
supplies for the courthouse, and determine the budget therefor.  These determinations align with
their express authority over analogous matters.  See, e.g. Iowa Code § 331.322(5), (10) (county
supervisors shall furnish fuel, lights, and office supplies to county officers and supplies for the
jail, and shall appoint and pay jail assistants), § 602.1303(1) (county shall provide custodial
services for district court).  We point out, however, that nothing in chapter 331 would prohibit
the supervisors from effectively transferring much of their responsibility over the courthouse and
its personnel to the auditor, who, pursuant to section 331.502, acts subject to the direction of the
supervisors.  A delegation of responsibility to the auditor seems particularly appropriate for
counties in which supervisors serve part-time. 
III.  Summary
The supervisors and the auditor both act as caretakers of the courthouse, but the auditor
acts subject to instruction from the supervisors.  The auditor’s general custody and control of the
courthouse only involves the building, or buildings, occupied and appropriated according to law
for the holding of courts.  The supervisors, not the auditor, have authority to hire, fire, and assign
maintenance and custodial personnel for the courthouse, purchase maintenance and custodial 
supplies for the courthouse, and determine the budget therefor.  
Sincerely, 
Bruce Kempkes 
Assistant Attorney General 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CITIES:  Home inspections.  Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A
(amend. 25); Iowa Const. art. I, § 6 (1857); Iowa Code § 364.1 (2001).  Cities have home rule
authority to pass ordinances requiring home inspections only for homes sold on contract.  Such
an ordinance would not, on its face, violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection, even if
it only applied to persons or entities selling a minimum number of homes per year on contract.  
(Kempkes to Deluhery, State Senator, 9-20-01) #01-9-2
September 20, 2001
The Honorable Pat Deluhery
State Senator
State Capitol
LOCAL
Dear Senator Deluhery:
You have requested an opinion on the validity of proposed city ordinances that relate to
real property.  You ask whether a city has home rule authority to pass an ordinance requiring
home inspections.  If so, you ask whether an ordinance requiring home inspections only for
homes sold on contract, and not for homes acquired through mortgages, would violate
constitutional guarantees to equal protection of the laws.
I.  Applicable law
Municipal home rule rests in the Iowa Constitution as well as in Iowa statutes.  The Iowa
Constitution provides that a municipality may pass ordinances to determine its “local affairs and
government” as long as they are “not inconsistent with” statutory provisions.  Iowa Const. art. III,
§ 38A (amend. 25).  Iowa Code chapter 364 (2001) is entitled Powers and Duties of Cities. 
Section 364.1 codifies constitutional home rule:
A city may, except as expressly limited by the Constitution,
and if not inconsistent with the laws of the [G]eneral [A]ssembly,
exercise any power and perform any function it deems appropriate
to protect and preserve the rights, privileges, and property of the
city or of its residents, and to preserve and improve the peace,
safety, health, welfare, comfort, and convenience of its residents
. . . .
(emphasis added).  See generally Iowa Code § 364.2(3) (“inconsistent” means “[a]n exercise of  
. . . power [that] is irreconcilable with the state law”).  
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The federal constitution provides that a State shall not “deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV.  The state constitution
provides that “[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the General
Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which,
upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.”  Iowa Const. art. I, § 6.
II.  Analysis
(A)
You have asked whether a city has home rule authority to pass an ordinance requiring 
home inspections.  
Such an ordinance obviously purports to protect consumers.  See Cincinnati Bd. of
Realtors, Inc., v. City of Cincinnati, 353 N.E.2d 898, 907 (Ohio App. 1975), affirmed, 346
N.E.2d 666 (Ohio 1976).  A house is the single largest investment most consumers will ever
make.  We believe that the broad language of section 364.1 -- that a city may protect and preserve
the rights and property of its residents and preserve and improve the safety, health, welfare,
comfort, and convenience of its residents -- properly encompasses regulations on housing in
general and home inspections in particular.  At least one court has held:
[A city generally has] the power to require an inspection before a
home owner may sell his one- or two- family residence.  Such an
inspection deters fraud and helps enforce the city’s building code. 
Both the means and goals are validly within [the city’s] police
power.  The home rule act by itself is specific enough to grant
[cities] the authority to enact such an ordinance.
. . . .
The particular inspection method challenged here is aimed at the
specific practice of fraudulent conveyance of homes with serious
structural and other deficiencies. . . .  Such fraudulent transactions
pose an obvious threat to the health and welfare of [the city’s
residents], and an ordinance directed against them is within the
[home rule] authority of the [city] . . . .
Butcher v. City of Detroit, 347 N.W.2d 702, 705, 706 (Mich. App. 1984).  See Cincinnati Bd. of
Realtors, Inc., v. City of Cincinnati, 353 N.E.2d at 903 (upholding city ordinance requiring
persons selling property intended for residential use to have property inspected before entering
into contract for sale).  See generally 6A E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations 
§ 24.22, at 66, 66-67 (1997) (“the privilege of every citizen to use his or her property according
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to his or her own will is both a liberty and a property right, but these rights are always
subordinate to the interests of the public welfare”; thus, a city “may impose new and burdensome
restrictions on private property” designed to protect the public welfare).
In addition, we see no constitutional or statutory provision that prevents cities from
passing an ordinance requiring home inspections.  See generally Iowa Code ch. 558, 364. 
Chapter 558, entitled Real Estate Disclosures, does require persons intending to transfer property
to make a disclosure statement containing “information relating to the condition and important
characteristics of the property and structure located on the property, including significant defects
in the structural integrity of the structure . . . .”  Iowa Code § 558A.4(1).  This requirement,
however, does not preclude passage of a city ordinance requiring home inspections.  See
generally 7 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 24.323, at 273 (1997) (“that a
state has enacted regulations governing an [activity] does not of itself prohibit a municipality
from exacting additional requirements; so long as there is no conflict between the two, both the
statute and the ordinance will stand”).  Indeed, the two requirements would complement each
other.
(B)
You have asked whether a city ordinance requiring home inspections for homes sold on
contract vis-a-vis homes acquired through mortgages violates constitutional guarantees to equal
protection of the laws. 
The Supreme Court of Iowa typically equates the state constitution with the federal
constitution for purposes of equal protection and engages in the same analysis for both.  See, e.g.,
Harden v. State, 434 N.W.2d 881, 885-86 (Iowa), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869 (1989); Duncan v.
City of Des Moines, 222 Iowa 218, 268 N.W. 547, 551 (1936); see also 1966 Iowa Op. Att’y
Gen. 95, 102-03; Note, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 309, 309 (1982).  See generally Iowa Const. art. I, § 6
(1857). 
As a threshold matter, only laws that treat “similarly situated” classes of individuals
differently trigger equal protection analysis.  Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727,
731 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1185 (1995).  Obviously, laws that treat differently
situated classes of individuals differently cannot, by definition, offend equal protection.  See id. 
Challengers to a classification bear the burden to prove that they are similarly situated to the class
allegedly receiving favorable treatment under the law.  Id. 
We believe that a city ordinance requiring a home inspection for homes sold on contract
vis-a-vis homes acquired through mortgages does not treat similarly situated individuals
differently.  Even if it did, we do not believe that such an ordinance violates equal protection on
its face.  To violate equal protection “on its face” means that a law by its own terms improperly
classifies persons for different treatment. 
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A challenger to the ordinance would bear the burden to prove that its classification “is
arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.”  In re Williams,
628 N.W.2d at 452.  A court would strongly presume its validity.  See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S.
312, 319, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 125 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1993).  The court would invalidate the ordinance
only if it rested on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of its objective.  Id. at 321.  The
challenger would have to negate every conceivable basis which might support the ordinance’s
classification.  Id. at 320.  The court would uphold the ordinance if any conceivable state of facts 
provided a rational basis for its classification.  Id. 
A constitutionally justifiable reason for passing an ordinance requiring home inspections
only for homes sold on contract would be to protect unknowing buyers from acquiring homes 
with serious deficiencies.  State law requires city housing codes to include a program for the
regular inspection of rental houses.  See Iowa Code § 364.17; see also Iowa Code § 403A.3(8). 
A contract sale of a home bears some resemblance to the renting of a house in that the buyer,
who lacks ownership of the property until final payment, makes installment payments.  As a
practical matter, financially strapped persons who cannot obtain mortgages can only acquire a
house by purchasing one on contract.  These persons may have limited knowledge of the housing
market and lack the protections afforded to persons acquiring homes through the use of real
estate agents, lawyers, financial institutions, and mortgages.  Some landlords could attempt to
circumvent inspections of rental houses by ostensibly “selling” them (often to their own tenants)
on contract:  
Under the installment land contract, the purchaser typically
[makes] monthly payments for a long term, but [does] not build up
any equity with these payments and [does] not receive title until all
payments [are] complete.  The installment land contract [has]
important economic advantages for poor purchasers.  Down
payments [are] often low, closing costs [are] minimal, and
immediate occupancy [is] possible. 
. . .  [I]nstallment land contracts[, however, have been]
systematically more open to abusive practices than mortgages . . . . 
Unlike a mortgage, installment contracts [do] not involve a
third-party lender to require inspections and appraisals and thus
assure a fair purchase price.  There [is] no counsel at the time of
sale because title [passes] only years later, if and when installment
payments [are] completed.  In addition, and perhaps most
importantly, a missed payment [can] and often [does] trigger
forfeiture -- the “owner” [can] be evicted summarily, without the
procedural protections of mortgage foreclosure. 
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Swire, “The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination:  A Law and Economics Analysis,”
73 Tex. L. Rev. 787, 801-02 (1995). 
A city could conclude that a landlord owning rental houses may attempt to avoid housing
inspections and the cost of remedying any deficiencies noted therein by entering into contract
sales with unsophisticated buyers who, unable to comply with onerous contractual terms and
conditions, will inevitably default and leave ownership of the houses with the landlord.  Indeed,
this concern was expressed in a report, provided to us by the City of Davenport, on land sales
contracts, housing quality, and predatory lending practices.  We therefore believe that a city has a
constitutionally justifiable ground for requiring a home inspection only for sales of homes on
contract.  Cf. Butcher v. City of Detroit, 347 N.W.2d at 706 (holding that city ordinance requiring
home inspections for contract sales of certain residences did not constitute unconstitutional
taking of property without due process).  
A city could certainly choose to treat all homesellers the same by passing an ordinance
requiring that all homes undergo a proper home inspection upon conveyance and that all
prospective homebuyers receive a copy thereof.  A city could also choose to limit home
inspections to persons or entities selling a minimum number of homes on contract per year on the
ground that multiple home sales within a limited time frame indicate the existence of a business.
  
The city could rationally distinguish between an owner who sells a home on an individual
basis and an owner who sells houses as part of a business.  Cf. Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282
U.S. 499, 501, 51 S. Ct. 228, 75 L. Ed. 482 (1931) (no violation of equal protection where law
gave more extensive venue for actions against corporations than that fixed for individual);
Cincinnati Street Ry. Co. v. Snell, 193 U.S. 30, 35-36, 24 S. Ct. 319, 48 L. Ed. 604 (1904) (no
violation of equal protection where law gave greater right to transfer a case to an individual than
to a corporation).  See generally 7 McQuillin, supra, § 24.334, at 302-03.  For example, a mother
may give her son a haircut without a barbering license, but if she engages in the business of
barbering, she must obtain such a license and comply with all statutory and administrative
requirements.  See generally Iowa Code ch. 158. 
Indeed, government has broad authority to regulate activities when conducted as trades or
businesses:  
Commerce, business, industry, trades, occupations and
vocations carried on within a municipal corporation are subject to
reasonable regulation by the municipal corporation under its police
power.  Moreover, they are subject to licensing as a suitable means
of regulation.  They are [also] subject to regulation to prevent or
suppress nuisances . . . .
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Municipal competency to regulate business rests on
municipal . . . power to prevent businesses, industries, trades and
occupations from injuring or menacing the public health, safety,
morals, order, welfare and convenience, to prevent them from
becoming public nuisances and to suppress them when they do. 
The power extends to all businesses and it extends to these evils
whether they arise from the inherent nature of a business, the
manner in which it is conducted or its location or surroundings. 
Otherwise stated, businesses, professions and occupations affected
with a public interest are subject to reasonable regulation for the
common good. . . . [Accordingly, cities] may place conditions on
the operation of a business enterprise in the exercise of their police
powers . . . .
7 McQuillin, supra, § 24.321, at 267-68, § 24.322, at 268-69 (footnotes omitted). 
III.  Summary
Cities have home rule authority to pass ordinances requiring home inspections. 
Ordinances requiring home inspections only for homes sold on contract, and not for homes
acquired through mortgages, do not facially violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection
even if they apply only to persons or entities selling a minimum number of homes per year.     
Sincerely,
Bruce Kempkes 
Assistant Attorney General 
COUNTIES; ZONING; TAXATION:   Distinguishing “industry” from “agriculture”; egg
breaking.  Iowa Code §§ 331.304, 335.1, 335.2, 335.3, 335.4, 428.20, 441.21 (1999).  A county
may subject a proposed egg-breaking operation to zoning regulations, because, as a matter of
law, that particular operation does not constitute agriculture.  “Agriculture” in this context means
the art or science of cultivating the ground, including the harvesting of crops and the rearing and
managing of livestock.  Whether the county may classify the proposed egg-breaking operation as
industry for property tax purposes is a question of fact initially for the county assessor’s
determination and ultimately a court’s.  “Industry” in this context includes any process of
manufacturing, refining, and purifying and excludes any process that does not change the
character of an agricultural commodity.  (Kempkes to Eddie, State Representative, 2-1-01) 
#01-2-1
February 1, 2001
The Honorable Russell Eddie
State Representative
State Capitol
LOCAL
Dear Representative Eddie:
Against the backdrop of a continuing debate about the vertical integration of agricultural
and industrial operations, see Note, 4 Gt. Plains Nat. Resources J. 261, 271-76 (2000), you and
the Buena Vista County Attorney’s Office have each requested an opinion on the scope of a
county’s authority to regulate land use through zoning.  That authority essentially permits a
county to regulate industry and not agriculture.  
A facility proposes to engage in egg-breaking operations, in addition to its egg-laying and
egg-washing operations, for the purpose of reducing its transportation costs.  The egg-laying
operation would consist of thirty “high rise cage layer buildings,” each nearly 600 feet long and
55 feet wide.  The buildings would initially house two million chickens and produce more than
1.4 million eggs per day, and eventually house four million chickens and produce more than 2.8
million eggs per day.  The egg-washing operation would help guard against bacterial
contamination and result in a substantial amount of wastewater.  The egg-breaking operation
would separate the shells from the liquid contents, which would then undergo transport (either
with commingled or separated whites and yolks) in refrigerated tanker trucks.  Five to seven
employees would oversee or run several types of equipment in the egg-breaking operation: 
conveyors, scanners (for detecting “bad eggs”), breaking machines, squeezing machines (to
extract any remaining liquids out of the broken shells), pumps, vats, holding tanks, and storage
barrels.  The facility would sell or use the broken shells as fertilizer or as an additive to poultry
feed.  
The questions presented are whether such a proposed egg-breaking operation constitutes
agriculture vis-a-vis industry for purposes of zoning as well as property taxes.  They primarily
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involve an examination of Iowa Code chapters 335 and 441 (2001).
I.  Zoning
(A) Applicable law
Chapter 335 -- formerly chapter 358A -- is entitled County Zoning and was originally
enacted in 1947.  It applies to any county at the option of its board of supervisors.  Iowa Code 
§ 335.1.  Among other things, a county must design its zoning regulations to preserve the
availability of agricultural land and protect the health and the general welfare of its residents,
with a “reasonable consideration [of] the character of the area of the district and the peculiar
sustainability of such area for particular uses” and with a “view to . . . encouraging the most
appropriate use of land throughout [the] county.”  Iowa Code § 335.5.
Section 335.3 identifies the subjects of county zoning:
Subject to section 335.2, the board of supervisors may by
ordinance regulate and restrict the height, number of structures, and
size of buildings and other structures, the percentage of lot that
may be occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other open spaces,
the density of population, and the location and use of buildings,
structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or other
purposes . . . .
(emphasis added).  Section 335.2, sometimes termed the “freedom to farm act,” provides in part: 
Except to the extent required to implement section 335.27
[which permits enactment of agricultural land preservation
ordinances], no ordinance adopted under this chapter applies to
land, farm houses, farm barns, farm outbuildings or other
buildings or structures which are primarily adapted, by reason of
nature and area, for use for agricultural purposes, while so used.
(emphasis added).  Cf. Iowa Code § 331.304(3)(b) (county building code shall not apply to 
“farm houses or other farm buildings which are primarily adapted for use for agricultural
purposes, while so used”), § 414.23 (section 335.2 applies to city opting to zone land
extraterritorially). 
(B) Analysis
Premised upon assumed facts and circumstances, the question whether the proposed egg-
breaking operation constitutes industry or agriculture for purposes of chapter 335 is one of law. 
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See Kuehl v. Cass County, 555 N.W.2d 686, 688 (Iowa 1996) (whether activity or operation falls
within section 335.2 “is, in its entirety, a matter of statutory interpretation”).  See generally 61
IAC 1.5(1).
(1) Principles of review
Four important principles underlie such a question:  
First:  Zoning regulations promulgated under laws such as section 335.3 are intended “to
protect the general well-being of others by prohibiting uses that would be injurious to others.” 
Helmke v. City of Ruthven, 418 N.W.2d 346, 352 (Iowa 1988) (Schultz, J., dissenting).  “The
power to zone is grounded in the general proposition that every owner of property holds it under
an implied condition that his use will not be injurious to others having an equal right to
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community as a whole.”  Note, Ill
Blows the Wind that Profits Nobody”:  Control of Odors from Iowa Livestock-Confinement
Facilities, 57 Iowa L. Rev. 451, 493 (1971) (footnote omitted).
Second:  Enacted in 1947, section 335.2 was intended “[to protect] the farmer and his
investment in the land.”  Goodell v. Humboldt County, 575 N.W.2d 486, 494 (Iowa 1998).  More
specifically, it was intended to exempt “traditional farms” from county zoning.  See Alan Vestal,
Iowa Land Use and Zoning Laws, § 3.11, at 75, 76 (1979); Note, 57 Iowa L. Rev., supra, at 495. 
In 1963, the General Assembly amended section 335.2 by removing a requirement that land and
buildings adapted for agricultural purposes be used as a “primary means of livelihood” and
adding a requirement that land and structures be “primarily” adapted for agricultural purposes. 
See 1963 Iowa Acts, 60  G.A., ch. 218, § 2.  Removing the “primary means of livelihood”th
requirement clearly broadened the exemption, but only from the standpoint of ownership; adding
the requirement that land and structures be “primarily” adapted for agricultural purposes clearly
narrowed the exemption.  See Note, 57 Iowa L. Rev., supra, at 496-97. 
Third:  Courts generally “construe zoning restrictions strictly in order to favor the free use
of property.”  Ernst v. Johnson County, 522 N.W.2d 599, 602 (Iowa 1994).  Nevertheless, the
withholding of power in section 335.2, construed in the extreme, could effectively render the
broad grant of power in section 335.3 meaningless.  Like exceptions, State v. Robinson, 618
N.W.2d 306, 312 (Iowa 2000), exemptions should not swallow their rules, In re Annis, 232 F.3d
749, 753 (10  Cir. 2000).  Proper analysis thus requires a consideration of section 335.2 andth
335.3; it should not address the one and ignore the other.  See State v. Carter, 618 N.W.2d 374,
377 (Iowa 2000) (statute must not be construed in isolation); State v. Carpenter, 616 N.W.2d
540, 542 (Iowa 2000) (statute must be construed in its entirety); March v. Pekin Ins. Co., 465
N.W.2d 852, 854 (Iowa 1991) (related statutes must be harmonized); see also Iowa Code 
§ 4.4(2) (statutory construction may take into account that legislature presumably intended for
entire statute to be effective).  See generally Iowa Code § 4.6(1) (statutory construction may take
into account legislative object).  
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Fourth:  Courts generally defer to administrative decisions classifying property as
industrial or agricultural and review difficult cases under a standard of reasonableness.  See, e.g.,
Helmke v. City of Ruthven, 418 N.W.2d at 352 (a court “cannot substitute its judgment for that of
[a city] board of adjustment,” and thus “whether the evidence in a close case . . . might well
support an opposite finding is of no consequence”).
   
(2) Prior use, abandoned use, nature of land 
Preliminarily, we note that section 335.2 prohibits the zoning of land or buildings which
are primarily adapted, “by reason of nature and area,” for use for agricultural purposes, “while so
used.”  The words “by reason of nature and area” have led this office and a district court to
conclude that a county can zone land, formerly used as a gravel pit, on which the owner proposes
to operate a feed lot.  1968 Op. Att’y Gen. 450, 451-52; Note, 57 Iowa L. Rev., supra, at 502. 
“[T]he land used for the feedlot was not, by its nature, primarily adapted for agricultural purposes
due to its essential nature as a gravel pit.  Therefore, due to the nature of the land, it could be
subjected to regulation under county zoning even though the use made of the land for raising
cattle might be considered an agricultural purpose.”  Note, 57 Iowa L. Rev., supra, at 502.  The
words “while so used,” according to one commentator, “apparently mean that [section 335.2]
creates a special class of nonconforming uses which become subject to zoning regulations as
soon as agriculture is abandoned for a sufficient period of time.”  Note, County Zoning in Iowa,
45 Iowa L. Rev. 743, 756 (1960).  Thus, prior use of the land for non-agricultural purposes,
abandonment of  agricultural activities on the land, or the nature of the land itself may determine
whether the county can regulate the proposed egg-breaking operation under chapter 335.
(3) Industry versus agriculture
It appears that large Iowa producers, until recently, brought unbroken eggs to the
marketplace, see Iowa Code ch. 196, and that such activity, in general, constitutes part of
agriculture, cf. Iowa Code § 9H.1(11) (“farming” for purposes of corporate farming act includes
egg production).  The difficult question remains whether the proposed operation of a large Iowa
producer to break eggs before bringing them to the marketplace also constitutes agriculture.   See
generally Nat’l Broiler Marketing Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 835-36, 98 S. Ct. 2122,
56 L. Ed. 2d 728 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[a]t some point along the path of 
downstream integration [from agriculture to industry an agricultural exemption] loses its
purpose”).
At one end of the chapter 335 spectrum, section 335.3 provides counties with broad
powers to zone industry, along with trades and residences.  1998 Op. Att’y Gen. ___ 
(#97-1-1(L)).  “Industry” commonly means systematic labor, especially for the creation of value;
a department or branch of a business or manufacture, especially one that employs much labor and
capital; or manufacturing as a whole.  Marks Co. v. United States, 12 U.S. Cust. Ct. App. 110,
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112, cert. denied, 266 U.S. 625 (1924); Black’s Law Dictionary 776 (1990); Webster’s Ninth
New Collegiate Dictionary 584 (1979); see North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass’n v. N.L.R.B., 109
F.2d 76, 80 (9  Cir. 1940) (“industrial activity” commonly means treating or processing rawth
products in factories).  See generally Iowa Code § 4.1(38) (undefined words in statutes shall be
construed according to context and approved English usage).  “Manufacturing,” in turn,
commonly means to make a product suitable for use or to produce according to an organized plan
and with division of labor.  Black’s, supra, at 964-65; Webster’s, supra, at 695.
At the other end of the chapter 335 spectrum, section 335.2 prohibits counties from
zoning agriculture, which, ironically, has been termed Iowa’s “leading industry.”  Montgomery v.
Bremer County Supervisors, 299 N.W.2d 687, 696 (Iowa 1980).  In the most recent case on
section 335.2 -- Kuehl v. Cass County, 555 N.W.2d 686, 688-89 (Iowa 1996) -- the Supreme
Court of Iowa (1) observed that the phrase “for use for agricultural purposes” refers to the
functional aspects of land and structures and (2) specifically defined “agriculture” as the art or
science of cultivating the ground, including harvesting of crops and rearing and management of
livestock.  Accord Thompson v. Hancock County, 539 N.W.2d 181,183 (Iowa 1995); Farmegg
Products, Inc. v. Humboldt County, 190 N.W.2d 454, 457-58 (Iowa 1971) (disapproved in Kuehl
on other grounds).  This definition of “agriculture” excludes the proposed egg-breaking operation
as a step beyond the rearing, managing, and harvesting stages.  
An earlier case involving the worker compensation law, which expressly exempts
employees engaged in agriculture, also drew the agricultural line at the rearing, managing, and
harvesting stages.  The court in Crouse v. Lloyd’s Turkey Ranch, 251 Iowa 156, 100 N.W.2d 115
(1959), considered whether the slaughtering of 8,000 turkeys by a ranch that raised some of them 
constituted agriculture and thus precluded an injury claim by one of six seasonal employees
solely engaged in the slaughtering operation.  Acknowledging that a single entity may engage in
agriculture and industry at the same time and upon the same tract of land, the court distinguished
between operations associated with the raising of animals and operations associated with the
processing of animals, particularly processes  “not necessary but perhaps more profitable” in the
marketing of the animals.  100 N.W.2d at 117, 118 (agriculture encompasses harvesting, but
different question arises when one takes “one step further” by processing the harvest for purpose
of marketing).  Thus, when the ranch raised turkeys, which it could and did market alive, it
engaged in agriculture; but when the ranch slaughtered them, it moved into the realm of 
industry.  Id.   Accord Helmke v. City of Ruthven, 418 N.W.2d at 351, 352 (zoning case affirming
Crouse analysis and specifically noting that grain storage facility, which fell within the scope of
section 335.2 as agricultural, “does not involve the processing of grain into flour”).  Cf. Kennedy
v. State Bd. of Assessment, 224 Iowa 405, 276 N.W. 205, 206 (1937) (“processing” in sales tax
statute means subjecting raw materials to manufacturing). 
In addition, the proposed egg-breaking operation falls within the common definition of
“industry,” because it takes large amounts of a natural, whole, raw, and ready-for-market
agricultural commodity and, with division of labor, changes it into something else.  Compare
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Fischer Artificial Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Iowa State Tax Comm’n, 248 Iowa 497, 81 N.W.2d
437, 440 (1957) (breaking, powdering, and adding preservatives to eggs transforms their natural
state and constitutes manufacturing); Kennedy v. State Bd. of Assessment, 276 N.W. at 206 (“the
glazing of an eggshell to better preserve the egg [has been held to be] a processing”); N.L.R.B. v.
Adams Egg Products, Inc., 190 NLRB 280 (1971) (breaking and separating eggs changes their
raw and natural state and does not constitute agriculture) with Helmke v. City of Ruthven, 418
N.W.2d at 351, 352 (grain storage facility engaged in agriculture under chapter 335 when, among
other things, it did not process grain into flour).  See generally Black’s, supra, at 776, 964-65;
Webster’s, supra, at 584, 695.  Egg breaking separates the edible portion of an egg from its
inedible shell, much like the turkey slaughtering in Crouse v. Lloyd’s Turkey Ranch separated the
edible portion of a turkey from its inedible “shell” of feathers, bones, and skin.
Administrative rules promulgated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture under the Egg
Products Inspection Act, moreover, equate egg breaking with “manufacturing,” a term
necessarily suggesting the presence of industry.  See 21 U.S.C. § 1031 et seq.; 7 C.F.R. §§ 57.5,
94.2; Black’s, supra, at 776.  Iowa’s law on organic agriculture similarly distinguishes between
“agricultural commodities” that are raw, natural, and unprocessed and “agricultural products”
that are subjected to a separating, extracting, cutting, slaughtering, or some other physically
modifying process.  See Iowa Code § 190C.1(2), (3), (4), (14). 
Although we conclude that the proposed egg-breaking operation is industry and thus is
subject to county zoning regulations, we emphasize that this conclusion “is limited to the facts of
this particular situation.”  1980 Op. Att’y Gen. 896 (#80-12-17(L)).  See generally 61 IAC 1.5(2). 
All egg breaking does not necessarily constitute industry for purposes of chapter 335, because,
like farms, all industrial concerns are not created equally.  See Farmegg Products, Inc. v.
Humboldt County, 190 N.W.2d at 458 (determination whether particular activity is industry or
agriculture “<cannot be made in the abstract’”).  Quantity may have its own quality.  The line
dividing industry from agriculture for the processing of a particular agricultural commodity thus
might waver along the continuum of “farming as a way of life” on the far end of the line to “large
scale <agri-industry’” on the other.  See generally Kuehl v. Cass County, 555 N.W.2d at 689
(determination whether activity or operation constitutes agricultural purpose involves
consideration of circumstances incident to the site that detract from the agricultural purpose). 
Compare, for example, the two following situations:  (1) the processing of a few gallons
of milk into fresh butter, which is then offered for sale at a self-serve roadside kiosk by a
diversified Century Farm that has a hundred acres and a teenager who milks the family’s cows
and pumps the family’s churn and (2) the processing of thousands of gallons of milk into butter,
which is then packaged for nationwide transport and marketed by an agricultural conglomerate
that operates its butter-making plant within a ten-acre complex of buildings used for
manufacturing diverse products, obtains all its milk from individual dairy farmers, manages and
trains its many employees to operate, maintain, and repair multiple pieces of sophisticated
Representative Russell Eddie
Page 7
machinery along the assembly line, adds preservatives to its butter, and generates extensive
pollution.  Zoning administrators might see a substantial difference between these two situations,
even though they both use the same raw material (milk) to create the same end product (butter),
and a court would accord deference to their judgment under such circumstances.  See generally
Helmke v. City of Ruthven, 418 N.W.2d at 352 (court cannot substitute its judgment for that of a
city board of adjustment; thus, whether evidence in a close case might support opposite finding
“is of no consequence”).
In this vein, we note that the burden of proof on whether an activity or operation
constitutes industry or agriculture apparently lies with the party seeking an exemption from
county zoning.  See Johnson v. Linn County, 347 N.W.2d 441, 442 (Iowa App.1984) (landowner
could not rely upon precursor to section 335.2 when “the evidence did not indicate that [his]
thirty acre parcel was adapted for agricultural purposes while [he] owned the property”).  See
generally Iowa R. App. P. 14(f)(5) (burden of proof ordinarily falls upon party who would suffer
loss if issue not established); Ernst v. Johnson County, 522 N.W.2d 599, 602 (Iowa 1994) (party
claiming nonconforming use in zoning dispute bears burden to establish lawful and continued
existence of use); Iowa Farmers Purchasing Ass’n v. Huff, 260 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Iowa 1977)
(party claiming statutory exception bears burden to show its applicability); Cerro Gordo County
Supervisors v. Miller, 170 N.W.2d 358, 360, 361 (Iowa 1969) (county zoning ordinance has a
strong presumption of validity, and challenger bears burden to demonstrate its invalidity).
II.  Taxation
(A) Applicable law
Chapter 441 is entitled Assessment and Valuation of Property.  Among other things, it
distinguishes between property used for industry and property used for agriculture.  1982 Op.
Att’y Gen. 41, 42; see Iowa Code § 441.21.  We understand that county assessors essentially
equate “manufacturing,” as defined in section 428.20, with “industry.”  See generally Black’s,
supra, at 776.  Section 428.20 defines a “manufacturer” as a person “who purchases, receives, or
holds personal property of any description for the purpose of adding to its value by a process of
manufacturing, refining, purifying, combining of different materials, or by the packing of meats,
with a view to selling the property for gain or profit. . . .”  See Iowa Limestone Co. v. Cook, 211 
Iowa 534, 233 N.W. 682, 684, 686 (1930) (quarry did not constitute a manufacturer simply by
blasting and crushing big rocks to make irregularly shaped small rocks). 
(B) Analysis
Whether the proposed egg-breaking operation constitutes industry or agriculture for
property tax purposes rests in the first instance with the county assessor, who must consider all
relevant facts and circumstances.  We have explained that the classification of property “for
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purposes of taxation is determined by the [county] assessor.  It is not the function of this office to
determine questions of fact.”  1960 Op. Att’y Gen. 220, 225.  See 701 IAC 71.1(1) (county
assessors responsible for classifying real estate); 1976 Op. Att’y Gen. 373, 374.  
Two administrative rules of the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance provide some
guidance for the county assessor.  The first provides:
Agricultural real estate shall include all tracts of land and
the improvements and structures located on them which are in
good faith used primarily for agricultural purposes . . . .  Land and
the nonresidential improvements and structures located on it shall
be considered to be used primarily for agricultural purposes if its
principal use is devoted to the raising and harvesting of crops or
forest or fruit trees, the rearing, feeding, and management of
livestock, or horticulture, all for intended profit.
701 IAC 71.1(3) (emphasis added).  The second provides: 
Industrial real estate includes land, buildings, structures,
and improvements used primarily as a manufacturing
establishment.  A manufacturing establishment is a business entity
in which the primary activity consists of adding to the value of
personal property by any process of manufacturing, refining,
purifying, the packing of meats, or the combination of different
materials with the intent of selling the product for gain or profit
. . . .
701 IAC 71.1(6)(a)(1) (emphasis added).  
These rules point the county assessor toward determining the “primary activity” of a
facility that houses egg-breaking as well as egg-laying and egg-washing operations upon a single
site.  Ultimately, a court might have to make that determination in light of three governing
principles.  See generally 1998 Op. Att’y Gen. ___ (#98-5-2(L)); Annot., “Taxes –
Manufacturing,” 17 A.L.R.3d 7, 20 (1968).  First:  Courts accord deference to assessing officials
and uphold classifications supported by substantial evidence.  See Hearst Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of
Revenue and Finance, 461 N.W.2d 295, 300 (Iowa 1990).  Second:  Courts require taxpayers to
bear the burden to show improper classifications.  See Eagle Food Centers, Inc. v. City of
Davenport Bd. of Review, 497 N.W.2d 860, 862-63 (Iowa 1993); 1960 Op. Att’y Gen. 220, 224. 
Third:  Courts resolve tax statutes in favor of taxpayers in doubtful cases.  See Welp v. Iowa
Dep’t of Revenue, 333 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Iowa 1983).
III.  Summary
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The county may subject the proposed egg-breaking operation to zoning regulations,
because, as a matter of law, that particular operation does not constitute agriculture. 
“Agriculture” in this context means the art or science of cultivating the ground, including the
harvesting of crops and the rearing and managing of livestock.  Whether the county may classify
the proposed egg-breaking operation as industry for property tax purposes is a question of fact
initially for the county assessor’s determination and ultimately a court’s.  “Industry” in this 
context includes any process of manufacturing, refining, and purifying and excludes any process
that does not change the character of an agricultural commodity. 
Sincerely,
Bruce Kempkes 
Assistant Attorney General 
ECONOMIC EMERGENCY RESERVE FUND; CASH RESERVE FUND: Use of funds for
cash flow purposes.  Iowa Code §§ 8.55(1), (3), 8.56(1), (3), (4) (2001).  Moneys from the
economic emergency fund and the cash reserve fund may be used for cash flow purposes to pay
legal obligations of the State for which the Legislature has made appropriations.  Moneys so used
from the cash reserve fund must be returned by the end of the fiscal year.  The law does not state
when moneys used from the economic emergency fund must be returned.  (Johnson to
Eisenhauer, Director, Iowa Department of Management, 10-5-01) #01-10-2
October 5, 2001
Cynthia Eisenhauer
Director
Department of Management
State Capitol
L O C A L
Dear Ms. Eisenhauer:
You have requested a formal opinion of the Attorney General regarding use of the State’s
reserve funds for cash flow purposes.  In the letter requesting our opinion, you state  that “the
Governor and the Legislature are required to use the revenue estimate of the State’s Revenue
Estimating Conference.”  You further advise us that “the official estimate for March 14, 2001,
coupled with  legally enacted appropriations,” projected  “a positive ending balance for Fiscal
Year 2001" according to “both the Legislative Fiscal Bureau and  the Department of
Management.”
You indicate  that the State’s largest source of revenue, the personal income tax, is not
received until late in the fiscal year.  Because of this, on April 1, when the final quarterly
allotments are made to departments and other entities, actual cash on hand in the general fund is
not sufficient to make those allotments.  You further advise us that, historically, the Department
of Management  has utilized money for cash flow purposes from the economic emergency fund,
pursuant to Iowa Code section 8.55(3) (2001),  and from the cash reserve fund, pursuant to
section 8.56(3),  until the anticipated tax revenues are received.  In keeping with this practice, 
the Department of Management  made the allotments for the final quarter of Fiscal Year 2001 to
pay the State’s legal obligations for which appropriations were made by the Legislature.
According to your letter, it now appears that the actual general fund revenues were not
sufficient to cover these legally allotted expenses.
You have posed two questions:
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1.         “Does the language in 8.55 and 8.56 allow the Economic Emergency Fund
and the Cash Reserve Fund to be used for determining the cash position of the
State, and, when official revenue estimates and other budget assumptions show a
positive General Fund ending balance for the fiscal year, may those funds be used
during the fiscal year for making allotments to pay obligations for which
appropriations have been made?”
2.        “If, when actual revenue collections, transfers, accruals, and standing
appropriations are finalized and  the General Fund is found to not have had
sufficient resources to pay all legally allotted and appropriated items, do these
statutes direct how the State should account for the actual payment of these
obligations?”
APPLICABLE LAW
  The Iowa economic emergency fund is created by Iowa Code section 8.55.  The statute
creating this fund was enacted in 1984.  1984 Iowa Acts, 70  G.A., ch.1305, § 21.  The fund isth
considered separate from the general fund of the State.  Iowa Code § 8.55 (1)(2001).  Money in
the economic emergency fund may be appropriated only in the fiscal year for which the
appropriation is made and only for emergency expenditures.  Iowa Code § 8.55(3)(2001).  The
statute contains one exception to these restrictions on the use of money in the fund:  
However, . . . the balance in the Iowa economic emergency fund
may be used in determining the cash position of the general fund of
the state for the payment of state obligations.
Iowa Code § 8.55(3)(2001).
The cash reserve fund is created by Iowa Code section 8.56.  It was adopted in 1992. 
1992 Iowa Acts, 74  G.A., ch. 1227, § 6.  The cash reserve fund is also  separate  from theth
general fund of the State.  Iowa Code § 8.56 (1).  The statute creating the cash reserve fund
contains a number of restrictions on the use of money in the fund.  See Iowa Code §§ 8.56(1),
(3), (4)(2001).  The statute contains the same exception for the use of money in the fund that is
found in  the economic emergency fund: 
However, . . .  the balance in the cash reserve fund may be used in
determining the cash position of the general fund of the state for
payment of state obligations.  
Iowa Code § 8.56(3)(2001).
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Section 8.56(3) contains an additional requirement regarding the use of money in the cash
reserve fund that is not found in the economic emergency fund:
Moneys in the cash reserve fund may be used for cash flow
purposes provided that any moneys so allocated are  returned  to
the cash reserve fund by the end of each fiscal year.
Iowa Code § 8.56(1)(2001).
    ANALYSIS
I.
Your first question is whether sections 8.55(3) and  8.56(3) authorize the use of money
from the economic emergency fund and the cash reserve fund for cash flow purposes until
anticipated tax revenues are received, specifically, to make allotments to pay legal obligations for
which appropriations have been made by the Legislature. 
 Both section 8.55(3) and section 8.56(3) contain restrictions on the use of reserve funds. 
Both of these statutes contain precisely the same exception to these restrictions: 
  
However, . . .  the balance in the . . .  reserve fund may be used in
determining the cash position of the general fund for the payment
of state obligations.
Iowa Code §§ 8.55(3), 8.56(3)(2001).  (Emphasis added).
The precise meaning of this statutory exception, standing alone, is ambiguous.  It is
unclear what is meant by the language of the statute which allows reserve funds to be used in
“determining” the cash position of the State, and the phrase “cash position” is not defined in the
statute.  
Where the language of a statute is ambiguous or where reasonable persons would be
uncertain as to its meaning, it is necessary to interpret it according to rules of statutory
construction.  Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc. v. Branstad, 537 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Iowa 1995). 
The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature.  Miller v. 
Westfield Insur. Co., 606 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Iowa 2000).  In determining the legislative intent, a
statute should not be read in isolation; rather, all parts of the statute should be considered
together.  General Electric Co.  v.  Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review, 492 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa
1992).  In interpreting the words of a statute, every attempt should be made to give effect to every
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word in the statute and to avoid rendering any part of it superfluous or meaningless.  Iowa Dep’t
of Transportation v. Nebraska-Iowa Supply Co., 272 N.W.2d 6, 11 ( Iowa 1978).
Applying these principles of statutory construction, we believe that a reasonable
construction of sections 8.55(3) and 8.56(3), when read in their entirety,  is that the reserve funds
may be used for cash flow purposes.  These sections state that the reserve funds “may be used in
determining the cash position of the state for the payment of state obligations.” The phrase  “for
the payment of state obligations” implies that the funds can be used for the precise purpose of
paying, on a cash basis, the State’s legal obligations for which appropriations were made  by the
Legislature.  Any interpretation to the contrary would render the phrase “for the payment of state
obligations” superfluous or meaningless, contrary to accepted rules of statutory construction.  
It is our understanding that the Department of Management has interpreted sections
8.55(3) and 8.56(3) in this manner since those statutes were adopted.  It is also our understanding
that the Department of Management has routinely utilized the reserve funds for cash flow
purposes since the 1980s. This long-standing practice is very significant in interpreting sections
8.55(3) and 8.56(3).  The Legislature is presumed to know the construction of a statute given to it
by the executive department of government.  John Hancock Mutual Life Insur. Co. v. 
Lookingbill, 218 Iowa 373, 253 N.W. 604, 611 (1934).  See Lever Bros. v. Erbe, 249 Iowa 454,
87 N.W.2d 469, 474  (1958) (There is a presumption that the Legislature was aware of federal
regulations interpreting an act when it adopted a similar state statute).  Where there has been a
long-standing interpretation of a statute and the Legislature has left it  materially unchanged, the
presumption exists that the Legislature has acquiesced in the interpretation.  Smith v. Iowa Liquor
Control Comm’n, 169 N.W.2d  803, 807 (Iowa 1969).  Indeed, the courts readily acknowledge
that they will “give weight to the administrative interpretation of statutes, particularly when they
are long-standing.”  General Electric Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Review, 492 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa
1992). 
In 1992, eight years after the economic emergency fund had been established, the
Legislature created the cash reserve fund.  1992 Iowa Acts, 74  G.A., ch.  1227, § 6.   At theth
same time, the Legislature amended portions of section 8.55(3) relating to the use of money in
the economic emergency fund.  1992 Iowa Acts, 74  G.A., ch.  1227, § 5.  Notably, in amendingth
the statute governing the economic emergency fund, the Legislature did not in any way restrict
the use of the fund for cash flow purposes, even though the funds had been used for cash flow
purposes prior to the amendments.  This is further evidence of legislative acquiescence in the
Department of Management’s interpretation of the statutes.
As noted above, when the cash reserve fund was created in 1992, it included the same
exception to the restrictions on the use of funds as the economic emergency fund and allowed the
fund “to be used in determining the cash position of the general fund of the state for the payment
of state obligations.”  However, one additional restriction on the use of the funds for cash flow
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purposes was included:  the requirement that  “any moneys so allocated [be] returned to the cash
reserve fund by the end of each fiscal year.” Iowa Code § 8.56(1). 
In contrast, there is no requirement that moneys from the economic emergency fund
which are used for cash flow purposes must be returned by the end of the fiscal year:  the statute
is silent on when these funds must be returned.  This is significant because the statute governing
the economic emergency fund was amended in the same year that the cash reserve fund was
created.  See 1992 Iowa Acts, 74  G.A., ch. 1227, §§ 5, 6.  When the Legislature wanted toth
require that money used for cash flow purposes be returned to the fund by the end of the fiscal
year, it certainly knew how to say so.  The omission of such a requirement from section 8.55(3) is
an indication that the legislature did not intend to impose such a requirement on the use of
moneys from the economic emergency fund.  See State v. Carpenter, 616 N.W.2d 540, 543 (Iowa
2000) (“We acknowledge the rule of statutory construction that legislative intent can be
‘expressed by omission as well as by inclusion’.”)
We conclude that sections 8.55(3) and 8.56(3) authorize the Department of Management
to use moneys from the economic emergency fund and the cash reserve fund for cash flow
purposes, specifically, to pay the State’s legal obligations for which appropriations have been
made by the Legislature.  Monies used from the cash reserve fund for this purpose must be
returned to the cash reserve fund by the end of the fiscal year.  The statute is silent as to when
monies used from the economic emergency fund must be returned.
II.
Your second question is whether the statutes in question explain how the State should
account for the use of the reserve funds for cash flow purposes when the general fund is found 
to have insufficient resources to pay all legally allotted and appropriated items.
We are unable to answer this question in an Attorney General’s opinion.  As we have
noted on a prior occasion:
This office can only render an opinion on issues of law, meaning
those issues which can be answered by statutory construction or
legal research.  1972 Op. Att’y Gen. 686.  If resolution of a
question is dependent on factors other than legal issues, it must be
resolved by other entities as provided by law. . . . This office cannot
resolve accounting issues as a matter of law.  
1992 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen.  60. (Emphasis added).
We believe that your question as to the proper method of accounting in this situation
should be resolved by your accountants, applying the principles of law we have set forth above.
CONCLUSION
A reasonable construction of sections 8.55(3) and  8.56(3) is that moneys from the
economic emergency fund and the cash reserve fund may be used for cash flow purposes,
specifically, to pay legal obligations of the State incurred as a result of legislative appropriations . 
The long-standing interpretation of these statutes by the Department of Management, as well as
that Department’s routine practice under these statutes,  support this conclusion.  The Legislature
has acquiesced in this practice and has not amended the statutes to prevent it.  Although moneys
used from the cash reserve fund for cash flow purposes must be repaid at the end of the fiscal
year, the statutes contain no such requirement for funds used from the economic emergency fund.
We are unable to advise you, as a matter of law, as to the proper method of accounting for
these practices.
Very truly yours,
Dennis W.  Johnson
Solicitor General
LAW ENFORCEMENT; COUNTIES AND COUNTY OFFICERS:  Use of special deputies. 
Iowa Code § 331.652 (2001).  County sheriffs may not use special deputies on a regular, ongoing
basis to assist in performing official duties.  They may only appoint them to assist in handling an
emergency.  (Kempkes to Goodlow, Monroe County Attorney, 10-17-01) #01-10-4(L)
Mr. Steven E. Goodlow
Monroe County Attorney
108 Washington Ave. East
Albia, IA 52531
Dear Mr. Goodlow:
Iowa has long-authorized its county sheriffs to use private citizens, untrained in law
enforcement, to assist in the performance of official duties.  See Stickney v. Stickney, 77 Iowa
699, 42 N.W. 518, 519 (1889).  Twenty years ago, however, the General Assembly backed away
from the tradition by passing legislation that provided for the establishment and training of
reserve deputies to assist county sheriffs and their regular deputies.  See 1980 Iowa Acts, 68th
G.A., ch. 1191.  See generally 1984 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 86 (#84-2-6(L)).
You have requested an opinion on the use of private citizens to assist in the performance
of official duties at a time when county sheriffs may, due to budget constraints, have relatively
few regular or reserve deputy sheriffs at their disposal.  You ask whether county sheriffs may use
private citizens as “special deputies” on a regular, ongoing basis.  This question implicates an
examination of Iowa Code chapters 80D and 331 (2001).
I.  Applicable law
Chapter 331 is entitled County Home Rule Implementation.  Section 331.652 provides in
part:
(1).  The sheriff may call upon any person for assistance to:
(a).  Keep the peace or prevent the commitment of
crime.
(b).  Arrest a person who is liable to arrest.
(c).  Execute a process of law.
(2).  The sheriff, when necessary, may summon the power
of the county to carry out the responsibilities of office.
Chapter 80D is entitled Reserve Peace Officers.  Section 80D.1 permits the establishment
of a force of reserve deputy sheriffs to assist the county sheriff and any regular deputy sheriffs in
performing official duties.  Section 80D.1A(3) defines a reserve deputy sheriff as a volunteer,
non-regular, sworn member of the sheriff's office who serves with or without compensation, has
regular police powers while functioning as a deputy sheriff, and “participates on a regular basis”
in the activities of the county sheriff's office.
II.  Analysis
Section 331.652 authorizes county sheriffs to appoint special deputies, viz., “persons who
would not otherwise be classified as regular or reserve deputies.”  1984 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 119 
(#84-2-6(L)).  You have asked whether they may use special deputies on a regular, ongoing basis
to assist in performing official duties. 
In 1939, this office concluded that the precursor to section 331.652 only sanctioned the
temporary appointment of these volunteers.  See 1940 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 564, 565; see also 
1980 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 882 (#80-12-4(L)) (county sheriff may summon assistance of
individual or posse comitatus “on an ad hoc basis”).  Cf. 1982 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 148, 149
(county sheriff has authority to appoint “irregular, special deputies” who may have such duties
and powers as keeping the peace, preventing crime, arresting persons liable thereto, and
executing process of law); 1898 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 101, 101 (county sheriffs may summon a
posse comitatus, but counties lack authority “to aid in having an effective posse comitatus always
subject to call”).  
In 1984, we answered the question whether special deputies can serve as permanent
employees of the county sheriff’s office: 
[A]ny exercise of [the appointment authority in section 331.652(1)]
should be limited to dire emergency situations in which the sheriff
is required to exercise [that] authority . . . because of the
impossibility of calling upon regular or reserve deputies.  Once the
emergency has passed, however, the sheriff would be required to
comply with [chapters 80D or 331] if he or she wishes to appoint a
special deputy to a more permanent position as [a] regular or
reserve deputy . . . .  [T]he sheriff should resort to appointment of
special deputies . . . only in very unusual circumstances.
1984 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 119 (#84-2-6(L)) (quotation marks omitted). 
Our 1984 opinion accurately summarizes current law and governs your question. 
Accordingly, we conclude that county sheriffs have no authority under section 331.652 to use
special deputies on a regular, ongoing basis.  Any other conclusion would tend to subvert the
legislative intent underlying chapter 80D, which provides for the establishment and training of
reserve deputy sheriffs.  See generally Iowa Code ch. 80B (imposing mandatory training upon
regular peace officers), ch. 80D (setting standards and placing limits on scope of authority of
reserve peace officers). 
We recognize that a regular, ongoing force of special deputies may, as a matter of fact,
significantly assist a county sheriff who must contend with a manpower shortage that
accompanies a tight budget and a county that elects not to take advantage of chapter 80D.  Your
question, however, rests squarely on a matter of law, and, as a matter of law, section 331.652
limits the use of special deputies to assist in emergencies.  See 1984 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 119
(#84-2-6(L)).  Emergencies are specific, sudden and unexpected, temporary, and require
immediate responsive action.  Black’s Law Dictionary 522-23 (6  ed. 1991); Webster’s Ninthth
New Collegiate Dictionary 368 (1979).
III.  Summary
County sheriffs may not use special deputies on a regular, ongoing basis to assist in
performing official duties.  They may only use them to assist in handling an emergency. 
Sincerely,
Bruce Kempkes 
Assistant Attorney General 
COUNTY AND COUNTY OFFICERS; INCOMPATIBILITY OF OFFICES:  County board of
supervisors appointing supervisor to county conservation board.   Iowa Code section 331.216
(2001) supersedes the common law and permits county supervisors to appoint one of their own
members to serve simultaneously on the county’s conservation board.  Enactment of section
331.216 reverses the conclusions reached in our prior opinions -- e.g., 1980 Op. Att’y Gen. 51
(#79-4-4(L)); 1980 Op. Att’y Gen. 202 (#79-6-5(L)); 1970 Op. Att’y Gen. 27 -- that the common
law does not permit a supervisor to serve simultaneously as a member of another county office.  
(Kempkes to Hansen, Osceola County Attorney, 4-27-01) #01-4-4(L)
Mr. Robert E. Hansen
Osceola County Attorney
Courthouse
300 7  St.th
Sibley, IA 51249
Dear Mr. Hansen:
You have requested an opinion on the appointment authority of a county board of
supervisors.  You ask whether the supervisors can appoint one of their own members to serve
simultaneously on the county’s conservation board.
In Iowa, the common law as well as statutes governs whether a person may
simultaneously serve in multiple public offices.  See 1994 Op. Att’y Gen. 35 (#93-9-1(L)). 
Courts in several states have held that the common law prohibits a superior board from
appointing one of its own members to serve on an inferior board.  3 E. McQuillin, The Law of
Municipal Corporations § 12.75, at 403-04 (2001).  They describe such an appointment as
against public policy.  Id. at 403.  In 1969, this office identified some of the conflicts generated
by self-appointment in concluding that the common-law doctrine of incompatibility of offices
prohibits simultaneous service by a supervisor on the conservation board:
Due to the fact that [conservation board members] are
appointed by and may be removed for cause by the [supervisors]
and the further fact that the [conservation board is required by
statute] to file a full report of its receipts, disbursements and the
program of work for the period covered and recommendations with
the [supervisors,] it is our view that [the offices of supervisor and 
conservation board member] are incompatible, and no one person
should be a member of both boards. 
1970 Op. Att’y Gen. 27, 28-29.  Subsequent opinions involving analogous circumstances reached
the same conclusion.  See 1980 Op. Att’y Gen. 51 (#79-4-4(L)) (supervisor may not
simultaneously serve as member of county board of health or county fair board); 1980 Op. Att’y
Gen. 202 (#79-6-5(L)) (same).
More than a decade after our 1969 opinion, the General Assembly amended the Iowa
Code chapter entitled County Home Rule Implementation.  It specifically amended the part that
governs supervisors by adding this sentence:  
Unless otherwise provided by state statute, a supervisor
may serve as a member of any appointive board, commission, or
committee of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or a
nonprofit corporation or agency receiving county funds.
 
1981 Iowa Acts, 69  G.A., ch. 117, § 215.  Cf. Iowa Code § 23A.1(1) (“political subdivision”th
includes county for purposes of legislation regulating competition by government with private
sector).  See generally Iowa Code § 4.1(30)(c) (unless otherwise defined, “may” in statute
confers a power).  Now codified at Iowa Code section 331.216 (2001), this provision lies at the
heart of your question.
There is no question that the General Assembly may modify the common law.  1980 Op.
Att’y Gen. 202 (#79-6-5(L)); see American Canyon Fire Prevention Dist. v. Napa County, 190
Cal. Rptr. 189, 192 (Ct. App. 1983) (legislature may abrogate common-law doctrine of
incompatibility “when it considers it necessary or convenient to permit officers to hold
incompatible offices”).  If it does, we apply established principles of statutory construction only
when the statute is ambiguous.  See Iowa Code § 4.6; Farmers Co-op Co. v. DeCoster, 528
N.W.2d 536, 537 (Iowa 1995).  "A statutory provision is ambiguous if reasonable minds could
differ or be uncertain as to its meaning."  In re S.M.D., 569 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Iowa 1997).  
We discern no ambiguity in section 331.216 under this definition.  Section 331.216
supersedes common-law precepts by broadly providing that a supervisor may serve on any
appointive board of the county unless otherwise provided by statute.  See generally Black’s Law
Dictionary 94 (1991) (“any” means an indefinite number of whatever kind and often equates with
“every” or “all”).  We have discovered no statute providing otherwise.  See generally Iowa Code
chs. 331, 350.  
Nevertheless, we point out that a supervisor simultaneously serving on the conservation
board may repeatedly encounter conflicts of interest as a supervisor.  As we recently explained:
Although [two public offices may not be incompatible as a matter
of law, their statutory duties may] thrust a person appointed to both
public offices into situations in which conflicts of interest may
arise.  Our opinions have emphasized the distinction between
incompatibility and conflicts of interest.  While we do not wish to
blur the distinctions that have been drawn, we caution against the
appointment of one person to two public offices that will likely
confront the person repeatedly with conflicts of interest.
2000 Op. Att’y Gen. ___ (#00-9-1) (citation omitted).  
We iterate this caution here, especially in light of the policies underlying the common-law
prohibition against self-appointment.  If, however, the supervisors proceed to appoint one of their
own members to the conservation board, the supervisor qua supervisor should refrain from
participating in discussions as well as abstain from voting if conflicts of interest arise.  See, e.g.,
571 IAC 33.21 (member of Natural Resources Commission must refrain from participating in
discussions as well as abstain from voting when conflict of interest arises); 1998 Op. Att’y Gen.
___ (#98-5-3) (member of city council who wishes to exercise caution in resolving conflict of
interest should refrain from participating in decision-making process as well as abstain from
voting). 
In summary:  Iowa Code section 331.216 (2001) supersedes the common law and permits
county supervisors to appoint one of their own members to serve simultaneously on the county’s
conservation board.  Enactment of section 331.216 reverses the conclusions reached in our prior
opinions -- e.g., 1980 Op. Att’y Gen. 51 (#79-4-4(L)); 1980 Op. Att’y Gen. 202 (#79-6-5(L));
1970 Op. Att’y Gen. 27 -- that the common law does not permit a supervisor to serve
simultaneously as a member of another county office.
Sincerely,
Bruce Kempkes 
Assistant Attorney General 
MUNICIPALITIES: Public notice and required readings and publication of proposed ordinances. 
Iowa Code §§ 21.4(1), 380.3, 380.6(1)(a) (2001).  Iowa Code section 21.4(1) requires that the
council give notice of the time, date, and place of each meeting as well as its tentative agenda,
which would include listing of proposed ordinances to be discussed.   Iowa Code section 380.3
allows a municipal council to suspend the multiple reading requirements therein and approve an
ordinance by affirmative vote at a single meeting.  Iowa Code section 380.6(3) requires that
proposed ordinances be published after passage.  (Biederman to Hardisty, Adams County Atty.,
3-2-01) #01-3-1(L)
March 2, 2001
Mr. Earl Hardisty
Adams County Attorney
Courthouse Box 28
Corning, IA 50841
Dear Mr. Hardisty:
You have requested an opinion on a number of questions raised by recent actions of a
municipal council in passing a local ordinance.   It is our understanding that the ordinance in
question was not published prior to passage.  Instead, the council listed the proposed ordinance
on a meeting agenda and after a first reading moved to waive second and third readings and
proceeded immediately to vote for passage.   After the vote for passage, the ordinance was
published once, with indication that it was now in effect.  Your letter questioned the validity of
the ordinance in light of these facts and whether, if the ordinance was in fact invalid, it may
become valid through passage of time or re-adoption procedures.   The facts as you present them
do not illustrate the invalidity of the ordinance and therefore we do not reach the latter issues.
 There is no requirement that proposed ordinances be published prior to passage although
publication is required after passage.  Iowa Code § 380.6 (2001).  An ordinance only becomes
law when published and publication is essential to its validity.  State ex rel. Bump v. Omaha &
C.B. Ry. & Bridge Co., 113 Iowa 30, 84 N.W. 983, 984 (Iowa 1901).   Publication may occur
immediately after passage if the ordinance is approved by the mayor.  Iowa Code § 380.6(1)(a). 
If the mayor vetoes the ordinance, publication may take place immediately after the council re-
passes the measure.  Id. Iowa Code § 380.6(2).  If the mayor takes no action, publication can take
place “not sooner than fourteen days after the date of passage.”  Id. Iowa Code § 380.6(3).   A
city ordinance becomes effective upon publication, unless a subsequent date is specified within
the ordinance.  Iowa Code § 380.6(1)(a), (b), (c) (2001).
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The open meetings law, codified at Iowa Code chapter 21 (2001), covers the issue of the
agenda.  Prior to passage, the legislative body entertaining proposed legislation must list the item
on its agenda to provide adequate public notice of consideration of the issue.   Keeler v. Iowa
State Bd. of Public Instruction, 331 N.W.2d 110, 111 (Iowa 1983).  A governmental body may
not meet without giving adequate prior public notice pursuant to section 21.4.  Iowa Code § 21.3. 
Section 21.4 requires that the council give notice of the “time, date, and place of each meeting” 
as well as its tentative agenda, which would include listing of proposed ordinances to be
discussed.   Iowa Code § 21.4(1).   Such notice must be posted or published no later than 24
hours prior to the meeting unless there are exigent circumstances requiring a council meeting to
be convened in less time.  Iowa Code § 21.4(2).   Failure to comply with the Open Meetings Law
may result in a number of remedies, including but not limited to voiding action taken during the
meeting.  Iowa Code § 21.6.    
Three meetings are generally required for consideration and voting on a proposed
ordinance or amendment, “unless this requirement is suspended by a recorded vote of not less
than three-fourths of all the members of the council.”  Iowa Code § 380.3 (2001).  If such a vote
is recorded, consideration and passage may occur on the same day.  Id.  City of Bloomfield v.
Blakeley, 192 Iowa 310, 184 N.W. 634, 635 (Iowa 1921) (referring to similar code language,
then found at Iowa Code section 682).  However, such suspension of the three meeting
requirement must be the exception rather than the rule.  This office has previously addressed a
similar question concerning the number of readings required prior to passage of a county
ordinance.  1991 Op. Att’y Gen. 21 (#91-4-3).  The opinion of this office is that waiver of the
three meeting rule should remain an exceptional method of procedure and that, although
alternative methods may be permitted by statute, “interests of public notice and participation in
the . . . legislative process and governmental accountability demand sparing use of this
alternative legislative method.”  Id. 
In summary, though there is no publication requirement prior to passage, ordinances must
be published after passage to be valid.  Proposed council legislation must be included in the
meeting agenda to comply with the Open Meetings Law; there is a separate remedy for failure to
do so which does not include invalidating an ordinance.  Additionally, although a municipality
may waive the three meeting requirement and enact an ordinance in one meeting, such a waiver
must be used sparingly in the interests of public notice and participation.  If a council has
followed statutory requirements for open meetings and publication, the ordinance is
presumptively valid.
Sincerely,
MELISSA ANNE BIEDERMAN
Assistant Attorney General
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COUNTY AND COUNTY OFFICERS:  County attorney; giving legal advice.  Iowa Code 
§ 331.756 (2001).  A county attorney qua county attorney lacks authority to give legal advice to a
private, nonprofit corporation that supervises criminal defendants released on probation or parole
pursuant to court order.  (Kempkes to Holmes, Story County Attorney, 5-17-01) #01-5-3(L)
Mr. Stephen H. Holmes
Story County Attorney
Courthouse
Nevada, IA 50201
Dear Mr. Holmes:
You have requested an opinion on the extent to which a county attorney, as county
attorney, has authority to give legal advice to a private, nonprofit corporation.  You ask whether a
county attorney must or may advise the Center for Creative Justice, which, in addition to
providing various social services, supervises criminal defendants released on probation or parole
pursuant to court order.  Although this question might implicate ethical as well as legal principles
relating to conflicts of interest, we limit our examination to provisions in Iowa Code chapter 331
(2001).
Chapter 331 is entitled County Home Rule Implementation.  Among other things, it sets
forth the duties and powers of elected county officers.  Sections 331.757, 331.758, and 331.903
identify the powers of a county attorney:  to appoint and remove assistants and clerks, and
administer oaths and take affirmations.  Section 331.756 identifies the duties of a county
attorney, who, if serving the county on a full-time basis, must refrain from the private practice of
law.  See Iowa Code § 331.752(1); see also 1924 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 140, 140 (“county
attorney’s private practice, if any, is entirely separate and distinct from his official business”).  In
particular, section 331.756(7) provides in part that a county attorney 
[shall give] advice or a written opinion, without compensation, to
the board [of supervisors] and other county officers and to school
and township officers . . . upon any matters in which the state,
county, school, or township is interested, or relating to the duty of
the officer in any matters in which the state, county, school, or
township may have an interest . . . .
See generally Iowa Code § 4.1(30)(a) (unless otherwise provided, “shall” in statutes imposes a
duty). 
Chapter 331 clearly imposes a duty upon a county attorney to give advice to the
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supervisors, other county officers, township officers, and school officers.  Although undefined by
section 331.756, the phrase “other county officers” unquestionably includes the principal county
officers:  the auditor, treasurer, recorder, and sheriff.  See, e.g., 1912 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 320,
320; see also In re Assessment of Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. of Sioux City, 155 Iowa 536, 136
N.W. 543, 544 (1912); Clark v. Tracy, 95 Iowa 410, 64 N.W. 290, 291 (1895).  The phrase also
encompasses certain other county positions or boards.  See, e.g., 1990 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 7 
(#89-2-2(L)) (county conference board, because all its members act in interest and on behalf of
county); 1980 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 523 (#79-12-3(L)) (county hospital trustee, because elected
position); 1962 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 131, 131 (county conservation board, because enabling act
requires assistance from “other county officials,” which includes county attorney); see also 1992
Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 139 (#92-7-1(L)) (listing prior opinions); 1982 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 496
(#82-8-6(L)) (county conservation board).  See generally 1988 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 116 
(#88-11-3(L)) (county attorney may have additional duties to perform if county enters into
agreement, pursuant to chapter 28E, which involves obligations of the county).
The General Assembly has instructed that undefined words and phrases in statutes shall
be construed according to approved English usage.  See Iowa Code § 4.1(38).  In common usage,
“county officers” means those persons
whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the
limits of the county . . . , whose duties apply only to that county,
and through whom the county performs its usual political
functions. . . . [A “county officer” represents the county]
continuously and as part of the regular and permanent
administration of public power in carrying out certain acts with the
performance of which it is charged in behalf of the public. 
Black’s Law Dictionary 351 (6  ed. 1991).  Accord Sheboygan County v. Parker, 70 U.S. (3th
Wall.) 93, 96, 18 L.E. 33 (1865); see 20 C.J.S. Counties § 97, at 299 (1990).  This definition
clearly excludes the directors or officers of a private, nonprofit corporation that supervises
criminal defendants released on probation or parole pursuant to court order.  See 1990 Iowa Op.
Att’y Gen. 60 (#90-1-4(L)) (county attorney has no duty to give advice to county fair society,
which, though statutorily created, operates as a nonprofit corporation); see also 1999 Ohio Op.
Att’y Gen. 028 (county attorney has no duty to represent nonprofit corporation that functions as
county convention and visitor bureau merely because it receives county funds).  Cf. 1980 Iowa
Op. Att’y Gen. 732 (#80-6-21(L)) (director of private, nonprofit organization, which administers
community mental health center, does not constitute “public officer” for purposes of common-
law doctrine of incompatibility of public office).  And, although a county attorney has the duty to
institute and try criminal prosecutions in the name and on behalf of the State, that duty certainly
does not extend to the giving of legal advice to any entity, public or private, which supervises
criminal defendants released on probation or parole.  See generally Iowa Code chs. 904, 906,
907.   
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The question remains whether a county attorney has discretion to give legal advice to the
Center for Creative Justice.  Although two prior opinions have concluded that county attorneys
may choose to advise entities or persons lying outside the scope of section 331.756(7) -- joint
911 service boards, 1992 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 139 (#92-7-1(L)), and county fair societies, 1990
Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 60 (#90-1-4(L)) – those opinions do not provide county attorneys with carte
blanche authority to give legal advice to all entities and persons. 
A joint 911 service board constitutes a public entity and clearly serves a public purpose of
the county.  See Iowa Code ch. 34A; 1992 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 139 (#92-7-1(L)).  Although a
private entity, a county fair society exists by virtue of express statutory authority, has a right to
public funding, and clearly serves a public purpose of the county.  See Iowa Code ch. 174; 1990
Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 60 (#90-1-4(L)).  In contrast, the Center for Creative Justice does not
constitute a public entity, does not exist by virtue of express statutory authority, and does not
have a right to public funding.  Even though it may perform the important function of supervising
criminal defendants released on probation and parole, the county has no statutory responsibility
to supervise them.  See generally Iowa Code §§ 906.1, 907.2.  Such circumstances place the
Center for Creative Justice outside the sphere of the county attorney’s legal advice.  
III.  Summary
A county attorney qua county attorney lacks authority to give legal advice to a private,
nonprofit corporation that supervises criminal defendants released on probation or parole
pursuant to court order.
Sincerely,
Bruce Kempkes 
Assistant Attorney General 
APPROPRIATIONS; COUNTIES:  Transfer from special fund for unrelated program.  2001
Iowa Acts, 79  G.A., ch. ___, § ___ (S. F. 65); Iowa Code §§ 25B.2, 455E.11 (2001).  Theth
General Assembly in Senate File 65 can divert money from the groundwater protection fund to
the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program before the end of the fiscal year as long as
the diversion impairs no contractual obligation.  The State Mandates Act, which may excuse
local entities from paying administrative fines or penalties levied by the State, does not apply to a
legislative scheme in which the State provides financial benefits to local entities that achieve
waste-reduction goals.  (Kempkes to Jackson, Des Moines County Attorney, 9-6-01) #01-9-1
Mr. Patrick C. Jackson
Des Moines County Attorney
215 Columbia St.
Burlington, IA 52601
Dear Mr. Jackson:
You have requested an opinion on the validity and impact of recent legislation that
became effective on February 7 with the Governor’s signature.  Pointing to Senate File 65, you
ask whether the General Assembly can divert money before the end of the fiscal year on June 30
from the groundwater protection fund to a different state program and, if so, whether this
diversion can relieve a county regional solid waste commission from paying administrative fines
or penalties levied by the State for failure to achieve waste-reduction goals.  You acknowledge
that the Supreme Court of Iowa in 1993 upheld a diversion of money at the end of the fiscal year
from the groundwater protection fund to the general fund.  Your questions invite examination of
Iowa Code chapters 25B and 455E (2001) as well as Senate File 65. 
I.  Applicable law
Senate File 65 describes itself as an act providing supplemental funding for the Low-
Income Home Energy Assistance Program.  See S.F. 65, 79  G.A., 1  Sess. (Iowa 2001).  Itth st
provides money for that program by appropriating unencumbered or unobligated money from
three funds, including the groundwater protection fund.  See S.F. 65, §§ 1-3. 
Chapter 455E is entitled Groundwater Protection.  Section 455E.11(1) establishes the
groundwater protection fund, which represents charges collected by landfill entities, and provides
in part: 
Notwithstanding section 8.33 [which generally provides for
automatic reversion to the state treasury every August 31 of
unencumbered or unobligated balances of appropriations], any
unexpended balances in [the fund] and in any of the accounts
within [the fund] at the end of each fiscal year shall be retained in
the fund and the respective accounts within the fund . . . .  The fund
may be used for the purposes established for each account within
the fund [viz., solid waste, agriculture management, household
hazardous waste, and storage tank management].
Section 455E.11(2) provides that money collected from fees relating to those accounts shall be
deposited in its respective account and shall be appropriated, used, or expended for specified
purposes, none of which relate to low-income home energy assistance.
Iowa Code chapter 25B is entitled State Mandates – Funding Requirements.  It only
applies to a “political subdivision,” specially defined as “a city, county, township, or school
district” (or, for some purposes, a community college and area education agency).  See Iowa
Code §§ 25B.2(3), 25B.3(1).  Section 25B.2(3) provides in part:
If, on or after July 1, 1994, a state mandate is enacted by the
general assembly, or otherwise imposed, on a political subdivision
and the state mandate requires a political subdivision to engage in
any new activity, to provide any new service, or to provide any
service beyond that required by any law enacted prior to July 1,
1994, and the state does not appropriate moneys to fully fund the
cost of the state mandate, the political subdivision is not required
to perform the activity or provide the service and the political
subdivision shall not be subject to the imposition of any fines or
penalties for the failure to comply with the state mandate unless the
legislation specifies the amount or proportion of the cost of the
state mandate which the state shall pay annually.
See generally Iowa Code § 25B.3(2) (defining “state mandate”).
II.  Analysis
You have asked whether the General Assembly can divert money before the end of the
fiscal year on June 30 from the groundwater protection fund to a different state program and, if
so, whether this diversion can relieve a county regional solid waste commission from paying
administrative fines or penalties levied by the State for failure to achieve waste-reduction goals.  
We understand that the “county regional solid waste commission” arose through the joint
exercise of governmental powers.  See generally Iowa Code ch. 28E. 
(A)
Before this year, the General Assembly specified that money deposited in the
groundwater protection fund be appropriated, used, or expended for matters relating to solid
waste, agriculture management, household hazardous waste, and storage tank management.  See
Iowa Code § 455E.11.  Earlier this year, however, the General Assembly took unencumbered and
unobligated money in that fund and applied it to a matter clearly constituting a public purpose,
but, as well, clearly unrelated to solid waste, agriculture management, household hazardous
waste, and storage tank management.  See S.F. 65.  You have questioned the authority of the
General Assembly to do so.  
Your question necessitates a limited review, because the General Assembly may enact
any law not expressly (or by clear implication) prohibited by the United States or Iowa
Constitution.  Courts indulge in every presumption in favor of validating a legislative enactment. 
See Frost v. State, 172 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 1970).  They reluctantly interfere with the
budgetary process.  Polk County v. Iowa St. App. Bd., 330 N.W.2d 267, 276 (Iowa 1983).
In Des Moines Metropolitan Area Solid Waste Agency v. Branstad, 504 N.W.2d 888
(Iowa 1993), the Supreme Court of Iowa considered whether the General Assembly had authority
to divert money from the groundwater protection fund to the general fund.  The supreme court
upheld the diversion and concluded that the General Assembly may divert money from a fund so
long as the diversion does not “conflict with a provision of the constitution controlling such fund,
or would impair the obligation of a contract to constitute a breach of trust . . . .”  Des Moines
Metro. Area Solid Waste Agency v. Branstad, 504 N.W.2d at 890 (quoting Michigan Sheriffs’
Ass’n v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 255 N.W.2d 666, 672 (Mich. App. 1977)).  Compare id.
with 1992 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 8, 12 (legislature may divert funds so long as diversion does not
“conflict with a constitutional provision or impair a contractual relationship such as arises where
the [S]tate holds trust or retirement funds, holds funds obtained to repay a specific indebtedness
such as revenue bonds, or holds funds obtained for a specific [purpose] and no other purpose”);
1992 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 119, 120.  See generally U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 (no state shall pass any
law impairing obligation of contracts); Iowa Const. art. I, § 21 (1857) (legislature shall not pass
law that impairs obligation of contracts).  Des Moines Metropolitan Area Solid Waste Agency v.
Branstad thus sets the parameters for legislative diversion of funds.  
We see nothing in the state constitution that controls the groundwater protection fund. 
Thus, unless Senate File 65 impairs a contractual obligation, the General Assembly in Senate File
65 could divert money from this fund to the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program.  
See generally 1980 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 882, 887 (federal constitutional provision protecting
against impairment of contracts only applies “to a state law enacted after the making of a contract
whose obligation is asserted to have been impaired”).
That the General Assembly diverted money from the groundwater protection fund before
the end of the fiscal year, and thus possibly hindered compliance with waste-reduction goals, has
no relevance to the analysis enunciated in Des Moines Metropolitan Area Solid Waste Agency v.
Branstad.  See generally Iowa Const. art. III, § 24 (1857) (“[n]o money shall be drawn from the
treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law”); City of Des Moines v. Iowa Dist.
Ct., 241 Iowa 256, 264, 41 N.W.2d 36, 40 (1950) (“[w]hat the [State] gives it can as readily, take
away”); 1982 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 63, 64 (legislature, which has “exclusive constitutional
authority to appropriate funds from the state treasury,” may “specify how [an appropriation] shall
be spent”).
(B)
You have asked whether the diversion of money from the groundwater protection fund
can, pursuant to section 25B.2(3) in the State Mandates Act, relieve a county regional solid waste
commission from paying administrative fines or penalties levied by the State for failure to
achieve waste-reduction goals.  Section 25B.2(3) excuses the payment of state-imposed “fines”
or “penalties” when the General Assembly does not “fully fund” the cost of a “state mandate.” 
Preliminarily, we have no means of determining the existence of a state mandate.  Section
25B.3(2) defines “state mandate” as requiring a political subdivision to establish, expand, or
modify its activities “in a manner which necessitates additional expenditures of local revenue by
all affected political subdivisions of at least [$100,000], or additional combined expenditures of
local revenue by all affected political subdivisions within five years of enactment of [$500,000]
or more . . . .”  This language necessitates estimation.  The Legislative Service and Fiscal
Bureaus each have duties regarding this accounting, see Iowa Code §§ 25B.4-.5, but, upon
inquiry, these agencies do not have any records on whether a state mandate exists here.  
 
Similarly, questions of “full,” “sufficient,” or “adequate” funding of legislative programs
necessarily involve factual determinations, which lie outside the proper scope of an opinion.  See
1989 Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. 77; 1996 Okla. Op. Att’y Gen. 21.  See generally 61 Iowa Admin.
Code 1.5(3)(c) (Attorney General opinions determine matters of law or statutory construction or
interpretation).  We have previously stated that our office “cannot resolve accounting issues as a
matter of law.”  1992 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 55, 60. 
In any event, we cannot accept the premise of your question that the State levies 
administrative fines or penalties for failure to achieve waste reduction goals.  Rather, the General
Assembly has provided financial incentives linked with waste reduction:  a “planning area” pays
a lower tonnage fee to the State if it meets or exceeds waste reduction goals, Iowa Code 
§ 455D.3(3); and a “sanitary landfill operator” retains more of its tonnage fees normally
transferred to the State if its updated comprehensive plan receives approval from the Iowa
Department of Natural Resources (DNR), Iowa Code § 455B.310(3).  See generally Iowa Code 
§ 455B.311 (DNR director “may” make “grants” to a combination of cities, counties, and central
planning agencies from funds reserved under and for the purposes specified in section
455E.11(2)(a)).  We cannot properly characterize the failure to receive these benefits as a fine or
penalty.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 632 (6  ed. 1990) (“fine” means a pecuniary punishment orth
mulct; “penalty,” an elastic term, generally means pecuniary punishment).  See generally Iowa
Code § 4.1(38) (undefined words in statutes shall be construed according to context and
approved English usage).  Nor can we properly characterize a legislative scheme which does not
require waste reduction, but merely establishes waste-reduction goals for local entities, as a state
“mandate.”  See Iowa Code § 25B.3(2) (“state mandate” means a statutory requirement or
appropriation which requires a political subdivision to perform an activity); see also Webster’s
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 692 (1979) (“mandate” signifies a command).
III.  Summary
The General Assembly in Senate File 65 can divert money from the groundwater
protection fund to the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program before the end of the fiscal
year as long as the diversion impairs no contractual obligation.  The State Mandates Act, which
may excuse local entities from paying administrative fines or penalties levied by the State, does
not apply to a legislative scheme in which the State provides financial benefits to local entities
that achieve waste-reduction goals. 
Sincerely,
Bruce Kempkes 
Assistant Attorney General 
NUISANCE; COUNTIES:  Assessment for abatement by county.  Iowa Code §§ 331.384,
364.12, 384.62 (1999).  A county abating a nuisance located on a private lot has authority to
assess all reasonable abatement costs against the lot.  (Kempkes to Lloyd, Clarke County
Attorney, 1-18-01) #01-1-2
January 18, 2001
Mr. John D. Lloyd
Clarke County Attorney
Courthouse
100 S. Main St.
Osceola, IA 50213
Dear Mr. Lloyd:
You have requested an opinion on the liability for costs incurred by counties that abate
nuisances located on private lots.  You ask whether a county has authority to assess all abatement
costs against a lot or, instead, whether it only has authority to assess costs up to twenty-five
percent of the lot’s value.  After examining Iowa Code chapters 331 and 384 (1999), we conclude
that a county may assess all reasonable abatement costs against the lot.
I.  Applicable law
Chapter 331 is entitled County Home Rule Implementation.  Section 331.384(1)(a)
provides that a county -- like a city, Iowa Code § 364.12(3) -- may require the abatement of a
nuisance “in any reasonable manner.”  Section 331.384(2) provides:
If the property owner does not perform an action required
under this section within a reasonable time after notice, a county
may perform the required action and assess the costs against the
property for collection in the same manner as a property tax. . . . 
However, in an emergency, a county may perform any action
which may be required under this section without prior notice and
assess the costs as provided in this section after notice to the
property owner and hearing.
(emphasis added).  Section 331.384(5) provides:
The procedures for making and levying a special
assessment pursuant to this section and for an appeal of the
assessment are the same procedures as provided in sections 384.59
through 384.67 and sections 384.72 through 384.75, provided that
the references in those sections to the council shall be to the board
of supervisors and the references to the city shall be to the county.
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(emphasis added). 
Chapter 384 is entitled City Finance.  Section 384.62 provides in part:
A special assessment against a lot for a public improvement
may not be in excess of the amount of the assessment, . . . and an
assessment may not exceed twenty-five percent of the value of the
lot . . . .
Special assessments for the construction or repair of
underground connections for private property for gas, water,
sewers, or electricity may be assessed to each lot for the actual cost
of each connection for that lot, and the twenty-five-percent
limitation does not apply.
(emphasis added).
II.  Analysis
In permitting a county to assess the costs of abating a nuisance located on a private lot,
section 331.384 expressly incorporates certain provisions in chapter 384 that normally apply to
special assessments linked with the making of public improvements.  One of those provisions,
section 384.62, limits special assessments to twenty-five percent of a lot’s value in certain
instances.  The question thus arises whether this limitation applies to an assessment for a
county’s abating a nuisance on a private lot. 
Section 331.384(5) does not broadly provide that “sections 384.59 through 384.67 and
sections 384.72 through 384.75” shall apply to special assessments for a county’s abating a
nuisance.  Rather, section 331.384(5) more narrowly provides that “[t]he procedures for making
and levying special assessments pursuant to this section and for an appeal of the assessment are
the same procedures as provided in sections 384.59 through 384.67 and sections 384.72 through
384.75.” (emphasis added).  By express language, then, section 331.384(5) only incorporates the
procedures contained in those specified provisions; it does not incorporate the provisions in toto.
The word “procedures” commonly means a set or defined series of steps for
accomplishing a goal or performing a task and legally signifies adjective law as distinguished
from substantive law.  E.g., United States v. Jones, 846 F. Supp. 955, 964 n. 19 (S.D. Ala. 1994),
affirmed, 57 F.3d 1020 (11  Cir. 1995); People v. Bauer, 614 N.Y.S.2d 871, 876 (City Ct. 1994);th
Marbet v. Keisling, 838 P.2d 580, 581 (Or. 1992); Black’s Law Dictionary 41, 1203-04 (1990);
Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 910 (1979).  In the context of nuisance proceedings,
these meanings do not easily encompass a limitation on costs.  See generally Iowa Code 
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§ 4.1(38) (statutory words and phrases shall be construed according to context and approved
English usage).  Rather, they encompass such administrative matters as, for example, the filing of
an assessment schedule, Iowa Code § 384.59; the challenging of an assessment, Iowa Code 
§ 384.66; and the paying of an assessment, Iowa Code § 384.67. 
We therefore conclude that the twenty-five-percent limitation does not apply to an
assessment for a county’s abating a nuisance on a private lot.  This construction harmonizes with
section 331.384(2), which permits a county to abate a nuisance on private property “and assess
the costs against the property” and with section 657.4, which permits district courts by warrant to
order abatement of a nuisance “at the expense of the defendant.” (emphasis added).  See
generally March v. Pekin Ins. Co., 465 N.W.2d 852, 854 (Iowa 1991) (related statutes must be
harmonized).  In addition to textual considerations, our conclusion receives support on at least
five more levels:  
First:  Full recovery by counties comports with the common law.  See 58 Am. Jur. 2d
Nuisance § 414, at 992, § 422, at 999, § 425, at 1003, § 428, at 1005 (1989).  See generally Iowa
Code § 4.6(4) (statutory construction may take into account the common law). 
Second:  Full recovery comports with an apparent legislative scheme of permitting public
entities the opportunity to recoup, in some manner, their expenses for abating nuisances located
on private lots.  See generally Iowa Code § 4.6(4) (statutory construction may take into account
laws upon same or similar subject).  Those entities include 
-- the Iowa Department of Transportation, Iowa Code § 306C.19(2); 
-- cities, Iowa Code § 364.12(3); City of Muscatine v. Northbrook Partnership
Co., 619 N.W.2d 362, 367-68 (Iowa 2000) (cities may seek personal judgments
against private property owners to recover costs); French v. Iowa Dist. Court, 546
N.W.2d 911, 915 n. 3 (1996) (cities may assess private lots for abatement costs); 
-- the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, Iowa Code § 455B.275(4); 
-- governing bodies of levee and drainage districts, Iowa Code § 468.149; and 
-- county health boards, Boone County Health Bd. v. Wood, 243 N.W.2d 862, 866
(Iowa 1976); see Iowa Code § 137.6(2). 
Third:  Full recovery encourages the abatement of nuisances that harm or might harm the
public health, safety, and welfare by providing some measure of financial assurance to counties. 
See generally Iowa Code § 4.6(5) (statutory construction may take into account consequences of
a particular construction).  Full recovery does not provide a windfall to counties:  it merely gives
them the opportunity to recoup their outlays and places them in roughly the same position as a
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third party who abates a nuisance and thereafter seeks payment for its abatement.  See Boone
County Health Bd. v. Wood, 243 N.W.2d at 868.  See generally Iowa Code § 4.4(3) (statutory
construction presumes that legislature intended just and reasonable result).  
Fourth:  A county abating a nuisance located on a private lot merely acts as the alter ego
of the owner, who, in comparison with the county, certainly has a higher responsibility for its
abatement.  See generally Iowa Code § 331.384(2).  Less than full recovery encourages lot
owners to refrain from properly abating nuisances in a timely fashion and provides them with a
type of windfall when the county, acting in the public interest, steps in to abate them.  See
Brandon Township v. Jerome Builders, Inc., 263 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Mich. App. 1978).  See
generally Iowa Code § 4.4(5) (statutory construction presumes that legislature intended to favor
public interest over any private interest); In re Johnson, 213 N.W.2d 536, 538 (Iowa 1973)
(statutory construction disfavors a construction resulting in an inequity).  Equity, which governs
nuisance proceedings, does not favor unjustly enriched lot owners who have unclean hands.  Cf.
Iowa Code § 4.2 (courts shall liberally construe statute with a view to promote its object and
assist the parties in obtaining justice).
Fifth:  A construction of section 331.384(5) incorporating the twenty-five-percent
limitation of section 384.62 would ignore the language of section 384.62 in its entirety.  See
generally Iowa Code § 4.4(2) (statutory construction presumes that legislature intended for entire
statute to be effective); State v. Carpenter, 616 N.W.2d 540, 542 (Iowa 2000) (statute must be
construed in its entirety).  Although the first paragraph of section 384.62 clearly provides that the
twenty-five-percent limitation applies to public improvements, the second paragraph just as
clearly provides that this limitation does not apply to every public improvement.  See Iowa Code
§ 384.62 (second paragraph:  “the twenty-five-percent limitation does not apply” to special
assessments for constructing or repairing underground connections for private property for gas,
water, sewers, or electricity).  Any construction of section 331.384(5) incorporating the twenty-
five-percent limitation from section 384.62 would have the rather awkward if not insolvable
problem of explaining why the first paragraph takes precedence over the second when counties,
acting solely in the public interest, abate nuisances located on private lots.
III.  Summary
A county abating a nuisance located on a private lot has authority to assess all abatement
costs against the lot.  The costs must be reasonable.  Boone County Health Bd. v. Wood, 243
N.W.2d at 869-70; 6A E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 24.79, at (1997); see
Iowa Code § 331.384(1)(a). 
Sincerely,
Mr. John D. Lloyd
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Bruce Kempkes 
Assistant Attorney General  
CIVIL SERVICE; COUNTIES; SHERIFF:  Office reorganization.  Iowa Code §§ 20.7, 331.323,
331.652, 331.903, 341A.6, 341A.8, 341A.12 (2001).  Acting in good-faith and for the purpose of
economy or efficiency, county sheriffs can eliminate a lieutenant’s position in reorganizing their
offices and effectively demote the lieutenant having the least seniority.  They may not undertake
such a reorganization for the purpose of avoiding the civil service laws.  (Kempkes to Martin,
Cerro Gordo Attorney, 10-31-01) #01-10-5(L)
Mr. Paul L. Martin
Cerro Gordo County Attorney
220 N. Washington Ave.
Mason City, IA 50401
Dear Mr. Martin:
You have requested an opinion on the scope of authority of county sheriffs over their
offices.  You ask whether a sheriff, in reorganizing his office, may eliminate a lieutenant’s
position and effectively demote a lieutenant.  
With the appointment of a civilian as jail administrator, the sheriff says he no longer has
any need for a lieutenant in charge of headquarters, a position only created in 1997.  He proposes
reducing the number of lieutenants in his officer from three to two and returning the lieutenant
having the least seniority to his former position of deputy sheriff.  
I.  Applicable law
In answering your question, we focus upon Iowa Code chapters 20, 331, and 341A
(2001). 
Chapter 20 is entitled Public Employment Relations (Collective Bargaining).  Among
other things, it provides that public employers “shall have, in addition to all powers, duties, and
rights established by constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, charter, or special act, the
exclusive power, duty, and the right to . . . [h]ire, promote, demote, transfer, assign and retain
public employees in positions within the public agency,” to “[m]aintain the efficiency of
governmental operations,” and to “[r]elieve public employees from duties because of lack of
work or for other legitimate reasons.”  Iowa Code § 20.7(2), (4), (5).  Cf. Iowa Code § 20.9
(public employers and employees may enter into contract that provides inter alia for “procedures
for staff reduction”).
Counties have home rule authority under the state constitution.  See Iowa Const. art. III, 
§ 39A (amend. 37).  In essence, counties may exercise any power and perform any function they
deem appropriate for improving the general welfare of their residents so long as their actions do
not offend state law.  Chapter 331 is entitled County Home Rule Implementation.  Section
331.301(3) provides that counties may exercise their general powers subject only to limitations
“expressly imposed” by state law.  Section 331.323(2)(g) provides that the county supervisors
shall establish the number of deputies, assistants, and clerks in the sheriff’s office.  Section
331.652(7) provides:  “Subject to the requirements of chapter 341A and section 331.903, the
sheriff may appoint and remove deputies, assistants, and clerks.”  Section 331.903(1) similarly
provides that the sheriff may appoint, with the approval of the county supervisors, one or more
deputies, assistants, and clerks and that the county supervisors shall determine the number of
deputies, assistants, and clerks. 
Chapter 341A is entitled Civil Service for Deputy County Sheriffs.  Section 341A.6(9)
authorizes civil service commissions to “classify deputy sheriffs and subdivide them into groups
according to rank and grade which shall be based upon the duties and responsibilities of the
deputy sheriffs.”  Under section 341A.8, no person in the classified civil service “shall be
reinstated in or transferred, suspended, or discharged from any such place, position, or
employment contrary to the provisions of [chapter 341A].”  Section 341A.12 provides that no
person in the classified civil service “who has been permanently appointed or inducted into civil
service . . . shall be removed, suspended, or demoted except for cause . . . .” 
II.  Analysis
You have asked whether sheriffs have authority to reorganize their offices and, if not,
whether civil service commissions may approve reorganizations that eliminate a lieutenant’s
position and effectively demote a lieutenant.  We assume that chapter 341A encompasses this
position, see Iowa Code § 341A.7, and that the reorganization complies with the terms of any
collective bargaining agreement, see generally Iowa Code ch. 20.
Nothing in chapters 20, 331, and 341A requires a sheriff’s office to have lieutenants or a
specific number thereof.  Chapter 341A only prohibits the removal, transfer, or demotion of a
person within the classified civil service, except for cause.  See Iowa Code § 341A.12;
Burmeister v. Muscatine County Civil Serv. Comm’n, 538 N.W.2d 877, 878 (Iowa App. 1995). 
We do not believe that this prohibition overrides the sheriff’s prerogative to achieve reductions in
force made in good faith.  See generally Iowa Code § 20.7; 1980 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 523 
(#79-12-4(L)) (sheriff has authority to appoint deputies in number approved by county
supervisors and has sole authority to terminate them); 1982 Op. Att’y Gen. 58, 58-59 (public
entity seeking to achieve reduction in force can terminate employee protected by veteran
preference statute, which permits removal for incompetency or misconduct; it would be incorrect
to “surmise that an eligible veteran who occupies a covered position could only be removed for
misconduct or incompetency [and not for any] other cause”).  
This office recently addressed the analogous question about a city’s authority to
consolidate positions in a fire department.  See 2000 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. __ (#00-2-2).  We
explained:
As a matter of logic, the authority to create and abolish
positions includes the authority to consolidate them.  Cities possess
this authority even though the persons affected by its exercise
enjoy civil service status.  Cities “are not bound to keep [civil
service employees] upon the payrolls if it is decided, in good faith,
that the positions should be abolished, either because of financial
necessity or the dictates of good and economical business
management.” 
That cities may make good-faith modifications in the civil
service for the purpose of economy or efficiency comports with
their authority, in general, to exercise full control over all their
officers and employees.  Courts have viewed the creation or
abolition of a position in city government as something more than
a mere administrative act.  The abolition of a position in the
budgetary process is a “quintessential legislative function,
reflecting [a governing body’s] ordering of policy priorities in the
face of limited financial resources.”  Civil service legislation thus
does not completely restrict city government in the areas of
personnel and fiscal management.  We have observed:
Although Civil Service statutes are designed to
protect and safeguard against arbitrary actions of
superior officers in removing employees, the
overriding concern is always the protection of the
public.  As such, Civil Service legislation is not
designed to prevent a department from being
reorganized in the interest of efficiency and
economy.  Any reclassification, therefore, which
conforms the civil structure to the realities of the
agency prior to the reclassification is valid. 
2000 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. ___ (#00-2-2) (citations omitted). 
We believe that our 2000 opinion governs your question.  Accordingly, we conclude that
the sheriff can eliminate a lieutenant’s position in reorganizing his office and effectively demote
the lieutenant having the least seniority and that the civil service commission lacks jurisdiction
over such reorganization.  This caveat from our 2000 opinion, however, bears repeating:
We [caution] against merely establishing a title and moving
individuals into newly consolidated positions in order to establish a
pay differential:  “It should be shown that there is a substantial
difference in the work performed and that the reorganization
accords with realities.”  A similar caveat was issued by the court in
Helgevold v. Civil Service Commission: 
There are limits upon actions the city may take for
administrative reasons. The municipality may not
avoid the dictates of the civil service laws by merely
labeling an action administrative.  Reclassification
or reorganization will not be permitted when its
purpose is to avoid civil service laws. . . . 
. . . .
Therefore, [a] court must balance the interests
involved; those of the city in controlling the
functions and administration of the [city], and of the
employee in serving without threat of demotion or
removal for improper or partisan reasons.  The
fulcrum in balancing these interests is the public
good. 
The limitations mentioned by these caveats would require
factual findings.  The opinion process cannot resolve disputed
issues of fact, and this opinion does not purport to do so.
2000 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. ___ (#00-2-2).
III.  Summary
Acting in good-faith and for the purpose of economy or efficiency, county sheriffs can
eliminate a lieutenant’s position in reorganizing their offices and effectively demote the 
lieutenant with the least seniority.  They may not undertake such a reorganization for the purpose
of avoiding the civil service laws.
Sincerely,
Bruce Kempkes 
Assistant Attorney General 
EMINENT DOMAIN; MUNICIPALITIES; SCHOOLS:  City condemning school property.   
Iowa Const. art. IX (2  part), § 1 (1857); Iowa Code §§ 6A.4, 297.1, 306.2, 306.19 (2001). nd
Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or arbitrary abuse of discretion, a city may condemn
property owned by a school district to use as right-of-way for a street.  (Kempkes to McKean,
State Senator, 7-31-01) #01-7-1(L)
The Honorable Andy McKean
State Senator
509 S. Oak St.
Anamosa, IA 52205
Dear Senator McKean:
The phrase “eminent domain” signifies the lawful taking, or condemning, of property for
a public use.  Black’s Law Dictionary 523 (6  ed. 1990).  You have requested an opinion on theth
taking of public property for a different public use.  You ask whether a city can condemn
property owned by a school district to use as right-of-way for a major arterial street. 
I.  Applicable law
Your question invites examination of Iowa Code chapters 6A, 6B, 297, and 306 (2001) as
well as the state constitution.
Chapter 306 is entitled Establishment, Alteration, and Vacation of Highways.  It allocates
jurisdiction and control over primary and secondary roads, streets, and parkways.  The “primary
road system” means “those roads and streets both inside and outside the boundaries of 
municipalities,” Iowa Code § 306.3(6), and falls within the jurisdiction and control of the Iowa
Department of Transportation (DOT), Iowa Code § 306.4(1).  The “municipal street system”
means “those streets within municipalities that are not primary roads.”  Iowa Code § 306.3(5). 
See generally Iowa Code § 306.3(8) (defining “<road’ or <street’”).  Pursuant to section 306.4(3),
the municipal street system falls within the jurisdiction and control of “the governing body of
each municipality; except that the [DOT] and the municipal governing body shall exercise
concurrent jurisdiction over the municipal extensions of primary roads in all municipalities.”  
Chapter 306 also addresses the acquisition of right-of-way by an agency.  “Public road
right-of-way” means “an area of land, the right to possession of which is secured or reserved by
the state or a governmental subdivision for roadway purposes.”  Iowa Code § 306.3(7).  
“Agency” means “any governmental body which exercises jurisdiction and control over any road
as provided in section 306.4.”  Iowa Code § 306.2(1).  Section 306.19 specifically provides:
(1).  In the maintenance, relocation, establishment, or
improvement of any road, including the extension of such road
within cities, the agency having jurisdiction and control of such
road shall have authority to purchase or to institute and maintain
proceedings for the condemnation of the necessary right-of-way
therefor. 
. . . .
(4).  Proceedings for the condemnation of land for any
highway shall be under the provisions of chapter 6A and 6B. . . .
See Black’s Law Dictionary 728 (“highway” means a free and public roadway or street).  See
generally Iowa Code § 4.1(38) (undefined words in statutes shall be construed according to
context and approved English usage).
Chapter 6A is entitled Eminent Domain Law (Condemnation).  It confers the power of
eminent domain upon cities “for public purposes which are reasonable and necessary as an
incident to the powers and duties conferred upon cities.”  Iowa Code § 6A.4(6).  
Chapter 6B is entitled Procedure under Eminent Domain.  It sets forth detailed procedures
for condemning property pursuant to the power of eminent domain.
The state constitution invests the General Assembly with control over school lands.  Iowa
Const. art. IX (2  part), § 1 (1857).  Pursuant to that authority, the General Assembly enactednd
chapter 297, entitled Schoolhouses and Schoolhouse Sites.  It provides in part: 
The board of each school district may fix the site for each
schoolhouse, which shall be upon some public highway already
established or procured by such board and not in any public park,
and except in cities and villages, not less than thirty rods from the
residence of any landowner who objects thereto.                 
Iowa Code § 297.1. 
II.  Analysis
You have asked whether a city can condemn property owned by a school district to use as 
right-of-way for a major arterial street.  We limit our opinion to this narrow question and, in
doing so, assume that jurisdiction and control over the street rests exclusively with the city.  See
generally Iowa Code §§ 306.3(5), 306.4(3). 
In 1896, the Supreme Court of Iowa observed:
[I]t is not true that property devoted to one public use cannot be
subjected to another.  It is within the power of the [General
Assembly] to make the same property subservient to different
public uses, or even to take it from one public use and devote it to
another.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Starkweather, 97 Iowa 159, 66 N.W. 87, 88 (1896).  See Iowa
Att’y Gen., Eminent Domain in Iowa 2 (1962); Annot., “Condemnation – Of Public Entity’s
Land,” 35 A.L.R.3d 1293 (1971); Annot., “Condemnation of Public Property,” 91 L. Ed. 221
(1947); 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain § 100, at 534 (1996).  A public entity taking property
devoted to a public use for a different public use could not supersede or materially interfere with
the pre-existing use unless its enabling statute authorized that power in express language or by
necessary implication.  Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Starkweather, 66 N.W. at 88.  
The supreme court applied these well-established principles in subsequent cases when
municipalities sought to condemn railway property.  See, e.g., Connolly v. Des Moines & Central
Iowa Ry. Co., 246 Iowa 874, 68 N.W.2d 320, 326 (1955); Town of Alvord v. Great N. Ry. Co.,
179 Iowa 465, 161 N.W. 467, 469 (1917); Chicago, G.W. Ry. Co. v. Mason City, 155 Iowa 99,
135 N.W. 9, 10 (1912); see also 1928 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 255, 256.  Other jurisdictions
applying the principles have specifically upheld condemnations of school property by
municipalities.  See, e.g., In re Borough of Edgewood, 178 A. 383, 383-84 (Pa. 1935); Roberts v.
City of Seattle, 116 P. 25, 26 (Wash. 1911).
Iowa cases on this subject all predate 1968, when Iowa voters ratified a state
constitutional amendment providing for municipal home rule.  As a result of the amendment,
“[m]unicipal corporations may enact any law not inconsistent with [state statutes] to determine
their local affairs and government.”  Iowa Const. amend. 25 (1968).  The General Assembly
thereafter declared in section 364.1 that a city 
may, except as expressly limited by the Constitution, and if not
inconsistent with [state statutes], exercise any power and perform
any function it deems appropriate to protect and preserve the rights,
privileges, and property of the city or of its residents, and to
preserve and improve the peace, safety, health, welfare, comfort,
and convenience of its residents.
(emphasis added).  Thus, under section 364.2(2), a city “may exercise its general powers subject
only to limitations expressly imposed by a state or city law.”  
In Oakes Construction Co. v. Iowa City, 304 N.W.2d 797, 808 (Iowa 1981), the supreme
court held that constitutional home rule provides cities with the power to establish streets and
condemn rights-of-way and that statutory provisions merely augment this power.  See Bechtel v.
City of Des Moines, 225 N.W.2d 326, 333 (Iowa 1975).  It explained that a city has 
broad discretion of a legislative nature to determine whether a
street or road shall or shall not be established, initially or by
extension, and . . . courts cannot interfere with this legislative
function except in a clear case of fraud, bad faith, or arbitrary abuse
of discretion.
Oakes Constr. Co. v. Iowa City, 304 N.W.2d at 808.  Accord 1994 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 142
(#94-9-4(L)); see 1970 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 125, 127; see also Iowa Code § 6A.4(6) (cities may
exercise power of eminent domain for public purposes that are “reasonable and necessary”). 
Oakes Construction Co. v. Iowa City thus limits our inquiry.  We see nothing in chapter
306 that detracts from the home rule power of a city to condemn property for use as right-of-way. 
If anything, chapter 306 affirms that power.  See Iowa Code § 306.19(1) (city “shall have
authority to purchase or to institute and maintain proceedings for the condemnation of the
necessary right-of-way therefor”).  Cf. Iowa Code § 384.24(3)(a) (“essential corporate purpose”
of city which wishes to issue general obligation bonds includes opening, widening, and extending
rights-of-way). 
III.  Summary
Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or arbitrary abuse of discretion, a city may
condemn property owned by a school district to use as right-of-way for a street. 
Sincerely,
Bruce Kempkes 
Assistant Attorney General 
TAXATION; NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS; COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATIONS; RURAL
WATER DISTRICTS:  Property tax exemptions for pollution-control or recycling property of
entities providing water to rural areas.  Iowa Code §§ 357A.15, 427.1, 427A.1 (2001).  Either
section 427.1(17) or section 427.1(19) may exempt from property taxes the pollution-control or
recycling property of nonprofit corporations having sewage treatment facilities and providing
water to rural areas; only section 427.1(19) may exempt from property taxes the pollution-control
or recycling property of cooperative associations having sewage treatment facilities and
providing water to rural areas; the question whether either exemption applies to particular items
of pollution-control or recycling property will depend upon an assessment of the relevant facts
and circumstances, a task lying outside the proper scope of an opinion.  Section 357A.15
exempts from property taxes all pollution-control or recycling property of rural water districts
having sewage treatment facilities.  (Kempkes to McKibben, State Senator, 5-1-01) #01-5-1
The Honorable Larry McKibben
State Senator
State Capitol
LOCAL
Dear Senator McKibben:
Iowa Code chapters 357A, 499, and 504A (2001) each provide for the organization of
entities that provide water to rural areas.  You have requested an opinion on the possible taxation
of their property, which, in addition to systems for water, may include facilities for treating
sewage.  See generally Iowa Code §§ 357A.11(11), 499.7(7), 455B.291(7), -.298(2), 504A.3-
.4(16).  You ask whether property tax exemptions apply to unspecified pollution-control or
recycling property of those facilities.
I.  Applicable law
Chapter 427 is entitled Property Exempt and Taxable.  Section 427.13 generally subjects
property to taxation, and section 427.1 exempts certain property from taxation.  Section
427.1(17) -- formerly section 427.1(30) -- exempts “[t]he real property of a nonprofit corporation
engaged in the distribution and sale of water to rural areas when devoted to public use and not
held for pecuniary profit.”  Section 427.1(19) -- formerly section 427.1(32) -- exempts 
“[p]ollution-control or recycling property” of any entity, subject to certain conditions and
amounts. 
II.  Analysis
We assume that each provision of chapter 427 has a purpose.  We thus read chapter 427
as a whole in order to give meaning to each provision.  See Iowa Code § 4.4(2); Kohrt v. Yetter,
334 N.W.2d 245, 246 (Iowa 1984); 1980 Op. Att’y Gen. 639, 643.  A clear and unambiguous
provision requires no construction.  Farmers Co-op Co. v. DeCoster, 528 N.W.2d 536, 537
(Iowa 1995).  Undefined words and phrases receive their common and ordinary meanings.  Iowa
Code § 4.1(38).
Legislatures provide tax exemptions based upon types of entities, activities, or property. 
Section 427.1(19) is an example of an exemption focusing upon a specific type of property.  In
contrast, section 427.1(17) is an example of an exemption focusing upon a specific type of entity.
Government often exempts nonprofit corporations from taxation “to encourage their involvement
in necessary or desirable, yet unaddressed, aspects of society.”  Note, 25 J. Corp. L. 659, 662
(2000).  
(A)  Nonprofit corporations organized under chapter 504A
We believe that section 427.1(17) clearly and unambiguously provides a blanket
exemption to nonprofit corporations organized under chapter 504A that undertake the important
task of providing water to rural areas.  The exemption encompasses the real property of these
nonprofit corporations.  Section 427A.1(1)(d) broadly defines “real property” for property tax
purposes as including “[b]uildings, structures, equipment, machinery or improvements, any of
which are attached to . . . buildings, structures, or improvements . . . .”  
Whether a particular item of pollution-control and recycling property properly lies within
the scope of this definition amounts to a question of fact, which we cannot answer in an opinion. 
See generally 61 IAC 1.5(3)(c).  The breadth of the statutory language, however, certainly favors
a factual finding that it does.  See Iowa Code § 427A.1(2) (“attached” means connected by an
adhesive preparation; in a manner such that disconnecting requires the removal of one or more
fastening devices (other than electric plugs); or in a manner such that removal requires
substantial modification or alteration of the property removed or the property from which it is
removed); see also State v. Bishop, 257 Iowa 336, 132 N.W.2d 455, 457 (1965) (“equipment”
means implements used in operations or activities); Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary
383 (1979) (“equipment” means apparatus, or all fixed assets other than land and buildings of a
commercial enterprise).  As indicated in the following paragraph, a nonprofit corporation may
seek an exemption under section 427.1(19) to the extent that its pollution-control and recycling
property does not lie within the scope of section 427.1(17).  
(B)  Cooperative associations organized under chapter 499
Section 427.1(17) only applies to a “nonprofit corporation” providing water to rural areas. 
An entity that provides water to rural areas and organizes under chapter 499 does not constitute a
nonprofit corporation.  Compare Iowa Code § 499.2 (“cooperative association” means one which
“distributes its net earnings among its members”) with Iowa Code § 498.1 (“nonprofit
cooperative association” means one which declares itself “not for pecuniary profit”). 
Nevertheless, cooperative associations may seek an exemption for  pollution-control or recycling
property pursuant to the more detailed provisions of section 427.1(19).  Whether particular items
of pollution-control and recycling property satisfy the conditions of section 427.1(19) -- which,
among other things, specially defines “pollution-control property” and “recycling property” --
also amounts to a question of fact that lies outside the proper scope of an opinion.  See generally
61 IAC 1.5(3)(c).  
(C)  Rural water districts organized under chapter 357A
An entity that provides water to rural areas and organizes under chapter 357A -- a rural
water district -- receives special protection from taxation.  Section 357A.15 provides in part that
“[t]he facilities constructed or otherwise acquired by a district, including but not limited to
ponds, reservoirs, pipelines, wells, check dams, and pumping installations . . . shall not be
taxable in any manner by the state or any of its political subdivisions.”  (emphasis added).  We
believe that this broad protection encompasses all pollution-control and recycling property as a
matter of law, especially in light of the authorization in section 357A.11(11)(b) for rural water
districts to construct, operate, and maintain wastewater treatment works.  See Black’s Law
Dictionary 591 (1991) (defining “facilities” as that which promotes the ease of any action or
operation); Webster’s, supra, at 406 (defining “facility” as something built, installed, or
established to serve a particular purpose).  See generally Iowa Code § 4.1(38).
III.  Summary
Either section 427.1(17) or section 427.1(19) may exempt from property taxes the
pollution-control or recycling property of nonprofit corporations having sewage treatment
facilities and providing water to rural areas; only section 427.1(19) may exempt from property
taxes the pollution-control or recycling property of cooperative associations having sewage
treatment facilities and providing water to rural areas; the question whether either exemption
applies to particular items of pollution-control or recycling property will depend upon an
assessment of the relevant facts and circumstances, a task lying outside the proper scope of an 
opinion.  Section 357A.15 exempts from property taxes all pollution-control or recycling
property of rural water districts having sewage treatment facilities.
Sincerely, 
Bruce Kempkes 
Assistant Attorney General 
COUNTIES; SCHOOL DISTRICTS:  County contribution to wellness center; public purpose. 
Iowa Const., art. III, § 31 (1857); Iowa Code §§ 331.301, 346A.2 (2001).  Consistent with the
state constitutional requirement that an expenditure of public funds serve a public purpose, a
county may contribute money to a regional wellness center, owned and operated by a school
district, which will have an aquatic area, track, cardio-respiratory room, and other facilities that
promote good health.  (Kempkes to Ridout, Emmet County Attorney, 4-27-01) #01-4-2(L)
Mr. William B. Ridout
Emmet County Attorney
703 1  Ave. S.st
Estherville, IA 51334
Dear Mr. Ridout:
You have requested an opinion on the expenditure of public funds.  You ask whether a
county may contribute to a regional wellness center, owned and operated by a school district,
which will have an aquatic area, track, cardio-respiratory room, and other facilities that promote
good health.  
I.  Applicable law
Under statutory home rule, a county 
may, except as limited by the Constitution, and if not inconsistent
with the laws of the general assembly, exercise any power and
perform any function it deems appropriate . . . to preserve and
improve the peace, safety, health, welfare, comfort, and
convenience of its residents.
Iowa Code § 331.301(1).  See Iowa Const. amend. 37 (1978).  
II.  Analysis
We have discovered no law of the General Assembly that prohibits counties from
contributing to a regional wellness center owned and operated by a school district.  You have
raised a question, however, whether section 31 in article III of the 1857 Iowa Constitution may
prohibit such a contribution.  
Section 31 provides in part that “no public money or property shall be appropriated for
local, or private purposes, unless such appropriation . . . be allowed by two thirds of the members
elected to each branch of the [General Assembly].”  Case law and prior opinions have applied the
principle expressed in section 31 -- known as the “public purpose requirement” or the “public
purpose doctrine” -- to counties and other political subdivisions.  See, e.g., Love v. City of Des
Moines, 210 Iowa 90, 230 N.W. 373, 378 (1930); 1998 Op. Att’y Gen. ___ (#98-1-2(L)); 1996
Op. Att’y Gen. 9, 11; 1986 Op. Att’y Gen. 113, 113; see also Slutts v. Dana, 138 Iowa 244, 115
N.W. 1115, 1117 (1908) (“county” defined as a public corporation that exists only for public
purposes).  
“[I]t is impossible to conceive of a public improvement which will not incidentally
benefit some private individual engaged in private enterprise for private gain.”  15 E. McQuillin,
The Law of Municipal Corporations § 39.19, at 39 (1995) (footnote omitted).  Accordingly, the
public purpose requirement prohibits the expenditure of public funds “strictly for private
gratification.”  1986 Op. Att’y Gen. 113, 113.  We have some doubt that the public purpose
requirement, so defined, can encompass a transfer of public money between public entities.  For
purposes of this opinion, however, we will assume that it does.  Cf. 1990 Tex. Op. Att’y Gen.
JM-1255 (political subdivisions in Texas may assist each other only if the resources and powers
donated by one to another “are used for a definite public purpose of the donating subdivision”). 
The phrase “public purpose” has a flexible and expansive scope.  John R. Grubb, Inc. v.
Iowa Hous. Fin. Auth., 255 N.W.2d 89, 93 (Iowa 1977); 1990 Op. Att’y Gen. 79 (#90-7-3(L)).  It
“should not be construed narrowly.”  1996 Op. Att’y Gen. 9, 11.  Like beauty in the eye of its
beholder, a public purpose may take many forms.  2000 Op. Att’y Gen. ___ (#99-6-1(L)).   The
proper inquiry for the public purpose requirement “is to determine if a public interest is served,
regardless of whether incidental private purposes exist.”  1990 Op. Att’y Gen. 79 (#90-7-3(L))
(emphasis added).  In other words, a violation occurs in the absence of any public purpose.  1996
Op. Att’y Gen. 9, 11. 
A challenger to an expenditure of public funds bears the heavy burden of showing its
unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt and negating every reasonable basis in its support. 
1998 Op. Att’y Gen. ___ (#98-1-2(L)).  The absence of any public purpose “must be so clear <as
to be perceptible by every mind at first blush.’”  1996 Op. Att’y Gen. 9, 11 (citations omitted). 
As a result, courts generally do not invalidate expenditures.  See 2000 Op. Att’y Gen. ___ 
(#99-6-1(L)).  Each case, however, “must be decided with reference to the object sought to be
accomplished and to the degree and manner in which that object affects the public welfare.”  15
McQuillin, supra, at 40 (footnote omitted).  
The existence of a public purpose in any given situation typically depends upon an
assessment of specific facts and circumstances.  See, e.g., 1990 Op. Att’y Gen. 79 (#90-7-3(L))
(public purpose requirement does not per se prohibit cities and counties from providing loans to
private businesses in order to create jobs).  Certain expenditures, however, generate no dispute
among reasonable minds about their public purpose.  The construction of buildings for education
or athletics is a public purpose.  15 McQuillin, supra, at 50.  The promotion of public health is a
public purpose.  Fleming v. Hull, 73 Iowa 598, 35 N.W. 673, 678 (1887).  Indeed, the General
Assembly has expressly invested counties with statutory authority to preserve or improve the
public welfare, comfort, and convenience as well as the public health.  See Iowa Code 
§ 331.301(1); see also Iowa Code ch. 346A (county may provide health services through health
centers).  We can therefore conclude as a matter of law that a county may contribute money to a
regional wellness center, owned and operated by a school district, which will have an aquatic
area, track, cardio-respiratory room, and other facilities that promote good health.  
Nevertheless, we advise the county to make findings on the public purpose underlying
this contribution, if it occurs, and to take steps to ensure that its money does indeed assist in
promoting the public health.  See 1990 Op. Att’y Gen. 11 (#89-2-6(L)); 1986 Op. Att’y Gen. 113,
119; see also 1996 Op. Att’y Gen. 9, 12 (“legislative declaration of public purpose underlying
statute controls courts if <zone of doubt’ exists about statute’s public purpose”).  Cf. 1976 Op.
Att’y Gen. 604, 605 (“funds appropriated by [a] county to a nonprofit corporation do not
constitute an unrestricted gift,” but must be applied “to those purposes set out [by] statute”).  We
have previously explained that
[i]n determining whether a specific [expenditure] would serve
public rather than private purposes, . . . [a court] would review the
adequacy of the governing body’s findings of public purpose . . .
and the reasonableness of [achieving that purpose through the
expenditure.]  The court would also consider any evidence tending
to show that the expenditure is in fact for a private purpose.  We
recommend that the governing body consider all relevant factors    
. . . and thus balance the benefits to the public in general along with
the costs incurred.
1986 Op. Att’y Gen. 113, 118. 
III.  Summary
Consistent with the public purpose requirement, a county may contribute money to a 
regional wellness center, owned and operated by a school district, which will have an aquatic
area, track, cardio-respiratory room, and other facilities that promote good health.  1
Sincerely, 
Bruce Kempkes 
Assistant Attorney General 
  For purposes of this opinion, we have not considered or analyzed the preliminary1
question whether a school district has authority to own and operate a wellness center.  We limit
opinions to precise legal questions and do not use them to conduct generalized reviews of laws to
identify issues.  2000 Op. Att’y Gen. __ (#00-2-1); see 61 IAC 1.5(2).

LAW ENFORCEMENT; POLICEMEN; FIREMEN; SHERIFF:  Appointment of reserve
peace officers.  Iowa Code §§ 80D.1A, 80D.6, 80D.9, 80D.11, 331.903, 362.10 (2001). 
The maximum age limitations imposed by Iowa Code sections 331.903(6) and 362.10
(2001) upon the service of “deputy sheriffs” and “police officers” in the State of Iowa are
applicable to reserve peace officers appointed or employed pursuant to Iowa Code chapter
80D because reserve peace officers perform the same duties and functions as regular
deputy sheriffs and police officers.  (Lundquist to Shepard, Director, Iowa Law
Enforcement Academy, 4-27-01) #01-4-3(L)
Mr. Gene Shepard
Director
Iowa Law Enforcement Academy
P.O. Box 130
Johnston, IA 50131
Dear Mr. Shepard:
This letter is in response to your request for an Attorney General’s opinion as to
the question: “Are the maximum age limits delineated by Iowa Code sections 331.903(6)
and 362.10 applicable to reserve law enforcement officers appointed or employed
pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 80D?”  We conclude that reserve peace officers appointed
or employed pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 80D perform the duties and functions of a
“deputy sheriff” or a “police officer” as contemplated by Iowa Code sections 331.903(6)
and 362.10 and are thus subject to the age limitations imposed by those respective code
provisions. 
A sheriff may appoint, with the approval of the local board of county supervisors,
one or more deputies, assistants, or clerks for whose acts the sheriff is responsible.  Iowa
Code § 331.903(1) (2001).  “The maximum age for a person to be employed as a deputy
sheriff appointed pursuant to [Iowa Code section 331.903] is sixty-five years of age.” 
Iowa Code § 331.903(6) (2001).  Identical limitations apply to Iowa cities as the
“maximum age for a police officer, marshal, or fire fighter employed for police duty or
the duty of fighting fires is [also] sixty-five years of age.”  Iowa Code § 362.10 (2001). 
Iowa Code chapter 80D authorizes the governing body of a city or county to supplement
its regular law enforcement force by establishing a force of reserve peace officers.  Iowa
Code §§ 80D.1, 80D.8 (2001).  
The phrase “reserve peace officer” as used within Iowa Code chapter 80D means
“a volunteer, nonregular, sworn member of a law enforcement agency who serves with or
without compensation, has regular police powers while functioning as a law enforcement
agency’s representative, and participates on a regular basis in the law enforcement
agency’s activities including crime prevention and control, preservation of the peace, and
enforcement of law.”  Iowa Code § 80D.1A(3) (2001).  “Reserve peace officers shall
serve as peace officers on the orders and at the discretion of the chief of police, sheriff, or
commissioner of public safety or the commissioner’s designee, as the case may be.”  Iowa
Code § 80D.6 (2001).  “While performing official duties, each reserve peace officer shall
be considered an employee of the governing body which the officer represents and shall
be paid a minimum of one dollar per year.”  Iowa Code § 80D.11 (2001).
As stated above, the Iowa General Assembly has established 65 years of age as the
maximum age for those who may serve as police officers and deputy sheriffs in the State
of Iowa.  See Iowa Code § 331.903(6) (deputy sheriffs); Iowa Code § 362.10 (police
officers).   These particular provisions of the Iowa Code, however, do not expressly1
address the employment of reserve peace officers.  Nonetheless, the age limitations
delineated by sections 331.903 and 362.10 are arguably applicable to reserve peace
officers because law enforcement agencies often confer identical authority and duties
upon their reserve peace officers as they confer upon their regular officers or deputies. 
See Iowa Code § 80D.6 (2001) (“While in the actual performance of official duties,
reserve peace officers shall be vested with the same rights, privileges, obligations, and
duties as any other peace officers.”).  Consequently, the scope of law enforcement
personnel subject to the age limitations of Iowa Code sections 331.903(6) and 362.10 is
ambiguous.  See Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Community School Dist., 577 N.W.2d 845,
847 (Iowa 1998). (“A statute is ambiguous when reasonable minds differ or are uncertain
as to its meaning.”); see also State v. White, 545 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Iowa 1996); State v.
Green, 470 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Iowa 1991).
When a statute is ambiguous, reliance on rules of statutory construction is
appropriate.  See State v. Iowa Dist. Court for Mahaska County, 620 N.W.2d 271, 273
(Iowa 2000); State v. Schultz, 604 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 1999).  When construing the
meaning of ambiguous statutory provisions, one’s ultimate goal should be a reasonable
interpretation and construction that will best effect the purposes for the statute while
limiting absurd results.  See State v. Iowa Dist. Court for Mahaska County, 620 N.W.2d
271, 273 (Iowa 2000) (citing State v. Link, 341 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Iowa 1983)).  The
legislature’s intent in enacting a particular statute may be derived by considering “the
objects sought to be accomplished and the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied.” 
  Although other sections of the Iowa Code restrict peace officer service to those1
age 65 and under, e.g., Iowa Code §§ 321.477 (DOT enforcement officers), 330A.8(16)
(aviation authority officers), 400.17 (police officers subject to civil service), 456A.13
(full-time DNR enforcement officers), the scope of this opinion is limited only to the
applicability of Iowa Code sections 331.903 and 362.10 to the employment of reserve
peace officers.
Schultz, 604 N.W.2d at 62; see also Iowa Code § 4.6 (2001).  An interpretation should be
sought that “will advance, rather than defeat, the statute’s purpose.”  Schultz, 604 N.W.2d
at 62 (citing Danker v. Wilimek, 577 N.W.2d 634, 636 (Iowa 1998)). 
The Iowa Code does not specifically define a “deputy sheriff” or “police officer”
within the context of sections 331.903 and 362.10.  “In the absence of a legislative
definition of a term or a particular meaning in the law, [one should] give words their
ordinary meaning.”  State v. White, 563 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Iowa 1997); see also Arends v.
Iowa Select Farms, L.P., 556 N.W.2d 812, 814 (Iowa 1996) (“We may refer to prior
decisions, similar statutes, dictionary definitions, and common usage in interpreting a
statute.”).  The phrase “deputy sheriff” encompasses an “officer who, acting under the
direction of a sheriff, may perform most of the duties of the sheriff’s office.”  Black’s
Law Dictionary 1381-82 (7th ed. 1999); see  White, 563 N.W.2d at 617 (“The dictionary
provides a ready source for ascertaining the common and ordinary meaning of a word.”). 
A “police officer” commonly refers to a “peace officer responsible for preserving public
order, promoting public safety, and preventing and detecting crime.”  Black’s Law
Dictionary 1178 (7th ed. 1999).  
In the State of Iowa, a reserve peace officer is considered an employee of his or
her appointing law enforcement agency.  Iowa Code § 80D.11 (2001).  Reserve peace
officers have regular police power and are authorized to participate in the activities of
their employing agency including crime prevention and control, preservation of the peace,
and enforcement of the law.  Iowa Code § 80D.1A(3) (2001); see also 1980 Op. Att’y
Gen. 882 (# 80-12-4 (L)) (“Reserve officers, when acting in their official capacity as
such, have all the rights, authority, duty and responsibilities of regular peace officers
employed by the same law enforcement agency.”).  Officers appointed or employed
pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 80D are often called upon to perform duties that are
synonymous to those tasks typically assigned to regular deputy sheriffs and police
officers.  Reserve peace officers may carry firearms and other weapons.  Iowa Code
§ 80D.7 (2001).  Reserve peace officers wear uniforms that designate them as persons
authorized to act on behalf of the appointing agency.  Iowa Code § 80D.9 (2001). 
Reserve peace officers may serve papers and, if properly certified, invoke implied
consent.  1980 Op. Att’y Gen. 882 (# 80-12-4(L)); see State v. Wright, 441 N.W.2d 364,
368 (Iowa 1989).  Reserve peace officers are subject to the same supervisors and chain of
command as their regular counterparts.  Iowa Code §§ 80D.6, 80D.9 (2001). 
Notwithstanding their assigned title, reserve peace officers act as deputy sheriffs and
police officers in the performance of their official duties.
An overly narrow interpretation of the persons subject to the age limitations
imposed by Iowa Code sections 331.903(6) and 362.10 would unreasonably circumvent
the purposes for imposing an age requirement on law enforcement personnel.  All persons
assigned the authority to perform the functions and tasks of a police officer or deputy
sheriff, regardless of that person’s official title or position should be subject to the age
restrictions.  To find otherwise would permit law enforcement agencies to ignore the
service age limitations of Iowa Code sections 331.906 and 362.10 simply by manipulating
job titles or placing an officer on reserve status without altering that person’s duties,
assignments, or compensation.  
Legislative history provides further evidence that reserve peace officers are
encompassed within the limitations of Iowa Code sections 331.903(6) and 362.10.  See
Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
606 N.W.2d 359, 365 (Iowa 2000) (“Legislative history is properly considered in
interpreting statutory language found to be ambiguous.”); State v. McSorley, 549 N.W.2d
807, 809 (Iowa 1996)).  The Iowa General Assembly has specifically exempted volunteer
firefighters from the age requirements of Iowa Code section 362.10, but no similar
exception exists for reserve peace officers.  Had the legislature desired to exempt reserve
peace officers from the age restrictions delineated in sections 331.903(6) and 362.10, it
could have done so at the same time the volunteer firefighter exemption was created or at
various later times when these code provisions were amended.  See 1980 Iowa Acts, 68th
G.A., ch. 1124 (exempting volunteer firefighters); 1998 Iowa Acts, 77th G.A., ch. 1183,
§ 112 (adding 331.903(6)); 1998 Iowa Acts, 77th G.A., ch. 1183, § 113 (amending
362.10).  
Members of reserve peace officer forces are intended to supplement their
appointing authorities’ regular law enforcement forces.  Iowa Code § 80D.8 (2001). 
Because reserve peace officers appointed or employed pursuant to Iowa Code chapter
80D are authorized to essentially act as surrogates for regular deputies and officers, it
only follows that they be subject to the same age limitations as all other persons appointed
to serve as either sheriff’s deputies or police officers.  Accordingly, we conclude that the
maximum age limitations imposed by Iowa Code sections 331.903(6) and 362.10 (2001)
upon the service of deputy sheriffs and police officers in the State of Iowa are applicable
to reserve peace officers appointed or employed pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 80D.   
Sincerely,
JOHN R. LUNDQUIST
Assistant Attorney General
OPEN MEETINGS LAW; SCHOOLS:  Board member absent during closed session.  Iowa Code
§ 21.5 (2001).  A school board member, absent during a closed session of the board, may
subsequently obtain and review the minutes and tape recording of the closed session.  (Kempkes
to Shey, State Representative, 11-19-01) #01-11-1(L)
The Honorable Patrick Shey
State Representative
State Capitol
LOCAL
Dear Representative Shey:
You have requested an opinion about the consequences of a governmental body
conducting a meeting in closed session.  You ask whether school board members, absent during a
closed session of the board that they had a right to attend, may subsequently obtain and review
the minutes and tape recording of the closed session.  This question primarily requires an
examination of Iowa Code chapter 21 (2001).
I.  Applicable law
Chapter 21 is entitled Official Meetings Open to Public (Open Meetings).  It provides for
meetings conducted in open and closed session.  For open sessions, section 21.3 provides that
“[t]he minutes shall be public records open to public inspection.”  See generally Iowa Code ch.
22 (open records law).  For closed (or “executive”) sessions, section 21.5(4) imposes different
requirements:
 A governmental body shall keep detailed minutes of all
discussions, persons present, and action occurring at a closed
session, and shall also tape record all of the closed session.  The
detailed minutes and tape recording of a closed session shall be
sealed and shall not be public records open to public inspection.
However, upon order of the court in an action to enforce this
chapter, the detailed minutes and tape recording shall be unsealed
and examined by the court in camera.  The court shall then
determine what part, if any, of the minutes should be disclosed to
the party seeking enforcement of this chapter for use in that
enforcement proceeding.  In determining whether any portion of
the minutes or recording shall be disclosed to such a party for this
purpose, the court shall weigh the prejudicial effects to the public
interest of the disclosure of any portion of the minutes or recording
in question . . . .
(emphasis added). 
II.  Analysis
You have asked whether school board members, absent during a closed session of the
board that they had a right to attend, may subsequently obtain and review the minutes and tape
recording of the closed session. 
A school board constitutes a “governmental body” subject to the provisions of chapter 21. 
1972 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 158, 158; see Iowa Code § 21.2(1).  It may, under certain
circumstances, hold a closed session.  Iowa Code § 21.5.  When it does, it has a duty to keep
detailed minutes and shall tape record all of it, Iowa Code § 21.5(4), and its members have a duty
to keep confidential matters confidential, Gabrielson v. Flynn, 554 N.W.2d 267, 276 (Iowa
1996).  
Section 21.5(4) provides that the detailed minutes and tape recording of a closed session
“shall be sealed and shall not be public records open to public inspection” absent a court order. 
Iowa Code § 21.5(4).  See generally 1998 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. ___ (#97-10-1(L)) (“[a] public
record is not necessarily an open record”).  In preceding “inspection,” the adjective “public” has
significance.  See 1998 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. ___ (#98-4-4(L)) (“[w]e cannot presume that the
General Assembly inserted meaningless language into [a statute]”); see also Head v. Colloton,
331 N.W.2d 870, 874 (Iowa 1983).  A specific prohibition against public inspection does not
necessarily prohibit “nonpublic” inspection by, for example, a member of the governmental body
which held the closed session.  See generally District Township v. City of Dubuque, 7 Iowa 262,
275-76 (1858) (affirmative words “may, and often do, imply a negative of what is not affirmed,
as strongly as if expressed”; if “a thing is limited to be done in a particular form or manner, it
includes a negative that it shall not be done otherwise”); 1994 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 96, 97.  
In Head v. Colloton, 331 N.W.2d 870, 873-74 (Iowa 1983), the Supreme Court of Iowa 
considered a request by a leukemia victim for access to public hospital records which would
reveal the name of a potential bone marrow donor.  In denying access, it indicated a different
situation might exist if the victim had standing as a public officer or employee:
Chapter [21] is Iowa’s freedom of information statute.  Its
purpose is “to open the doors of government to public scrutiny – to 
prevent government from secreting its decision-making activities
from the public, on whose behalf it is its duty to act.” . . .
Because chapter [21] defines the right of the general public
to access to public records, the exemptions [from disclosure in
chapter 21] delineate exceptions only to the same general right. 
For example, they do not preclude access by an agency vested with
investigative authority and subpoena power.  Nor do they preclude
access by a public officer granted subpoena authority pursuant to
statute or rule.  In the present case, however, plaintiff has no
standing to seek access other than as a member of the public
generally.
Id. at 874 (interpreting Iowa Code ch. 66A (1983)) (citations omitted).  See Tausz v. Clarion-
Goldfield Community School Dist., 569 N.W.2d 125, 127 (Iowa 1997) (“the sealing of the record
of a closed session pursuant to section 21.5(4) only serves to deny access to inspection by
members of the general public”); 1996 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 24 (#95-6-6(L)) (public records law
targeted toward providing general public with general right of access rather than limiting the
right of individuals to examine their own confidential public records). 
Subsequently, in Gabrielson v. Flynn, 554 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Iowa 1996), the supreme
court did not decide the broad question whether “any member of a governing body has an
inherent right to access public and confidential records.”  It did, however, hold that school board
members
generally should be allowed access to both public and private
records that are necessary for the proper discharge of their duties. 
We agree that “members of the Board of Education occupy a
fiduciary position and are under a duty to make detailed inquiry
into any matter which appears to be wrong.”  This duty necessarily
implies that school board members should have access to records
and documents of the district, subject to the legal constraints of
chapter 22, in order to give effect to the authority granted them by
statute.
Id. (citations omitted).  
These cases indicate that section 21.5(4) does not prohibit board members from obtaining
and reviewing records of meetings that they had a right to attend.  Indeed, allowing access
permits absent board members to know what they missed during the closed session (which has
importance if subsequent meetings deal with the same or related issues) and provides them with
an opportunity, before the next meeting, to study or take other action on the issues addressed in
the closed session.  See generally Iowa Code § 4.4(3) (statutory construction presumes that
legislature intended a just and reasonable result), § 4.6(5) (statutory construction may take into 
account consequences of a particular construction).  Although the underlying case involved a
statute worded significantly different than section 21.5(4), one court has observed: 
The following example illustrates the hindrance that could occur to
a public body if [its members not present at executive sessions are
not allowed access to the records of those sessions.]  A, B and C
are members of a public body and meet in executive session.  Two
months later, D, E and F are elected to replace A, B and C.  If a
question arises concerning a topic known to have been considered
in executive session by A, B and C, should D, E and F be
precluded from access to that information?  To forbid them access,
and require that they make an independent determination
uninformed as to their predecessors’ action or declining to act,
hamstrings a public body.  We believe that . . . public policy opts
for opening the executive session to [the newly elected members]  
. . . .  
Picture Rocks Fire Dist. v. Updike, 699 P.2d 1310, 1311 (Ariz. App. 1985) (holding that member
absent from executive session entitled to copy of minutes under statute providing that minutes of
executive session “shall be kept confidential except from members of the public body which met
in executive session”).
We therefore conclude that section 21.5(4) merely prohibits members of the public from
gaining access to the minutes and tape recording of a school board’s closed session unless they
obtain a court order.  Cf. 1979 Ariz. Op. Att’y Gen. I79-304 (statute providing that minutes of
executive session “should be kept confidential except from members of the public body which
met in executive session” permits those members to reveal information pertaining to executive
session “to other, non-present members of the [public] body”).  Had the General Assembly
intended a prohibition of disclosure applicable to all persons, including board members, it could
have simply provided that the detailed minutes and tape recording of a closed session shall be
sealed “and shall not be open to inspection” absent a court order.  See Palmore v. United States,
411 U.S. 389, 395, 93 S. Ct. 1670, 36 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1973) (noting that Congress could have
chosen different statutory language if it had actually intended a particular meaning).  See
generally Iowa R. App. P. 14(f)(13) (statutory construction focuses upon what legislature wrote,
not what it should or might have written).  
School boards thus have an obligation to provide members absent from closed sessions
with access to the detailed minutes and tape recordings of those sessions.  If school boards do not
comply with this obligation, then absent members may seek court orders to provide them access
to the information.  Although section 21.5(4) permits district courts to unseal the detailed
minutes and tape recordings and to examine them in camera “in an action to enforce [chapter
21],” the supreme court in Dillon v. City of Davenport, 366 N.W.2d 918, 921-22 (Iowa 1985),
held that this provision does not, in all cases, prevent members of the general public from
obtaining access to confidential records outside the context of enforcement actions.  Moreover, as
we have explained, section 21.5(4) only pertains to members of the general public.  It does not
encompass members of school boards who have a right to attend closed sessions and who have a
duty to keep confidential matters confidential.  We therefore conclude that absent board members
may seek orders from district courts to compel school boards to provide them with the minutes
and tape recordings of closed sessions when their proper requests for access have gone unheeded. 
III.  Summary
School board members, absent during a closed session of the board that they had a right
to attend, may subsequently obtain and review the minutes and tape recording of the closed
session. 
Sincerely,
Bruce Kempkes 
Assistant Attorney General 
CIVIL SERVICE; COUNTY AND COUNTY OFFICERS:  Appointment of jailer.  Iowa Code
§§ 331.652, 331.903, 341A.7, 341A.8, 341A.14, 356.1 (2001).  The civil service laws for deputy
sheriffs, Iowa Code ch. 341A, do not per se apply to the position of jailer.  Whether they apply to
a jailer in a particular county constitutes a matter of fact, which falls outside the proper scope of
an opinion and rests upon an analysis of job duties.  Although a written certificate of appointment
from the civil service commission to county officials should precede their payment of
compensation to a properly appointed jailer for services rendered, they may pay compensation in
the absence of such certificate.  (Kempkes to TeKippe, Chickasaw County Attorney, 12-19-01)
#01-12-2(L)
Mr. Richard P. TeKippe
Chickasaw County Attorney
206 N. Chestnut
P.O. Box 129
New Hampton, IA 50659
Dear Mr. TeKippe:
You have requested an opinion on the scope of the civil service laws for deputy sheriffs. 
You ask whether county sheriffs must comply with those laws in appointing a jailer and, if so,
whether a written certificate of appointment from the civil service commission to county officials
must precede their payment of compensation for services rendered to a properly appointed jailer. 
These questions require an examination of Iowa Code chapters 331, 341A, and 356 (2001).
I.  Applicable law
Chapter 356 is entitled Jails and Municipal Holding Facilities.  Section 356.1 provides
that the jails in the several counties “shall be in charge of the respective sheriffs . . . .”  See 1984
Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 167, 171-72 (county sheriffs primarily responsible for the hiring and
supervising of jailers).  See generally Iowa Code § 80B.11A (providing for jailer training
standards), § 356.5 (identifying duties of “keeper of [the] jail”). 
Chapter 331 is entitled County Home Rule Implementation.  Section 331.652(7) and
section 331.903(1) provide that county sheriffs may make at-will appointments of deputies,
assistants, and clerks, subject to the requirements of chapter 341A.  Norton v. Adair County, 441
N.W.2d 347, 361 (Iowa 1989). 
Enacted in 1973, chapter 341A is entitled Civil Service for Deputy County Sheriffs. 
Violation of any of its provisions constitutes a simple misdemeanor.  Iowa Code § 341A.21.
Chapter 341A requires county sheriffs to make all appointments and promotions to
“classified civil service positions” only after the holding of competitive examinations and the
making of impartial investigations.  See Iowa Code § 341A.8; 1980 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 523
(#79-12-4(L)).  See generally Iowa Code § 341A.10 (identifying requirements for civil service
applicants).  Section 341A.7 provides in part that “classified civil service positions . . . shall
include persons actually serving as deputy sheriffs . . . .” 
Section 341A.14 provides:
No treasurer, auditor, or other officer, or employee of any
county subject to this chapter shall approve the payment of or be in
any manner involved in paying, auditing, or approving salary,
wage, or other compensation for services to any person subject to
the provisions of this chapter, unless a payroll, estimate, or account
for such salary, wage or other compensation containing the names
of the persons to be paid, the amount to be paid to each person, the
services on account of which same is paid, and any other
information which, in the judgment of the civil service commission
should be furnished on such payroll, bears the certificate of the
civil service commission, or of its personnel director or other duly
authorized agent.  The certificate shall state that the persons named
therein have been appointed or employed in compliance with the
terms of this chapter and the rules of the commission, and that the
payroll, estimate, or account is, insofar as known to the
commission, a true and accurate statement.  The commission shall
refuse to certify the pay of any public officer or employee whom it
finds to be illegally or improperly appointed, and may further
refuse to certify the pay of any public officer or employee who,
willfully or through culpable negligence, violates or fails to comply
with this chapter or with the rules of the commission.
II.  Analysis
(A)
You have asked whether county sheriffs, in appointing a jailer, must comply with the civil
service laws for deputy sheriffs.
There are deputy sheriffs, and there are jailers.  See McDonald v. Woodbury County, 48
Iowa 404, 405 (1878).  Nothing in chapters 356 and 341A requires jailers to come from the ranks
of deputy sheriffs.  A county who wishes to appoint a deputy sheriff as jailer may properly make
“a conscious decision . . . to have a sheriff’s deputy serving in that capacity rather than a
civilian.”  Buchanan County Supervisors v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 N.W.2d 252, 256
(Iowa 1998). 
Nothing in chapter 341A suggests that it applies to jailers per se.  Rather, chapter 341A
applies to “those deputies who are required to perform the duties of a deputy sheriff” and does
not apply to “those employees . . . who may be designated as deputy sheriffs, but who do not
actually perform law enforcement duties.”  1974 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 193, 196.  Accord 1984
Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 119 (#84-2-6(L)).  Duties of deputy sheriffs include “the prevention and
detection of crime and the enforcement of the criminal laws of this state and all individuals . . .
who by the nature of their duties may be required to perform the duties of a peace officer.”  1974
Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 193, 196.  Accord 1984 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 119 (#84-2-6(L)).  See
generally Iowa Code § 801.4(7)(a) (defining “peace officer”); 1982 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 392
(#82-4-13(L)) (“peace officer” does not necessarily include jailer).
As the language of section 341A.7 indicates, the question whether an appointee to “is a
civil service deputy [covered by chapter 341A] or is an employee in the sheriff’s office not
covered by [chapter 341A]” constitutes a matter of fact and falls outside the proper scope of an
opinion.  1986 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 86 (#86-2-9(L)).  Accord 1984 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 119
(#84-2-4(L)).  See generally 61 Iowa Admin. Code 1.5(3)(c).  Such a case-by-case determination
rests upon an analysis of job duties and would ultimately fall upon the judiciary.  See, e.g.,
Norton v. Adair County, 441 N.W.2d at 361 (“jailer/dispatcher” did not come within the scope of
chapter 341A, because evidence showed that she actually performed duties of clerk or assistant
and not that of deputy).
(B)
Assuming that chapter 341A applies to the position of jailer in a particular county, you
have asked whether a written certificate of appointment from the civil service commission to
county officials must precede their payment of compensation for services rendered to a properly
appointed jailer.  Section 341A.14 provides that no county official “shall approve” payment of
compensation to appointees unless the civil service commission forwards written certificates that,
among other things, include the amount of their compensation. 
We see no ambiguity in section 341A.14 requiring us to apply principles of statutory
construction.  See generally State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 630 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Iowa 2001) (courts
have no occasion to apply principles of statutory construction to unambiguous statute).  The use
of “shall” in section 341A.14 clearly imposes duties upon civil service commissions and county
officials.  See Iowa Code § 4.1(30)(a) (unless otherwise defined, “shall” in statutes imposes a
duty).  “When addressed to a public official the word <shall’ is ordinarily mandatory, excluding
the idea of permissiveness or discretion.”  1982 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 190, 192 (citation omitted). 
“If . . . a thing is prohibited [by statute] . . . such prohibition cannot, without judicial legislation,
be disregarded.”  Hill v. Wolfe, 28 Iowa 577, 580 (1870).   
A more difficult question, however, remains:  What consequences result when a county
sheriff properly appoints a jailer, but the civil service commission fails to comply with the
requirements of section 341A.14?  We believe that the answer lies with the characterization of
section 341A.14 as “directory” rather than “mandatory.”  
“It is . . . well established that some statutory provisions are directory, rather than
mandatory, meaning that performance may be delayed or even omitted without fatal effect.” 
1981 Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 51 (# 81-21).  “The mandatory-directory dichotomy does not refer to
whether a statutory duty is obligatory or permissive but instead relates to whether the failure to
perform an admitted duty will have the effect of invalidating the governmental action which the
requirement affects.”  1982 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 190, 192 (citation omitted).
“There is no simple test to determine whether a statutory requirement is mandatory or
directory.”  3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 57:3, at 12 (2001).  Such a question depends
upon legislative intent.  Id. at 16-17.  
Three principles of statutory construction aid in determining the legislative intent
regarding a civil service commission’s noncompliance with section 341A.14.  (1). “[If a statute]
merely requires certain things to be done and nowhere prescribes results that follow, such a
statute is merely directory.”  Id. at 24.  Section 341A.14 does not prescribe the results following
the payment of compensation in the absence of a written certificate.  (2). “In cases where no
apparent or actual injury results to anyone from the failure to adhere to the provisions of a statute,
a directory construction usually prevails in the absence of facts indicating that a mandatory
construction was intended.”  Id. at 22-23.  No apparent or actual injury results to anyone from
paying compensation in the absence of a written certificate to a person properly appointed as
jailer by the county sheriff.  (3). “The resulting consequences of alternate constructions are often
a deciding factor [in characterizing a statute as mandatory or directory].”  Id., § 57:7, at 32. 
Construing section 341A.14 as mandatory would impinge upon the right of a properly appointed
jailer, an innocent party, to receive compensation for services rendered.  See Solen Public Dist.
No. 3 v. Heisler, 381 N.W.2d 201, 204 (N.D. 1986) (construing statute as directory “is premised
on grounds of public policy and equity to avoid harsh, unfair, or absurd consequences when a
mandatory construction may do great injury to a party not at fault”).
Application of these three principles, we believe, leads to the classification of section
341A.14 as directory.  Although county officials may thus pay compensation in the absence of a
written certificate from the civil service commission to a person properly appointed as jailer for
services rendered, the civil service commission should nevertheless comply with the 
requirements of section 341A.14 in order to fulfill the legislative mandate of checks and balances
in the civil service process.  
III.  Summary
The civil service laws for deputy sheriffs, Iowa Code ch. 341A, do not per se apply to the
position of jailer.  Whether they apply to a jailer in a particular county constitutes a matter of
fact, which falls outside the proper scope of an opinion and rests upon an analysis of job duties. 
Although a written certificate of appointment from the civil service commission to county
officials should precede their payment of compensation to a properly appointed jailer for services
rendered, they may pay compensation in the absence of such certificate.
Sincerely,
Bruce Kempkes 
Assistant Attorney General 
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS; STATE OFFICERS AND DEPARTMENTS:  Pupil
transportation.  Iowa Code §§ 256.11, 285.1, 285.2, 285.16 (2001).  Resident pupils attending
accredited college preparatory schools located either within or without the school district of their
residences shall be entitled to transportation on the same basis as provided for resident pupils
attending public schools.  (Kempkes to Veenstra, State Senator, 6-11-01) #01-6-2(L)
The Honorable Kenneth Veenstra
State Senator
216 Arizona Ave. SW
Orange City, IA 51041
Dear Senator Veenstra:
In Silver Lake Consolidated School District v. Parker, 238 Iowa 984, 992, 29 N.W.2d
214, 218 (1947), the Supreme Court of Iowa held that state law did not then contemplate public
funding for the transportation of pupils to and from nonpublic schools.  More than fifty years
later -- during which time the General Assembly has amended the state law on school
transportation -- you have requested an opinion about the availability of public funding for the
transportation of pupils to and from the educational institution known as a “college preparatory
school.”  
I.  Applicable law
Your question invites examination of Iowa Code chapters 256 and 285 (2001).  Chapter
256 is entitled Department of Education.  Chapter 285, where the statutory trail begins, is entitled
State Aid for Transportation.  
Section 285.2 requires school districts to provide transportation services to nonpublic
school pupils as provided in section 285.1 when the General Assembly appropriates funds to the
Department of Education for paying transportation claims submitted by school districts.  Under
section 285.1(14), resident pupils attending a nonpublic school located either within or without
the school district of their residences shall be entitled to transportation on the same basis as
provided for resident public school pupils.  See 281 Iowa Admin. Code ch. 43 (pupil
transportation).  Section 285.16 -- which dates from 1978, see 1978 Iowa Acts, 67  G.A., ch.th
1001, § 12 -- defines “nonpublic school” to mean a nonpublic school “accredited by the
[Department of Education] as provided in section 256.11.”  Iowa Code § 285.16.  See 281 Iowa
Admin. Code ch. 12 (general accreditation standards). 
Section 256.11 -- which dates from 1986, see 1986 Iowa Acts, 71  G.A., ch. 1245, § 1411st
-- sets forth twelve subsections detailing requirements for accreditation of schools.  It then
provides a thirteenth subsection, where the statutory trail ends:
(13).  Notwithstanding subsections 1 through 12 and as an
exception to their requirements, a private high school or private
combined junior-senior high school operated for the express
purpose of teaching a program designed to qualify its graduates for
matriculation at accredited four-year or equivalent liberal arts,
scientific, or technological colleges or universities shall be placed
on a special accredited list of college preparatory schools, which
list shall signify accreditation of the school for that express
purpose only, if [the school complies with certain standards
established pursuant to statute or rule] . . . .
(emphasis added).  
II.  Analysis
You have asked about the availability of public funding for the transportation of pupils to
and from college preparatory schools.  
In attempting to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly on this subject, we initially
focus upon the language in chapter 285.  Only if that language is ambiguous will we proceed to
engage in statutory construction.  “A statutory provision is ambiguous if reasonable minds could
differ or be uncertain as to its meaning.”  2002 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. __ (#01-4-4(L)) (citations
and quotation marks omitted).  Under a well-settled rule of statutory construction, 
A statute is not to be read as though open to construction as
a matter of course. . . .  If the language given its plain and rational
meaning is precise and free from ambiguity, no more is necessary
than to apply to the words used their natural and ordinary sense in
connection with the subject considered.  
Dingman v. City of Council Bluffs, 249 Iowa 1121, 90 N.W.2d 742, 746 (1958). 
Turning to chapter 285, we see that accreditation determines the question of public
funding for the transportation of pupils to and from “nonpublic schools.”  See Iowa Code 
§§ 285.1, 285.2.  Section 285.16 specifically defines “nonpublic school” to mean a nonpublic
school “accredited by the [Department of Education] as provided in section 256.11.”  
Subsection thirteen of section 256.11 specifies the standards for accrediting college
preparatory schools and adds that any college preparatory school satisfying those standards “shall
be placed on a special accredited list . . . which shall signify accreditation of the school . . . .”  
(emphasis added).  See generally Iowa Code § 4.1(30)(a) (unless otherwise defined, “shall” in
statute imposes a duty).  Accreditation pursuant to section 256.11(13) has consequences for
college preparatory schools in at least one other context.  See Iowa Code § 714.19(9) (exempting
accredited college preparatory schools from certain matters relating to theft and fraud).  Cf. Iowa
Code § 299.2(4) (exempting child attending accredited college preparatory school from
compulsory attendance law).  
We believe that section 256.11(13) clearly and unambiguously places accredited college
preparatory schools within section 285.16 as nonpublic schools “accredited by the [Department
of Education] as provided in section 256.11.”  We see no reason to exempt subsection 13 from
the scope of “section 256.11."  Cf. Fernandez v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 324, 331 (2000) (Congress
intended “section” in tax statute to encompass all its subsections).  Just as we may not inflate the
terms of a statute under the guise of construction, see Marcus v. Young, 538 N.W.2d 285, 289
(Iowa 1995), we may not shrink them.  In this vein, we note that the General Assembly passed
section 285.16 some years after it passed section 256.11(13).  Had the General Assembly
intended to preclude public funding for the transportation of pupils to and from college
preparatory schools, it could have easily done so, for example, by limiting the definition of
“nonpublic school” in section 285.16 to “a nonpublic school accredited by the Department of
Education as provided by subsections one through twelve in section 256.11.”  See generally Iowa
R. App. P. 14(f)(13) (statutory construction focuses upon what legislature wrote, not what it
should or might have written); Dingman v. City of Council Bluffs, 90 N.W.2d at 746
(impermissible to write into statute “words which are not there”).
Moreover, by publicly funding pupil transportation, the General Assembly purportedly
sought to encourage enrollment and attendance at schools – whether public or nonpublic – which 
comply with the standards for accreditation.  See generally Luthens v. Bair, 788 F. Supp. 1032,
1039 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (public has interest in encouraging children to attend institutions that
meet state educational requirements for accreditation).  It thus appears reasonable for the General
Assembly to provide public funding for the transportation of pupils attending a college
preparatory school so long as it complies with the accreditation standards set forth in section
256.11(13).  See generally Iowa Code § 4.2 (statute shall be liberally construed to promote its
object), § 4.4(3) (legislature presumably intends just and reasonable result in passing statute), 
§ 4.6(1) (statutory construction may take into account legislative object). 
III.  Summary
Resident pupils attending accredited college preparatory schools located either within or
without the school district of their residences shall be entitled to transportation on the same basis
as provided for resident pupils attending public schools.
Sincerely, 
Bruce Kempkes
Assistant Attorney General 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; COUNTIES; MUNICIPALITIES:  Train speed
regulation.  Iowa Code § 327F.31 (2000).  The Iowa Department of Transportation may only
issue an order approving a locally proposed regulation for train speed if, in addition to meeting
the requirements in its administrative rules and the test of reasonableness, the proposal satisfies
the requirements of 49 U.S.C. § 20106:  (1) it must be “necessary to eliminate or reduce an
essentially local safety hazard”; (2) it must not be “incompatible with” a federal law, regulation,
or order; and (3) it may not “unreasonably burden” interstate commerce.  An opinion, which
determines matters of law, cannot determine as a matter of fact whether a specific proposal
satisfies the administrative rules or the second exception.  (Kempkes to Wandro, Director, Iowa
Department of Transportation, 5-7-01) #01-5-2
Mr. Mark F. Wandro
Director, Iowa Department of Transportation
800 Lincoln Way
Ames, IA 50010
Dear Mr. Wandro:
With the chartering of the Baltimore & Ohio in 1827 -- the first Iron Horse in North
America -- government at various levels began regulating the railway industry.  See P. Dempsey
& W. Thoms, Law and Economic Regulation in Transportation 3-16 (1986).  In 1852, the U.S.
Attorney General issued an opinion that a federal statute did not preempt a city from enforcing an
ordinance limiting the speed of trains within its corporate boundaries.  See 5 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen.
554, 556-57.  Nearly 150 years later, you ask whether current federal law preempts counties and
cities from regulating train speed within their respective corporate boundaries. 
I.  Applicable law
(A)
Iowa Code chapter 327F (2001) is entitled Construction and Operation of Railways. 
Section 327F.31 provides that “[a]n ordinance or resolution adopted by a political subdivision of
this state which relates to the speed of a train in an area within the jurisdiction of the political
subdivision is subject to approval by the [Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT)] . . . .”  
The IDOT has promulgated administrative rules for approval of train speed ordinances. 
See 761 IAC 800.15.  It has established a process, including notice and hearing, for determining
whether it shall issue an order approving a particular ordinance.  See 761 IAC 800.15(3).  Factors
relevant to the determination include, but are not limited to,
a.  Traffic density and speed.
b.  Accident frequency.
c.  Causes of accidents.
d.  Obstruction to visibility.
e.  Traffic controls at crossings.
f.  Population density.
g.  Resulting burden on the rail transportation system.
h.  Resulting benefit to residents of the political subdivision.
761 IAC 800.15(4).  If the IDOT issues an order approving an ordinance and if the affected
railroads do not contest that order, see 761 IAC 800.15(6), 761 IAC 800.15(7), it takes effect
twenty-five days after the mailing of notice to them.  761 IAC 800.15(6).
(B)
Title 49 of the U.S. Code is entitled Transportation.  Subtitle V is entitled Rail Programs,
and Subtitle IV is entitled Interstate Transportation.
Enacted as part of the federal High-Speed Rail Development Act of 1994, Part A of
Subchapter V is simply entitled Safety.  Part A purports to “promote safety in every area of
railroad operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents” and confers upon the
Transportation Secretary broad powers to “prescribe regulations and issue orders for every area
of railroad safety.”  49 U.S.C. §§ 20101, 20103.  Specific chapters address safety appliances,
signal systems, locomotives, accidents and incidents, and hours of service.  See 49 U.S.C.
Subtitle V, Pt. A.  Provisions of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, now repealed, still
remain in substance in Part A.  One of those provisions -- section 20106 -- provides:
Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety shall be
nationally uniform to the extent practicable. [Exception No. 1:]  A
State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order
related to railroad safety until the Secretary of Transportation
prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject of
the State requirement. [Exception No. 2:]  A State may adopt or
continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or
order related to railroad safety when the law, regulation, or order --
(1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety
hazard;
(2) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the
United States Government; and
(3) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.
49 U.S.C. § 20106.  See generally Florida E. Coast Railway Co. v. City of W. Palm Beach, 110
F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (recounting history of federal railway regulation).
In 1995, Congress enacted the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49
U.S.C. § 10101 et seq.  See generally Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803.  Part A, simply entitled
Rail, contains chapters that specifically address rates, licensing, operations, finance, and federal-
state relations.  See 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IV, Pt. A.  Section 10501(b) in Part A provides that the
newly created Surface Transportation Board has “exclusive [jurisdiction]” over 
(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided in this
part with respect to rates, classification, rules . . . , practices, routes,
services, and facilities of such carriers; and
(2) the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or
discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks,
or facilities . . .
. . . .  Except as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies
provided in this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation
are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or
State law. 
II.  Analysis
We must determine whether the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act
(ICCTA) or the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) preempts state and local governments from
regulating train speed.  We presume that those regulations rest upon considerations of public
safety.  See generally 1910 Op. Att’y Gen. 272, 272 (city has statutory authority to regulate train
speed if such regulation reasonably and necessarily protects public safety and welfare); Loiacono,
“Railroad Safety Steered Off Track,” 36 Trial 11, 11 (Aug. 2000) (around 400 fatal and 1,350
nonfatal incidents occurred at railway-highway crossings in 1999).
With its roots in the Supremacy Clause, the preemption doctrine invalidates any state or
local law that conflicts with or frustrates federal law.  CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S.
658, 663, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 123 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1993).  See generally U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. II.  
There is a presumption that state and local regulation of safety matters can constitutionally co-
exist with federal regulation.  Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
716, 105 S. Ct. 2371, 85 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1985).  Although courts have used labels to classify
different types of preemption, the ultimate issue depends on whether Congress clearly and
manifestly intended to preempt state or local regulation of a subject.  CSX Transp., Inc. v.
Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664.
(A)
Section 10501(b) of the ICCTA provides that the Surface Transportation Board shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over “transportation by rail carriers [and] the remedies provided in this
part” and that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies provided in this part with
respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under
Federal or State law.”  See generally 49 U.S.C. § 10102(9) (“transportation” includes
locomotive, yard, property, facility, instrumentality, or equipment of any kind related to the
movement of passengers or property by rail, and services related to that movement).  Many
federal and state cases have examined section10501(b), but no case has indicated that it preempts
state regulation of train speed.  
Enactment of the ICCTA did not remove railway safety matters from the duties of the
Transportation Secretary.  See Tyrrell v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., ___ F.3d ___, ___ (6  Cir. 2001)th
(2001 WL 418060).  One state administrative agency has observed that section 10501(b) does not
preempt state safety regulations for trains.  See In re Petition for Advisory Opinion, Nev. Pub.
Utilities Comm’n, No. 98-4052 (July 16, 1998).  The Surface Transportation Board itself has
succinctly explained that “section 10501(b) does not preempt valid safety regulation under the
[FRSA].”  Borough of Riverdale, STB Finance Docket No. 33466 n. 4 (February 27, 2001).  See
“Regulations on Safety Integration Plans,” STB Ex Parte No. 574, FRA Docket No. SIP-1,
Notice No. 1, 63 Fed. Reg. 72225, 75225 (Dec. 31, 1998) (although Surface Transportation
Board has some responsibility for promoting safe rail transportation, “primary jurisdiction,
expertise and oversight responsibility in rail safety matters are vested in the [Transportation
Secretary]”); see also Barnett, “Railroad Workplace Safety and Related Employment Issues,”
SA31 ALI-ABA 749, 755 n. 2 (Transportation Department’s Federal Railroad Administration,
not Occupational Safety and Health Administration, has responsibility for the “safety of railroad
operations”).  We therefore proceed to discuss the scope of FRSA preemption. 
(B)
Section 20106 of the FRSA sets forth the general rule that “[l]aws, regulations, and orders
related to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable.”  This language
clearly and manifestly reveals a congressional intent to preempt state and local regulation of train
speed.  Harris v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 234 F.3d 398, 400 (8  Cir. 2000); Stevenson v.th
Union Pac. R.R., 110 F.Supp. 2d 1086, 1088 (E.D. Ark. 2000); CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of
Mitchell, 105 F.Supp. 2d 949, 952 (S.D. Ind. 1999); Burlington N. & S.F. Ry. v. City of
Sedgewick, 1997 WL 807872 (D. Kan. 1997); Price v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,14 P.3d 702,
706 (Utah App. 2000).  Thus, state regulation of train speed can only occur if either of the two
exceptions in section 20106 applies.  In re Speed Limit for the Union Pac. R.R., 610 N.W.2d 677,
683-84 (Minn. App. 2000).
The first exception allows the adoption or continuance in force of a state requirement
related to railroad safety until such time as the Transportation Secretary prescribes regulations
“covering the subject of” the state requirement.  49 U.S.C. § 20106.  The Transportation
Secretary -- through the Federal Railroad Administration, see 49 U.S.C. § 103(a) -- has
promulgated regulations on train speed.  See 49 C.F.R. §§ 213.1, 213.9; see also 63 Fed. Reg.
33992, 33999 (June 22, 1998).  Accordingly, this exception no longer has any application.  CSX
Transp., Inc. v. City of Plymouth, 92 F.Supp. 2d 643, 653, 654 (E.D. Mich. 2000); In re Speed
Limit for the Union Pac. R.R., 610 N.W.2d at 683; see 49 C.F.R. § 213.2. 
The second exception provides:
A State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more
stringent law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety when
the law, regulation or order 
(1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety
hazard;
(2) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the
United States Government; and
(3) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.
(emphasis added). 
Expressly limited to a “State,” this exception does not extend to local governments acting
on their own.  Landrum v. Norfolk S. Corp., 836 F.Supp. 373, 375-76 (S.D. Miss. 1993)
(interpreting 45 U.S.C. § 434, precursor to 49 U.S.C. § 20106); Grand Trunk W. R.R. v. Town of
Merriville, 738 F.Supp. 1205, 1207 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (same); CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of
Tullahoma, 705 F.Supp. 385, 387 (E.D. Tenn. 1988) (same); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Smith,
664 F.Supp. 1228, 1238 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (same).  In Iowa, however, the General Assembly has
established a two-step process that involves political subdivisions, which may propose
regulations for train speed, and the IDOT, which may approve or reject the proposals.  See Iowa
Code § 327F.31; see also 761 IAC 800.15.  The question thus arises whether an IDOT order
approving a locally proposed regulation of train speed constitutes a “State . . . law, regulation, or
order” for purposes of the second exception. 
“Law” commonly signifies a body of rules of action or conduct prescribed by controlling
authority that have binding legal force.  52A C.J.S. Law 737-40 (1968); Black’s Law Dictionary
884 (1991).  See generally FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57, 111 S. Ct. 403, 112 L. Ed.
2d 356 (1990) (courts assume that ordinary meaning of statutory language accurately expresses
congressional purpose).  “Regulation” commonly means a rule or order prescribed by competent
authority relating to action of those under its control.  Black’s, supra, at 1286.  “Order” -- which
seems particularly applicable to an IDOT-approved regulation of train speed, see 761 IAC
800.15(3), 761 IAC 800.15(6), 761 IAC 800.15(7) -- commonly means a mandate, precept,
command, or direction authoritatively given, or a rule or regulation.  Black’s, supra, at 1096.  
Whatever the exact parameters of a “State . . . law, regulation, or order,” we believe that
this phrase properly encompasses an administrative order issued by a state agency that approves a
locally proposed regulation for train speed.  See CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Tullahoma, 705
F.Supp. at 388 (Congress intended state regulatory agencies to determine whether conditions
constitute essentially local safety hazard); see also Landrum v. Norfolk S. Corp., 836 F.Supp. at
376 (municipal action should be viewed as state action; a state legislature does not consider
hazards at various crossings and pass legislation accordingly; in practice, local authorities handle
such matters).  Counties and cities in Iowa simply do not have carte blanche authority to regulate
train speed.  Rather, they may only present proposals to the IDOT for train speed regulation.  See
Iowa Code § 327F.31.  It is the IDOT, through its review process, which has authority to stamp
those proposals with the force and effect of law by issuing administrative orders.  See Iowa Code 
§ 327F.31; 761 IAC 800.15.  Before that time, the proposals of counties and cities are just that --
mere proposals. 
We recognize that widely variant and confusing safety rules would defeat the express goal
of Congress to establish, as far as practicable, nationally uniform train standards.  See 49 U.S.C.
§§ 20101, 20106; Sisk v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 647 F.Supp. 861, 865 (D. Kan. 1986).  By
creating the second exception, however, Congress recognized some leeway for states to diverge
from those standards.  See Dempsey & Thoms, supra, at ix (“[t]he reports of regulation’s death,
like that of Mark Twain, are highly exaggerated”); Note, 58 Mo. L. Rev. 359, 365 (1993)
(“Congress did not intend the FRSA to cover the entire field of railway safety”).  We do not
believe that the two-step process established by section 327F.31 will create widely variant and
confusing safety rules in Iowa and frustrate the express goal of Congress.  First, a locally
proposed regulation on train speed would have to satisfy the test of reasonableness.  See Larkin v.
Burlington C.R. & N. Ry., 85 Iowa 492, 52 N.W. 480, 481-82 (1892); 1910 Op. Att’y Gen. 272,
272.  Second, it would need to satisfy the multi-factor test fashioned by the IDOT in its
administrative rules.  See generally 761 IAC 800.15(4).  Third, it would need to satisfy the 
requirements set forth in the second exception of section 20106:  (1) it must be necessary to
eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard; (2) it must not be incompatible with a
federal law, regulation, or order; and (3) it may not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.  
Thus, a proposal to establish a single speed limit for trains throughout the breadth of a
municipality that differs from federal regulations would not likely survive either administrative
or judicial scrutiny.  See 761 IAC 800.15 (political subdivision may propose regulation on train
speed for “an area” within its jurisdiction); Landrum v. Norfolk S. Corp., 836 F.Supp. at 375
(state regulation of train speed must target specific hazard and not apply across-the-board). 
Compare Earwood v. Norfolk S. Ry., 845 F.Supp. 880, 888 (N.D. Ga.1993) (“essentially local
safety hazard” does not encompass condition present at many intersections, such as multiple
tracks with rail cars that may obstruct view) with In re Speed Limit for the Union Pac. R.R., 610
N.W.2d at 684-85 (“essentially local safety hazard” may encompass one-mile segment of track
that has common hazards in running between opposing traffic lanes down middle of downtown
street).
Whether a specific proposal on train speed satisfies either the IDOT’s administrative rules
or the second exception of section 20106 requires the making of factual determinations, a task
that lies outside the proper scope of an opinion.  See generally 61 IAC 1.5(3)(c).  Nevertheless,
we caution the IDOT to tread carefully in its review of a proposal, because the three requirements
of the second exception provide but the tiniest of openings for escaping federal preemption.  See
Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 933 F.2d 1548, 1553 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 507 U.S. 658
(1993).  The opening is tiny for a reason.  As explained by the Federal Railroad Administration,
which has expertise in the area of railway safety:
[Local] speed limits may result in hundreds of individual speed
restrictions along a train’s route, increasing safety hazards and
causing train delays.  The safest train maintains a steady speed. 
Every time a train must slow down and then speed up, safety
hazards, such as buff and draft forces, are introduced.  These kinds
of forces can enhance the chance of derailment with its attendant
risk of injury to employees, the traveling public, and surrounding
communities.
. . . .
[T]here are significant safety reasons for facilitating the
fastest transit of trains throughout the railroad system.  For
example, the risk of releases of hazardous materials is reduced by
minimizing the time such shipments spend in transportation.  It
would be poor public policy to allow local governments to attempt
to lower their risk by raising everyone’s risk and by clogging the
transportation system. . . .
[In recent years communities along railroad rights-of-way
have proposed] to set slower train speeds on main tracks located in
urban areas.  They typically cite the inherent [danger] of grade
crossings . . . .
[This danger] is a separate issue from train speed.  The
physical properties of a moving train virtually always prevent it
from stopping in time to avoid hitting an object on the tracks
regardless of the speed at which the train is traveling.  Prevention
of grade crossing accidents is more effectively achieved through
the use of adequate crossing warning systems and through
observance by the traveling public of crossing regulations and
precautions.
63 Fed. Reg. 33992, 33998-99 (June 22, 1998) (emphasis added).  See U.S. Dep’t of Transp.,
Railroad-Highway Safety -- Pt. I:  A Comprehensive Study of the Problem (1972); U.S. Dep’t of
Transp., Railroad-Highway Safety -- Pt. II:  Recommendations for Resolving the Problem (1972). 
With regard to the immediately preceding paragraph, we point out that the federal government
through the Federal Railway-Highway Crossings Program provides funds for constructing
projects that eliminate hazards of railway-highway crossings.  See 23 U.S.C. § 130; 23 C.F.R. 
§ 646.214(b); Norfolk S. Ry. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 348-49, 120 S. Ct. 1467, 146 L. Ed. 2d
374 (2000).
III.  Summary
The IDOT may only issue an order approving a locally proposed regulation for train
speed if, in addition to meeting the requirements in its administrative rules and the test of
reasonableness, the proposal satisfies the requirements of 49 U.S.C. § 20106, viz., (1) it must be
necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard; (2) it must not be
incompatible with a federal law, regulation, or order; and (3) it may not unreasonably burden
interstate commerce.  An opinion, which determines matters of law, cannot determine as a matter
of fact whether a specific proposal satisfies either the administrative rules or 49 U.S.C. § 20106. 
Sincerely,
 
Bruce Kempkes 
Assistant Attorney General 
CASH RESERVE FUND:  Iowa Code § 8.56 (2001).  The cash reserve fund sets forth separate
methods under which money in the cash reserve fund can be disbursed.  Subsection 1 authorizes
disbursement of money for cash flow purposes which must be returned to the cash reserve fund
by the end of the fiscal year in which it was disbursed.  Subsection 3 authorizes appropriations
from the cash reserve fund for nonrecurring emergencies.  (Pottorff & Biederman to Wandro,
Director, Iowa Department of Transportation, 6-11-01) #01-6-1(L)
June 11, 2001
Mr. Mark Wandro, Director
Iowa Department of Transportation
800 Lincoln Way
Ames, IA 50010
Dear Mr. Wandro:
You have requested an opinion on whether the State’s cash reserve fund may be used to
make highway construction contract payments.  You point out that the primary road fund may
run short of money to pay contractors during the road construction season.  Although the primary
road fund borrows occasionally from the RISE fund  and from the farm to market road fund ,1 2
these sources, too, may be insufficient to make payments to contractors.   In view of possible
cash shortfalls, you ask whether money from the cash reserve fund may be transferred to the
primary road fund to make these payments, as long as the money borrowed from the cash reserve
fund is returned by the end of the fiscal year. 
The cash reserve fund is part of the State Treasury, but is considered separate and apart
from the general fund of the State of Iowa for all purposes except when determining the cash
position of the state.  Iowa Code § 8.56(1) (2001).  It was originally created in 1992 as a special
fund as defined by Iowa Code section 8.53, and  was established as part of the effort to eliminate
the state deficit under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).  Iowa Code  § 8.53.  See
1994 Op. Att’y Gen. 137; 1994 Op. Att’y Gen. 86.
Iowa Code section 8.56 includes two separate provisions addressing the manner in which
money may be disbursed from the cash reserve fund.  Subsection 1 provides that:
 [t]he moneys in the cash reserve fund . . . shall not be transferred,
used, obligated, appropriated, or otherwise encumbered except as
provided in this section . . . Moneys in the cash reserve fund may
 RISE means the revitalize Iowa's sound economy fund created under Iowa Code section1
315.2.
 The farm to market road fund is created under Iowa Code section 310.3.2
be used for cash flow purposes provided that any moneys so
allocated are returned to the cash reserve fund by the end of each
fiscal year.   
Subsection 3 further provides in relevant part that:
The moneys in the cash reserve fund may be appropriated by the
general assembly . . . only in the fiscal year for which the
appropriation is made.  The moneys shall only be appropriated by
the general assembly for nonrecurring emergency expenditures . . . 
 
Your question asks our office to decide whether these subsections should be construed as
separate means of disbursement or should be harmonized.  That is, may money be transferred
from the cash reserve fund for use by a state agency pursuant to subsection 1 as long as the
money is returned to the fund by the end of the fiscal year, or may money be transferred from the
cash reserve fund only upon an appropriation under subsection 3 which meets all other
requirements imposed by section 8.56 - including the requirement in subsection 1 that any money
appropriated be returned to the cash reserve fund by the end of each fiscal year?  
In order to resolve this issue, we turn to principles of statutory construction.  In statutory
construction, every effort should be made to ascertain legislative intent.  Perkins v. Madison
County Livestock & Fair Ass’n, 613 N.W.2d 264, 269 (Iowa 2000).  Like the courts, we seek a
“reasonable interpretation which will best effectuate the purpose of the statute and redress the
wrongs the legislature sought to remedy.” Miller v. Westfield Ins. Co., 606 N.W.2d 301, 303
(Iowa 2000). We do not “construe a statute in a way that would produce impractical or absurd
results.”  William C. Mitchell, Ltd. v. Brown, 576 N.W.2d 342, 348 (Iowa 1998).  Nor should we
construe a statute “to make any part of it superfluous unless no other construction is reasonably
possible." Miller v. Westfield Ins. Co., 606 N.W.2d at 305. 
Applying these principles, we cannot conclude that the legislature intended subsections 1
and 3 to be harmonized so that an appropriation is the sole method for disbursing money from
the cash reserve fund.  To harmonize these subsections in that way would effectively condition
any  appropriation for “nonrecurring emergencies” under subsection 3 on the money being
“returned to the cash reserve fund by the end of each fiscal year” under subsection 1.  This
construction would produce impractical results by limiting an appropriation of the money in the
fund to those emergencies for which a state agency would have the resources to repay the
appropriation by the end of the fiscal year.  Cf. Iowa Code § 8.55(3) (“The moneys in the Iowa
economic emergency fund may be appropriated by the general assembly only in the fiscal year
for which the appropriation is made.  The moneys shall only be appropriated by the general
assembly for emergency expenditures.”)  Moreover, appropriation bills typically are enacted late
in the legislative session when the fiscal year is winding down.  This construction would so
narrow the time period in which the money must be repaid that the cash reserve fund would be of
very limited utility. 
Further, restricting use of the cash reserve fund to appropriations for nonrecurring
emergencies would render language in subsection 1 superfluous.  Subsection 1 prohibits the cash
reserve fund from being “transferred, used, obligated, appropriated, or otherwise encumbered”
except as provided in section 8.56.  Iowa Code § 8.56(1) (emphasis added).  If the only method
of disbursing money from the Fund were by appropriation, the alternative terms prohibiting
money from being “transferred, used, obligated . . . or otherwise encumbered” would be
meaningless. 
In our view, subsections 1 and 3 are construed more reasonably as separate methods
under which money in the cash reserve fund can be disbursed.  If subsection 1 were construed to
authorize disbursement of money for cash flow purposes which must be returned to the cash
reserve fund by the end of the fiscal year in which it was disbursed, the fund would function as a 
reserve from which the State could utilize cash to pay bills on time provided that the State return
the cash by the end of the fiscal year from anticipated sources of revenue.   Under these3
circumstances, cash transferred from the cash reserve fund could be used by the State only for
purposes for which the legislature has  separately appropriated state funds.   4
Nothing in laws governing the primary road fund prohibits a transfer to the fund from the
cash reserve fund.  The Iowa Constitution specifically provides for the exclusive use of motor
vehicle registration fees and all licenses and excise taxes on motor vehicle fuel “for the
construction, maintenance and supervision of the public highways” in the state.  Iowa Const., art.
VII, § 8.  These constitutionally defined fees and taxes are deposited into what is designated by
statute as the road use tax fund.  Iowa Code § 312.1.  This fund, in turn, is distributed to various
other funds, including the primary road fund.  Iowa Code § 312.2.  The primary road fund,
however, is not limited to these sources and may receive other funds authorized for deposit. 
Section 313 expressly defines the primary road fund to include “[a]ll other funds which may by
law be credited to the primary road fund.”  Iowa Code § 313.3(3).  To the extent that section
8.56(1) authorizes transfer of money into the primary road fund, therefore, the laws governing the
primary road fund would not otherwise prohibit this transfer. 
In summary, the cash reserve fund sets forth separate methods under which money in the
cash reserve fund can be disbursed.  Subsection 1 authorizes disbursement of money for cash
flow purposes which must be returned to the cash reserve fund by the end of the fiscal year in
Tax and revenue anticipation notes are a structurally different but conceptually similar3
method of bridging cash flow, so the State can have access to cash to pay bills on time and repay
the cash from anticipated revenues later in the same fiscal year.  Iowa Code §§ 12.25, 12.26. See  
Stanley v. Fitzgerald, 580 N.W.2d 742, 745-48 (Iowa 1998). 
 The Iowa Constitution provides that “[n]o money shall be drawn from the treasury but in4
consequence of appropriations made by law.”  Iowa Const., art. III, § 24.  A valid appropriation, 
in turn, “is authority from the legislature . . . to the officer, to apply sums of money out of that
which may be in the treasury in a given year, to specified objects or demands against the
state.”Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 862, 146 N.W.2d 626, 638 (1966).  
which it was disbursed.  Subsection 3 authorizes appropriations from the cash reserve fund for
nonrecurring emergencies. 
 
Sincerely,
JULIE F. POTTORFF
Deputy Attorney General
MELISSA ANNE BIEDERMAN
Assistant Attorney General 
LOESS HILLS ALLIANCE; CONSERVATION EASEMENTS; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW;
REAL PROPERTY:  Permanent conservation easements.  Iowa Code §§ 161D.6, 457A.2 (2001). 
The Loess Hills Alliance -- in cooperation with the DNR, county conservation boards, cities, or
private, nonprofit organizations -- may acquire permanent conservation easements from private
landowners in the Loess Hills by making single payments thereto.  (Kempkes to Warnstadt, State
Representative, 12-19-01) #01-12-3
The Honorable Steven Warnstadt
State Representative 
Statehouse
LOCAL
Dear Representative Warnstadt:
Glaciers covered a large portion of the northern United States, including northern Iowa,
around 14,000 to 24,000 years ago.  When warm summer air melted them, tremendous flows of
water ran down the valleys, and the Missouri River valley in particular.  With cooler air, the
melting ceased, and the receding water left large mud flats in the Missouri River valley,
especially where it separates Iowa from Nebraska.  Westerly winds sorted the exposed sediments
on these flats, swept the finer materials into clouds of dust, and deposited them on the east side
of the river.  Highly erodible bluffs formed.  Since that time, wind and water have carved these
bluffs into steep, sharply ridged hills that run in a narrow band – totaling about a thousand square
miles in Iowa -- along the Missouri River valley.  
Known as Iowa’s Loess Hills, these formations
are rare[,] as the only other known loess site in the world with
equal geological and ecological significance is along the Yellow
River in Northern China.  Additionally, these lands hold cultural
significance to American Indians.  Finally, these lands represent
some of the last fragments of unplowed, mixed-grass prairie land.
Ansson & Hooks, “Protecting and Preserving Our National Parks in the Twenty-first Century,”
62 Mont. L. Rev. 213, 268 n. 337 (2001).  We understand that about ninety-five percent of this
fragile and unique ecosystem remains in private hands.  
You have requested an opinion on the powers of the Loess Hills Alliance, which the
General Assembly created two years ago.  You ask whether the Alliance -- in cooperation with
the Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR), county conservation boards, cities, or private,
nonprofit organizations -- may acquire permanent conservation easements from private
landowners in the Loess Hills by making single payments thereto.  This question, which invites
an examination of Iowa Code chapter 161D (2001), assumes that any cooperative agreement has
been approved by the Loess Hills Development and Conservation Authority.
I.  Applicable law
In 1993, the General Assembly passed chapter 161D and created the Authority.  See 1993
Iowa Acts, 75  G.A., ch. 136.  Members from twenty-two counties in western Iowa comprise theth
Authority.  See Iowa Code § 161D.1(1).  Its mission “is to develop and coordinate plans for
projects related to the unique natural resource, rural development, and infrastructure problems of
counties in the deep loess region of western Iowa,” taking into account issues of soil erosion and
water quality.  Iowa Code § 161D.1(2).  Under 161D.1(3), the Authority shall administer the
Loess Hills development and conservation fund and expend moneys in the fund “for the
planning, development, and implementation of development and conservation activities or
measures in the member counties.” 
In 1999, the General Assembly passed an act establishing the Alliance.  See 1999 Iowa
Acts, 78  G.A., ch. 119.  Members from seven of the twenty-two counties in the Authorityth
comprise the Alliance.  Section 161D.4 provides that its mission “is to create a common vision
for Iowa’s loess hills, protecting special natural and cultural resources while ensuring economic
viability and private property rights of the region.”  Section 161D.6(1) identifies the
responsibilities of the Alliance’s board of directors.  These responsibilities include:
(a).  To prepare and adopt a comprehensive plan for the
development and conservation of the loess hills area subject to the
approval of the [Authority].  The plan shall provide for the
designation of significant scenic areas, the protection of native
vegetation, the education of the public on the need for and methods
of preserving the natural resources of the loess hills area, and the
promotion of tourism and related business and industry in the loess
hills area.
(b).  To apply for, accept, and expend public and private
funds for planning and implementing projects, programs, and
other components of the mission of the alliance subject to approval
of the [Authority].
(c).  To study different options for the protection and
preservation of significant historic, scenic, geologic, and
recreational areas of the loess hills including but not limited to a
federal or state park, preserve, or monument designation, fee title
acquisition, or restrictive easement.
(d).  To make recommendations to and coordinate the
planning and projects of the alliance with the [Authority].
(e).  To develop and implement pilot projects for the
protection of loess hills areas with the use of restrictive easements
from willing sellers and fee title ownership from willing sellers
subject to approval of the [Authority].
Iowa Code § 161D.6(1) (emphasis added). 
II.  Analysis
You have asked whether the Alliance -- in cooperation with the DNR, county
conservation boards, cities, or private, nonprofit organizations -- may acquire permanent
conservation easements from private landowners in the Loess Hills by making single payments
thereto. 
Under the common law, an “easement” signifies a nonpossessory interest in land that
generally entitles the holder to use another’s land or to control its use.  Although easements
typically grant affirmative rights to their holders, conservation easements -- also known as
“scenic” or “open space” easements -- convey negative restrictions on landowners who, typically,
voluntarily agree to limit their use of the land to conserve its resources or preserve its unique
character.  Conservation easements function much like negative servitudes in gross.  Morrisette,
“Conservation Easements and the Public Good: Preserving the Environment on Private Lands,”
41 Nat. Resources J. 373, 380 (2001); Jordan, “Perpetual Conservation:  Accomplishing the Goal
Through Preemptive Federal Easement Programs,” 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 401, 407-08 (1993). 
See generally Black’s Law Dictionary 782, 1370 (6  ed. 1990) (“servitude” has relation to the th
estate burdened -- in contrast to an easement, which refers to the benefit or advantage or the
estate to which it accrues -- and is termed “negative” when it restrains the servient proprietor
from making  certain use of his property that impairs the easement enjoyed by the dominant
tenement; “in gross” is such as is neither appendant nor appurtenant to land, but is annexed to a
man’s person and usually terminates with the grantee’s death).
According to statute, a “conservation easement” signifies 
an easement in, servitude upon, restriction upon the use of, or other
interest in land owned by another [to preserve scenic beauty,
wildlife habitat, riparian lands, wet lands, or forests, promote
outdoor recreation, or otherwise conserve for the benefit of the
public the natural beauty, natural resources, and public recreation
facilities of the state].  
Iowa Code § 457A.2(1) (incorporating Iowa Code § 457A.1).  See Note, 4 Drake J. Agric. L.
357, 361 (1999).  
Under a typical conservation easement, 
[t]he owner retains title to the land -- a conservation easement is a
nonpossessory interest in the land -- and may continue to use the
land subject to restrictions imposed by the easement.  Thus, the
owner retains all rights to the property that the owner possessed
prior to the easement subject to the restrictions imposed by the
easement.  The owner may continue to exclude the public from
lands protected under a conservation easement, unless the
easement provides for public access.  The owner may also sell the
property or pass it onto heirs, but the property remains bound by
the terms of the conservation easement – conservation easements
run with the land and are usually perpetual unless the easement
stipulates otherwise.
Typically, a conservation easement prohibits any further
development of the land unless it is related to a use of the land that
is permitted by the easement.
See Morrisette, supra, 41 Nat. Resources J. at 379.  The holder of a permanent conservation
easement thus can preserve in perpetuity the scenic or recreational value of land and, in some
circumstances, halt “urban sprawl,” viz., the geographical growth of cities, particularly in the
form of residential subdivisions and retail shopping centers.  
With this understanding of property law, we turn to the scope of authority conferred upon
the Alliance by the General Assembly.  State agencies such as the Alliance have only those
powers and duties which the General Assembly by express language (or by necessary implication
from express language) confers upon them.  See Quaker Oats Co. v. Cedar Rapids Human Rights
Comm'n, 268 N.W.2d 862, 868 (Iowa 1978); but see 3 Sutherland’s Statutory 
Construction § 65:03, at 402-03 (2001) (noting modern judicial trend of according liberal
construction to agency enabling acts). 
The General Assembly has specified six responsibilities of the Alliance in section
161D.6(1).  Section 161D.6(1)(b) authorizes the Alliance to expend funds, subject to the
approval of the Authority, for planning and implementing “projects, programs, and other
components” of its mission.  The General Assembly chose not to define or otherwise qualify
these terms.  Compare Iowa Code ch. 161D with Iowa Code § 419.1(12) (providing detailed
definition of “project” for purposes of municipal support thereof).  
Undefined words in statutes “shall be construed according to the context and the
approved usage of the language . . . .”  Iowa Code § 4.1(38).  We know that “project” and
“program,” in common usage, can encompass many things.  See Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary 912, 913 (1979) (“project” signifies a specific plan or design, a planned undertaking;
“program” signifies a plan or system under which action can be taken toward a goal).  We also 
understand that federal agencies and conservation groups have used the term “project” to signify
the acquisition of permanent conservation easements from private landowners.  Moreover, we
can properly characterize chapter 161D as remedial, general welfare, or environmental
legislation.  Words and phrases in these types of legislation receive a liberal construction in order
to permit public entities (such as the Alliance and the Authority) to carry out their statutory
responsibilities.  See State ex rel. Miller v. DeCoster, 596 N.W.2d 898, 902 (Iowa 1999);
McCracken v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 595 N.W.2d 779, 784 (Iowa 1999); State ex rel.
Iowa Dep’t of Water, Air & Waste Management v. Grell, 368 N.W.2d 139, 141 (Iowa 1985); 3
Sutherland’s Statutory Construction § 60:2, at 183, 192-93 (2001); 3A Sutherland’s Statutory
Construction § 71.01, at 233, § 75.06, at 430 (1992). 
We therefore conclude that the broad language of section 161D.1(6)(b) permits the
Alliance -- in cooperation with the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, county conservation
boards, cities, or private, nonprofit organizations -- to make single payments to private
landowners in return for permanent conservation easements.  Cf. National Parks & Conservation
Ass’n v. Riverside County, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 345 (Ct. App. 1996) (for purposes of statute
requiring environmental impact reports, term “project” should be broadly interpreted to
maximize protection of the environment); Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority v.
Hensler, 284 Cal.Rptr. 498, 506 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting broad definition of “project” in
environmental statute as the whole of an action which has a potential for resulting in a physical
change in the environment, directly or ultimately); 1984 N.Y. Op. Atty. Gen. 51 (#84-F15)
(statute authorizing contributions to the conservation fund “for fish and wildlife purposes”
contemplates broad range of conservation programs and wildlife activities).  As this generation’s
trustees for the Loess Hills, the Authority and the Alliance have some degree of discretion in
determining how to carry out their various responsibilities and preserve this environmentally and
culturally important area for future generations.
Indeed, our conclusion comports with the Alliance’s, and the Authority’s, fundamental
purposes.  See generally Iowa Code § 4.2 (all statutes “shall be liberally construed with a view to
promote [their] objects”).  The Authority has the mission “to develop and coordinate plans for
projects related to the unique natural resource, rural development, and infrastructure problems of
counties in the deep loess region of western Iowa . . . .”  Iowa Code § 161D.1(2).  The Alliance
has the mission “to create a common vision for Iowa’s loess hills, protecting special natural and
cultural resources while ensuring economic viability and private property rights of the region.” 
Iowa Code § 161D.4. 
We recognize that section 161D.6(1)(e) vests the Alliance with the responsibility to
develop and implement pilot projects for the protection of the Loess Hills with the use of
restrictive easements and that section 161D.6(2) prescribes certain terms and procedures for
those easements.  We do not view these directives as excluding the use of permanent
conservation easements pursuant to section 161D.6(1)(b).  We have a duty to harmonize statutory
provisions.  See March v. Pekin Ins. Co., 465 N.W.2d 852, 854 (Iowa 1991).  We thus construe
section 161D.6(1)(b) as imposing upon the Alliance the responsibility (subject to approval from
the Authority) to expend funds for planning and implementing projects and programs that may
include the use of permanent conservation easements.  We construe sections 161D.1(e) and
161D.2 as imposing upon the Alliance the responsibility to develop and implement pilot projects
using restrictive easements and, in fulfilling this responsibility, to comply with the prescribed
terms and procedures.
Finally, as you note, the federal Farmland Protection Policy Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-98, 95 Stat. 1341 (1981) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 4201-09 (1981)), may serve as a
source of funds to assist in the purchase of permanent conservation easements.  Although federal
law may impose terms and conditions upon the Alliance’s use of such funds, we see nothing in
chapter 161D that prohibits their use by the Alliance to purchase conservation easements. 
Indeed, section 161D.6(1)(b) expressly authorizes the Alliance, with approval from the
Authority, to “apply for, accept, and expend public funds for planning and implementing
projects, programs, and other components of” its mission.
III.  Summary
The Loess Hills Alliance -- in cooperation with the DNR, county conservation boards,
cities, or private, nonprofit organizations -- may acquire permanent conservation easements from
private landowners in the Loess Hills by making single payments thereto.
Sincerely,
Bruce Kempkes 
Assistant Attorney General 
JUVENILE LAW; COUNTIES:  Unreimbursed shelter care costs.  Iowa Code §§ 232.141,
234.35, 234.39 (1999).  When counties incur expenses for providing children with shelter care
services that the State does not reimburse, section 234.39 does not authorize counties to pursue
reimbursement for those expenses from the parents.  (Kempkes to Zenor, Clay County Attorney,
1-11-01) #01-1-1 
January 11, 2001
Mr. Michael L. Zenor
Clay County Attorney
2000 Highway Blvd.
P.O. Box 317
Spencer, IA 51301
Dear Mr. Zenor:
When family crises endanger children, government may intervene to provide services to
them and their families.  You have requested an opinion about the authority of county
governments that intervene to provide endangered children with “shelter care” -- statutorily
defined as the temporary care of a child in a physically unrestricting facility.  You ask whether
counties incurring expenses in providing shelter care for children may pursue reimbursement
from the parents for those expenses the State does not reimburse.  This question concerns only
those costs in excess of the reimbursement rate established by the State, not the cost of shelter
care services per se, and requires an examination of Iowa Code chapters 232 and 234 (1999). 
I.  Applicable Law   
Chapter 232 is entitled Juvenile Justice.  It provides children and their families with
shelter care and other services.  Section 232.141 addresses (1) the financial liability of the child’s
parents, if any, which the court determines after a hearing, Iowa Code § 232.141(1); see 1992 Op.
Att’y Gen. 26 (#91-5-2(L)); (2) the financial liability of the county hosting the proceedings, Iowa
Code § 232.141(2), which may seek reimbursement for unreimbursed costs from the “county of
legal settlement,” if any, Iowa Code § 232.141(8); and (3) the financial liability of the State,
which reimburses the host county at specified rates for the costs it incurs, Iowa Code 
§ 232.141(5), (6).  
Chapter 234 is entitled Child and Family Services.  Section 234.35 establishes the
financial liability of the State for foster care services.  See Iowa Code § 237.15(2)(a); 1978 Op.
Att’y Gen. 473, 474.  Under section 234.35(1), the Iowa Department of  Human Services (DHS)
“is responsible for paying the cost of foster care for a child” under any one of nine circumstances,
including “[w]hen the child is placed in shelter care pursuant to [provisions in chapter 232].” 
Iowa Code § 234.35(1)(h).  Section 234.39 addresses the financial responsibility of parents for
their child’s foster care services:
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It is the intent of this chapter that an individual receiving
foster care services and the individual’s parents or guardians shall
have primary responsibility for paying the cost of the care and
services.  The support obligation established and adopted under
this section shall be consistent with the limitations on legal liability
established under sections 222.78 [for mentally retarded persons]
and 230.15 [for mentally ill persons], and by any other statute
limiting legal responsibility for support which may be imposed on
a person for the cost of care and services provided by the [DHS]. 
The [DHS] shall notify an individual’s parents or guardians, at the
time of the placement of an individual in foster care, of the
responsibility for paying the cost of care and services.  Support
obligations shall be established as follows . . . .
Section 234.39 then provides for the court in certain circumstances to establish “the amount of
the parent’s or guardian’s support obligation for the cost of foster care provided by the [DHS],”
Iowa Code § 234.39(1), and for the DHS in other circumstances to “determine the obligation of
the individual’s parent or guardian,” Iowa Code § 234.39(2). 
II.  Analysis
We understand that the foregoing statutory scheme may result in counties incurring
expenses, unreimbursed by the State, for providing shelter care services to children.  You have
asked whether counties have statutory authority to pursue reimbursement from the parents for
those expenses. 
Chapter 234 sets forth the limits of parental liability for children who receive “foster care
services,” which, although statutorily undefined therein, encompasses shelter care services.  See
Iowa Code § 234.35(1)(h) (DHS has financial responsibility for foster care services whenever a
child is “placed in shelter care pursuant to [provisions in chapter 232]”); see also 441 IAC
156.11(3) (DHS payments for foster care encompass shelter care); In re N.M., 528 N.W.2d 94, 97
(Iowa 1995) (“foster care,” undefined in chapter 232, “encompasses any out-of-home
placement”); 1992 Op. Att’y Gen. 86 (#92-2-8(L)) (DHS “currently interprets shelter care as a
level of foster care and will pay for shelter care costs [pursuant to section 234.35]”); 1992 Op.
Att’y Gen. 26 (#91-5-2(L)) (foster care includes “emergency shelter care”).  Cf. Iowa Code 
§ 237.15(2)(a) (“child receiving foster care” means “a child defined in section 234.1 [whose
placement] is the financial responsibility of the state pursuant to section 234.35").
In suggesting that counties may have grounds in chapter 234 for pursuing reimbursement
from the parents for the cost of shelter care services, you specifically refer to the opening
sentence of section 234.39:  “the intent of [chapter 234 is] that an individual receiving foster care
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services and the individual’s parents or guardians shall have primary responsibility for paying the
cost of the care and services.”  We do not believe that this general statement of legislative intent 
-- isolated from the rest of section 234.39 -- provides counties with a right to recoup their
unreimbursed expenses from parents.  See generally Telegraph Herald, Inc. v. City of Dubuque,
297 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Iowa 1980) (statute must be read as part of a whole).  
Viewing section 234.39 in its entirety, we see that the general statement of placing upon
the parents the “primary responsibility” for paying the cost of care and services only extends to
the care and services rendered by the State.  Section 234.39 does not extend parental liability to
the cost of care and services rendered by counties.  See generally 1978 Op. Att’y Gen. 473, 478
(observing that the cost of foster care was originally borne by the counties, that section 234.39
was passed as part of a measure relieving them of this cost, and that the cost reverts back to the
counties when appropriated funds are exhausted and legislature refuses a supplemental
appropriation).  Nowhere in its detailed provisions does section 234.39 specifically authorize
counties to recoup from parents the expenses incurred in providing shelter care services that the
State does not reimburse; in fact, section 234.39 does not mention counties at all.  Had the
General Assembly intended for parental liability to encompass the unreimbursed expenses
incurred by counties in providing shelter care services, it could have made express provision for
such authority.  Compare Iowa Code § 234.39 with Iowa Code § 232.52(2)(c)(2) (expressly
providing for court orders requiring parents to reimburse county for care and treatment for
children who commit delinquent acts), § 252.13 (expressly authorizing counties to recover
expenses, for supporting poor persons, from relatives within two years of paying expenses).  
We note that neither prior opinion, administrative rule nor case discussing section 234.39 
indicates that the General Assembly has conferred upon counties the authority to pursue
reimbursement from the parents for any portion of those expenses the State does not reimburse
for the provision of shelter care services.  See generally 441 IAC chs. 99, 156; In re B.G., 508
N.W.2d 687, 688 (Iowa 1993); 1996 Op. Att’y Gen. 84, 84, 85 (section 234.39 concerns parental
liability for support of a child receiving foster care services from the State; parents have a duty
under section 234.39 to repay the state for public assistance expended on minor children pursuant
to foster care placement). 
 
III.  Summary
When counties incur expenses for providing children with shelter care services that the
State does not reimburse, Iowa Code section 234.39 does not authorize counties to pursue
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reimbursement for those expenses from the parents.1
Sincerely,
Bruce Kempkes
Assistant Attorney General
  We understand that you also want to know whether the common law -- under which1
parents generally bear the responsibility for a child’s care and support, 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent &
Child § 14, at 146 (1987) -- provides counties with a basis for seeking reimbursement from
parents for the provision of shelter care services.  This office, however, “does not render official
opinions describing theories of liability or recovery in litigation.  The function of an . . . opinion
is to resolve issues of law to govern public officials without the need to resort to litigation.” 
1990 Op. Att’y Gen. 52 (#89-11-4(L)). 
